In Ubuntu, security_path_*() hooks are exported to Unionfs. Thus, prepare for
being called from inside VFS functions because I'm not sure whether it is safe
to use GFP_KERNEL or not.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The ACPI dependency moved to the TPM, where it belongs. Although
IMA per-se does not require access to the bios measurement log,
verifying the IMA boot aggregate does, which requires ACPI.
This patch prereq's 'TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal'
http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/4/378.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Jean-Christophe Dubois <jcd@tribudubois.net>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch pushes the ACPI dependency into the device driver code
itself. Now, even without ACPI/PNP enabled, the device can be registered
using the TIS specified memory space. This will however result in the
lack of access to the bios event log, being the only implication of such
ACPI removal.
Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
On Tue, 2010-04-27 at 11:47 -0700, David Miller wrote:
> From: "Tom \"spot\" Callaway" <tcallawa@redhat.com>
> Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2010 14:20:21 -0400
>
> > [root@apollo ~]$ cat /proc/2174/maps
> > 00010000-00014000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 15466577
> > /sbin/mingetty
> > 00022000-00024000 rwxp 00002000 fd:00 15466577
> > /sbin/mingetty
> > 00024000-00046000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0
> > [heap]
>
> SELINUX probably barfs on the executable heap, the PLT is in the HEAP
> just like powerpc32 and that's why VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS has to set
> both executable and writable.
>
> You also can't remove the CONFIG_PPC32 ifdefs in selinux, since
> because of the VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS setting used still in that arch,
> the heap will always have executable permission, just like sparc does.
> You have to support those binaries forever, whether you like it or not.
>
> Let's just replace the CONFIG_PPC32 ifdef in SELINUX with CONFIG_PPC32
> || CONFIG_SPARC as in Tom's original patch and let's be done with
> this.
>
> In fact I would go through all the arch/ header files and check the
> VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS settings and add the necessary new ifdefs to the
> SELINUX code so that other platforms don't have the pain of having to
> go through this process too.
To avoid maintaining per-arch ifdefs, it seems that we could just
directly use (VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC) as the basis for deciding
whether to enable or disable these checks. VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS isn't
constant on some architectures but instead depends on
current->personality, but we want this applied uniformly. So we'll just
use the initial task state to determine whether or not to enable these
checks.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Most of the LSM common audit work uses LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* for the naming.
This was not so for LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT which means the generic initializer
cannot be used. This patch just renames the flag so the generic
initializer can be used.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Change the credentials documentation to make it clear that the RCU read lock
must be explicitly held when accessing credentials pointers in some other task
than current. Holding a spinlock does not implicitly hold the RCU read lock.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Redirecting directly to lsm, here's the patch discussed on lkml:
http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/4/22/219
The mmap_min_addr value is useful information for an admin to see without
being root ("is my system vulnerable to kernel NULL pointer attacks?") and
its setting is trivially easy for an attacker to determine by calling
mmap() in PAGE_SIZE increments starting at 0, so trying to keep it private
has no value.
Only require CAP_SYS_RAWIO if changing the value, not reading it.
Comment from Serge :
Me, I like to write my passwords with light blue pen on dark blue
paper, pasted on my window - if you're going to get my password, you're
gonna get a headache.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
As an example IMA emits a warning when it can't find a TPM chip:
"No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!"
This patch prefaces that message with IMA so we know what subsystem is
bypassing the TPM. Do this for all pr_info and pr_err messages.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
integrity_audit_msg() uses "integrity:" in the audit message. This
violates the (loosely defined) audit system requirements that everything be
a key=value pair and it doesn't provide additional information. This can
be obviously gleaned from the message type. Just drop it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Convert all of the places IMA calls audit_log_format with %s into
audit_log_untrusted_string(). This is going to cause them all to get
quoted, but it should make audit log injection harder.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
IMA policy load parser will reject any policies with a comment. This patch
will allow the parser to just ignore lines which start with a #. This is not
very robust. # can ONLY be used at the very beginning of a line. Inline
comments are not allowed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
IMA parser will fail if whitespace is used in any way other than a single
space. Using a tab or even using 2 spaces in a row will result in a policy
being rejected. This patch makes the kernel ignore whitespace a bit better.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently the ima policy load code will print what it doesn't understand
but really I think it should reject any policy it doesn't understand. This
patch makes it so!
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
ima_parse_rule currently sets entry->action = -1 and then later tests
if (entry->action == UNKNOWN). It is true that UNKNOWN == -1 but actually
setting it to UNKNOWN makes a lot more sense in case things change in the
future.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
IMA will accept rules which specify things twice and will only pay
attention to the last one. We should reject such rules.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently IMA will only accept one rule per write(). This patch allows IMA to
accept writes which contain multiple rules but only processes one rule per
write. \n is used as the delimiter between rules. IMA will return a short
write indicating that it only accepted up to the first \n.
This allows simple userspace utilities like cat to be used to load an IMA
policy instead of needing a special userspace utility that understood 'one
write per rule'
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
policy load failure always return EINVAL even if the failure was for some
other reason (usually ENOMEM). This patch passes error codes back up the
stack where they will make their way to userspace. This might help in
debugging future problems with policy load.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In the comment of cap_file_mmap(), replace mmap_min_addr to be dac_mmap_min_addr.
Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This is an unused hook in SMACK so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
trying to grep everything that messes with a sk_security_struct isn't easy
since we don't always call it sksec. Just rename everything sksec.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a MAINTAINERS record for the key management facility.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/joern/logfs:
[LogFS] Erase new journal segments
[LogFS] Move reserved segments with journal
[LogFS] Clear PagePrivate when moving journal
Simplify and fix pad_wbuf
Prevent data corruption in logfs_rewrite_block()
Use deactivate_locked_super
Fix logfs_get_sb_final error path
Write out both superblocks on mismatch
Prevent schedule while atomic in __logfs_readdir
Plug memory leak in writeseg_end_io
Limit max_pages for insane devices
Open segment file before using it
* 'x86-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
x86: Do not free zero sized per cpu areas
x86: Make sure free_init_pages() frees pages on page boundary
x86: Make smp_locks end with page alignment
Fix a memory leak on an OOM condition in prepare_usermodehelper_creds().
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* 'upstream-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jlbec/ocfs2:
ocfs2: Fix a race in o2dlm lockres mastery
Ocfs2: Handle deletion of reflinked oprhan inodes correctly.
Ocfs2: Journaling i_flags and i_orphaned_slot when adding inode to orphan dir.
ocfs2: Clear undo bits when local alloc is freed
ocfs2: Init meta_ac properly in ocfs2_create_empty_xattr_block.
ocfs2: Fix the update of name_offset when removing xattrs
ocfs2: Always try for maximum bits with new local alloc windows
ocfs2: set i_mode on disk during acl operations
ocfs2: Update i_blocks in reflink operations.
ocfs2: Change bg_chain check for ocfs2_validate_gd_parent.
[PATCH] Skip check for mandatory locks when unlocking
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6: (33 commits)
r8169: offical fix for CVE-2009-4537 (overlength frame DMAs)
ipv6: Don't drop cache route entry unless timer actually expired.
tulip: Add missing parens.
r8169: fix broken register writes
pcnet_cs: add new id
bonding: fix broken multicast with round-robin mode
drivers/net: Fix continuation lines
e1000: do not modify tx_queue_len on link speed change
net: ipmr/ip6mr: prevent out-of-bounds vif_table access
ixgbe: Do not run all Diagnostic offline tests when VFs are active
igb: use correct bits to identify if managability is enabled
benet: Fix compile warnnings in drivers/net/benet/be_ethtool.c
net: Add MSG_WAITFORONE flag to recvmmsg
e1000e: do not modify tx_queue_len on link speed change
igbvf: do not modify tx_queue_len on link speed change
ipv4: Restart rt_intern_hash after emergency rebuild (v2)
ipv4: Cleanup struct net dereference in rt_intern_hash
net: fix netlink address dumping in IPv4/IPv6
tulip: Fix null dereference in uli526x_rx_packet()
gianfar: fix undo of reserve()
...
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/sparc-2.6:
sparc64: Properly truncate pt_regs framepointer in perf callback.
arch/sparc/kernel: Use set_cpus_allowed_ptr
sparc: Fix use of uid16_t and gid16_t in asm/stat.h
In commit 9df93939b7 ("ext3: Use bitops to read/modify
EXT3_I(inode)->i_state") ext3 changed its internal 'i_state' variable to
use bitops for its state handling. However, unline the same ext4
change, it didn't actually change the name of the field when it changed
the semantics of it.
As a result, an old use of 'i_state' remained in fs/ext3/ialloc.c that
initialized the field to EXT3_STATE_NEW. And that does not work
_at_all_ when we're now working with individually named bits rather than
values that get masked. So the code tried to mark the state to be new,
but in actual fact set the field to EXT3_STATE_JDATA. Which makes no
sense at all, and screws up all the code that checks whether the inode
was newly allocated.
In particular, it made the xattr code unhappy, and caused various random
behavior, like apparently
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=577911
So fix the initialization, and rename the field to match ext4 so that we
don't have this happen again.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
