If FWD-TSN chunk is received with bad stream ID, the sctp will not do the
validity check, this may cause memory overflow when overwrite the TSN of
the stream ID.
The FORWARD-TSN chunk is like this:
FORWARD-TSN chunk
Type = 192
Flags = 0
Length = 172
NewTSN = 99
Stream = 10000
StreamSequence = 0xFFFF
This patch fix this problem by discard the chunk if stream ID is not
less than MIS.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Using NIPQUAD() with NIPQUAD_FMT, %d.%d.%d.%d or %u.%u.%u.%u
can be replaced with %pI4
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Once an endpoint has reached the SHUTDOWN-RECEIVED state,
it MUST NOT send a SHUTDOWN in response to a ULP request.
The Cumulative TSN Ack of the received SHUTDOWN chunk
MUST be processed.
This patch fix to process Cumulative TSN Ack of the received
SHUTDOWN chunk in SHUTDOWN_RECEIVED state.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If SHUTDOWN chunk is received Cumulative TSN Ack beyond the max tsn currently
send, SHUTDOWN chunk be accepted and the association will be broken. New data
is send, but after received SACK it will be drop because TSN in SACK is less
than the Cumulative TSN, data will be retrans again and again even if correct
SACK is received.
The packet sequence is like this:
Endpoint A Endpoint B ULP
(ESTABLISHED) (ESTABLISHED)
<----------- DATA (TSN=x-1)
<----------- DATA (TSN=x)
SHUTDOWN -----------> (Now Cumulative TSN=x+1000)
(TSN=x+1000)
<----------- DATA (TSN=x+1)
SACK -----------> drop the SACK
(TSN=x+1)
<----------- DATA (TSN=x+1)(retrans)
This patch fix this problem by terminating the association and respond to
the sender with an ABORT.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The T5 timer is the timer for the over-all shutdown procedure. If
this timer expires, then shutdown procedure has not completed and we
ABORT the association. We should update SCTP_MIB_ABORTED and
SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB when aborting.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If ABORT chunks require authentication and a protocol violation
is triggered, we do not tear down the association. Subsequently,
we should not increment SCTP_MIB_ABORTED.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
RFC3873 defined SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB:
sctpCurrEstab OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Gauge32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of associations for which the current state is
either ESTABLISHED, SHUTDOWN-RECEIVED or SHUTDOWN-PENDING."
REFERENCE
"Section 4 in RFC2960 covers the SCTP Association state
diagram."
If the T4 RTO timer expires many times(timeout), the association will enter
CLOSED state, so we should dec the number of SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB, not inc the
number of SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch enables cookie-echo retransmission transport switch
feature. If COOKIE-ECHO retransmission happens, it will be sent
to the address other than the one last sent to.
Signed-off-by: Gui Jianfeng <guijianfeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
RFC3873 defined SCTP_MIB_OUTOFBLUES:
sctpOutOfBlues OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of out of the blue packets received by the host.
An out of the blue packet is an SCTP packet correctly formed,
including the proper checksum, but for which the receiver was
unable to identify an appropriate association."
REFERENCE
"Section 8.4 in RFC2960 deals with the Out-Of-The-Blue
(OOTB) packet definition and procedures."
But OOTB packet INIT, INIT-ACK and SHUTDOWN-ACK(COOKIE-WAIT or
COOKIE-ECHOED state) are not counted by SCTP_MIB_OUTOFBLUES.
Case 1(INIT):
Endpoint A Endpoint B
(CLOSED) (CLOSED)
INIT ---------->
<---------- ABORT
Case 2(INIT-ACK):
Endpoint A Endpoint B
(CLOSED) (CLOSED)
INIT-ACK ---------->
<---------- ABORT
Case 3(SHUTDOWN-ACK):
Endpoint A Endpoint B
(CLOSED) (CLOSED)
<---------- INIT
SHUTDOWN-ACK ---------->
<---------- SHUTDOWN-COMPLETE
Case 4(SHUTDOWN-ACK):
Endpoint A Endpoint B
(CLOSED) (COOKIE-ECHOED)
SHUTDOWN-ACK ---------->
<---------- SHUTDOWN-COMPLETE
This patch fixed the problem.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
RFC 4960: Section 9.2
The sender of the SHUTDOWN MAY also start an overall guard timer
'T5-shutdown-guard' to bound the overall time for the shutdown
sequence. At the expiration of this timer, the sender SHOULD abort
the association by sending an ABORT chunk. If the 'T5-shutdown-
guard' timer is used, it SHOULD be set to the recommended value of 5
times 'RTO.Max'.
The timer 'T5-shutdown-guard' is used to counter the overall time
for shutdown sequence, and it's start by the sender of the SHUTDOWN.
So timer 'T5-shutdown-guard' should be start when we send the first
SHUTDOWN chunk and enter the SHUTDOWN-SENT state, not start when we
receipt of the SHUTDOWN primitive and enter SHUTDOWN-PENDING state.
If 'T5-shutdown-guard' timer is start at SHUTDOWN-PENDING state, the
association may be ABORT while data is still transmitting.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Since call to function sctp_sf_abort_violation() need paramter 'arg' with
'struct sctp_chunk' type, it will read the chunk type and chunk length from
the chunk_hdr member of chunk. But call to sctp_sf_violation_paramlen()
always with 'struct sctp_paramhdr' type's parameter, it will be passed to
sctp_sf_abort_violation(). This may cause kernel panic.
sctp_sf_violation_paramlen()
|-- sctp_sf_abort_violation()
|-- sctp_make_abort_violation()
This patch fixed this problem. This patch also fix two place which called
sctp_sf_violation_paramlen() with wrong paramter type.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If we don't have the buffer space or memory allocations fail,
the data chunk is dropped, but TSN is still reported as received.
This introduced a data loss that can't be recovered. We should
only mark TSNs are received after memory allocations finish.
The one exception is the invalid stream identifier, but that's
due to user error and is reported back to the user.
This was noticed by Michael Tuexen.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
RFC 4960, Section 11.4. Protection of Non-SCTP-Capable Hosts
When an SCTP stack receives a packet containing multiple control or
DATA chunks and the processing of the packet requires the sending of
multiple chunks in response, the sender of the response chunk(s) MUST
NOT send more than one packet. If bundling is supported, multiple
response chunks that fit into a single packet MAY be bundled together
into one single response packet. If bundling is not supported, then
the sender MUST NOT send more than one response chunk and MUST
discard all other responses. Note that this rule does NOT apply to a
SACK chunk, since a SACK chunk is, in itself, a response to DATA and
a SACK does not require a response of more DATA.
We implement this by not servicing our outqueue until we reach the end
of the packet. This enables maximum bundling. We also identify
'response' chunks and make sure that we only send 1 packet when sending
such chunks.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Replacing (almost) all invocations of list_for_each() with
list_for_each_entry() tightens up the code and allows for the deletion
of numerous list iterator variables that are no longer necessary.
Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@crashcourse.ca>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fix 3 warnings about discarding const qualifiers:
net/sctp/ulpevent.c:862: warning: passing argument 1 of 'sctp_event2skb' discards qualifiers from pointer target type
net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c:4393: warning: passing argument 1 of 'SCTP_ASOC' discards qualifiers from pointer target type
net/sctp/socket.c:5874: warning: passing argument 1 of 'cmsg_nxthdr' discards qualifiers from pointer target type
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When receiving an error length INIT-ACK during COOKIE-WAIT,
a 0-vtag ABORT will be responsed. This action violates the
protocol apparently. This patch achieves the following things.
1 If the INIT-ACK contains all the fixed parameters, use init-tag
recorded from INIT-ACK as vtag.
2 If the INIT-ACK doesn't contain all the fixed parameters,
just reflect its vtag.
Signed-off-by: Gui Jianfeng <guijianfeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
With a was number of callsites sctp_add_cmd_sf wrapper bloats
kernel by some amount. Due to unlikely tracking allyesconfig,
with the initial result were around ~7kB (thus caught my
attention) while a non-debug config produced only ~2.3kB effect.
I (ij) proposed first a patch to uninline it but Vlad responded
with a patch that removed the only sctp_add_cmd call which is
wrapped by sctp_add_cmd_sf (I wasn't sure if I could do that).
I did minor cleanup to Vlad's patch.
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
__FUNCTION__ is gcc-specific, use __func__
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
RFC 3873 specifies several MIB objects that can't be obtained by the
current data set exported by /proc/sys/net/sctp/assoc. This patch
adds the missing pieces of data that allow us to compute all the
objects in the sctpAssocTable object.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
I was notified by Randy Stewart that lksctp claims to be
"the reference implementation". First of all, "the
refrence implementation" was the original implementation
of SCTP in usersapce written ty Randy and a few others.
Second, after looking at the definiton of 'reference implementation',
we don't really meet the requirements.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
If STCP is started while /proc/sys/net/sctp/auth_enable is set 0 and
association is established between endpoints. Then if
/proc/sys/net/sctp/auth_enable is set 1, a received AUTH chunk will
cause kernel panic.
Test as following:
step 1: echo 0> /proc/sys/net/sctp/auth_enable
step 2:
SCTP client SCTP server
INIT --------->
<--------- INIT-ACK
COOKIE-ECHO --------->
<--------- COOKIE-ACK
step 3:
echo 1> /proc/sys/net/sctp/auth_enable
step 4:
SCTP client SCTP server
AUTH -----------> Kernel Panic
This patch fix this probleam to treat AUTH chunk as unknow chunk if peer
has initialized with no auth capable.
> Sorry for the delay. Was on vacation without net access.
>
> Wei Yongjun wrote:
>>
>>
>> This patch fix this probleam to treat AUTH chunk as unknow chunk if
>> peer has initialized with no auth capable.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
>
> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
>
>>
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When parameter validation fails, there should be error causes that
specify what type of failure we've encountered. If the causes are not
there, we lacked memory to allocated them. Thus make that the default
value for the error.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Reported by Andrew Morton.
net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c: In function 'sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack':
net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c:484: warning: 'error' may be used uninitialized in this function
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch introduces new memory accounting functions for each network
protocol. Most of them are renamed from memory accounting functions
for stream protocols. At the same time, some stream memory accounting
functions are removed since other functions do same thing.
Renaming:
sk_stream_free_skb() -> sk_wmem_free_skb()
__sk_stream_mem_reclaim() -> __sk_mem_reclaim()
sk_stream_mem_reclaim() -> sk_mem_reclaim()
sk_stream_mem_schedule -> __sk_mem_schedule()
sk_stream_pages() -> sk_mem_pages()
sk_stream_rmem_schedule() -> sk_rmem_schedule()
sk_stream_wmem_schedule() -> sk_wmem_schedule()
sk_charge_skb() -> sk_mem_charge()
Removeing
sk_stream_rfree(): consolidates into sock_rfree()
sk_stream_set_owner_r(): consolidates into skb_set_owner_r()
sk_stream_mem_schedule()
The following functions are added.
sk_has_account(): check if the protocol supports accounting
sk_mem_uncharge(): do the opposite of sk_mem_charge()
In addition, to achieve consolidation, updating sk_wmem_queued is
removed from sk_mem_charge().
Next, to consolidate memory accounting functions, this patch adds
memory accounting calls to network core functions. Moreover, present
memory accounting call is renamed to new accounting call.
Finally we replace present memory accounting calls with new interface
in TCP and SCTP.
Signed-off-by: Takahiro Yasui <tyasui@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hideo Aoki <haoki@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The Security Considerations section of RFC 5061 has the following
text:
If an SCTP endpoint that supports this extension receives an INIT
that indicates that the peer supports the ASCONF extension but does
NOT support the [RFC4895] extension, the receiver of such an INIT
MUST send an ABORT in response. Note that an implementation is
allowed to silently discard such an INIT as an option as well, but
under NO circumstance is an implementation allowed to proceed with
the association setup by sending an INIT-ACK in response.
An implementation that receives an INIT-ACK that indicates that the
peer does not support the [RFC4895] extension MUST NOT send the
COOKIE-ECHO to establish the association. Instead, the
implementation MUST discard the INIT-ACK and report to the upper-
layer user that an association cannot be established destroying the
Transmission Control Block (TCB).
Follow the recomendations.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
ADD-IP spec has a special case for processing ABORTs:
F4) ... One special consideration is that ABORT
Chunks arriving destined to the IP address being deleted MUST be
ignored (see Section 5.3.1 for further details).
Check if the address we received on is in the DEL state, and if
so, ignore the ABORT.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The processing of the ASCONF chunks has changed a lot in the
spec. New items are:
1. A list of ASCONF-ACK chunks is now cached
2. The source of the packet is used in response.
3. New handling for unexpect ASCONF chunks.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Now that we support AUTH, discard unauthenticated ASCONF and ASCONF ACK
chunks as mandated in the ADD-IP spec.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When processing an unexpected INIT chunk, we do not need to
do any preservation of the old AUTH parameters. In fact,
doing such preservations will nullify AUTH and allow connection
stealing.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Our treatment of Heartbeats is special in that the inital HB chunk
counts against the error count for the association, where as for
other chunks, only retransmissions or timeouts count against us.
As a result, we had an off-by-1 situation with a number of
Heartbeats we could send.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
In net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c::sctp_sf_abort_violation() we may leak
the storage allocated for 'abort' by returning from the function
without using or freeing it. This happens in case
"sctp_auth_recv_cid(SCTP_CID_ABORT, asoc)" is true and we jump to
the 'discard' label.
Spotted by the Coverity checker.
The simple fix is to simply move the creation of the "abort chunk"
to after the possible jump to the 'discard' label. This way we don't
even have to allocate the memory at all in the problem case.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Commit d0ce92910b broke several retransmit
cases including fast retransmit. The reason is that we should
only delay by rto while doing retranmists as a result of a timeout.
Retransmit as a result of path mtu discover, fast retransmit, or
other evernts that should trigger immidiate retransmissions got broken.
Also, since rto is doubled prior to marking of packets elegable for
retransmission, we never marked correct chunks anyway.
The fix is provide a reason for a given retransmission so that we
can mark chunks appropriately and to save the old rto value to do
comparisons against.
All regressions tests passed with this code.
Spotted by Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Add SCTP-AUTH API. The API implemented here was
agreed to between implementors at the 9th SCTP Interop.
It will be documented in the next revision of the
SCTP socket API spec.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch implements the receive path needed to process authenticated
chunks. Add ability to process the AUTH chunk and handle edge cases
for authenticated COOKIE-ECHO as well.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Implement processing for the CHUNKS, RANDOM, and HMAC parameters and
deal with how this parameters are effected by association restarts.
In particular, during unexpeted INIT processing, we need to reply with
parameters from the original INIT chunk. Also, after restart, we need
to update the old association with new peer parameters and change the
association shared keys.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch introduces autotuning to the sctp buffer management code
similar to the TCP. The buffer space can be grown if the advertised
receive window still has room. This might happen if small message
sizes are used, which is common in telecom environmens.
New tunables are introduced that provide limits to buffer growth
and memory pressure is entered if to much buffer spaces is used.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If ADDIP is enabled, when an ASCONF chunk is received with ASCONF
paramter length set to zero, this will cause infinite loop.
By the way, if an malformed ASCONF chunk is received, will cause
processing to access memory without verifying.
This is because of not check the validity of parameters in ASCONF chunk.
This patch fixed this.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
While processing OOTB chunks as well as chunks with an invalid
length of 0, it was possible to SCTP to get wedged inside an
infinite loop because we didn't catch the condition correctly,
or didn't mark the packet for discard correctly.
This work is based on original findings and work by
Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Explicitely discard OOTB chunks, whether the result is a
SHUTDOWN COMPLETE or an ABORT. We need to discard the OOTB
SHUTDOWN ACK to prevent bombing attackes since responsed
MUST NOT be bundled. We also explicietely discard in the
ABORT case since that function is widely used internally.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
When SCTP client received an INIT ACK chunk with missing mandatory
parameter such as "cookie parameter", it will send back a ABORT
with T-bit not set and verification tag is set to 0.
This is because before we accept this INIT ACK chunk, we do not know
the peer's tag. This patch change to reflect vtag when responding to
INIT ACK with missing mandatory parameter.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Currently we abort on the INIT chunk we our backlog is currenlty
exceeded. Delay this about untill COOKIE-ECHO to give the user
time to accept the socket. Also, make sure that we treat
sk_max_backlog of 0 as no connections allowed.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
When multi bundling SHUTDOWN-ACK message is received in ESTAB state,
this will cause "sctp protocol violation state" message print many times.
If SHUTDOWN-ACK is bundled 300 times in one packet, message will be
print 300 times. The same problem also exists when received unexpected
HEARTBEAT-ACK message which is bundled message times.
This patch used net_ratelimit() to suppress error messages print too fast.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
PROTOCOL VIOLATION error cause in ABORT is bad encode when make abort
chunk. When SCTP encode ABORT chunk with PROTOCOL VIOLATION error cause,
it just add the error messages to PROTOCOL VIOLATION error cause, the
rest four bytes(struct sctp_paramhdr) is just add to the chunk, not
change the length of error cause. This cause the ABORT chunk to be a bad
format. The chunk is like this:
ABORT chunk
Chunk type: ABORT (6)
Chunk flags: 0x00
Chunk length: 72 (*1)
Protocol violation cause
Cause code: Protocol violation (0x000d)
Cause length: 62 (*2)
Cause information: 5468652063756D756C61746976652074736E2061636B2062...
Cause padding: 0000
[Needless] 00030010
Chunk Length(*1) = 72 but Cause length(*2) only 62, not include the
extend 4 bytes.
((72 - sizeof(chunk_hdr)) = 68) != (62 +3) / 4 * 4
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
