eed84f94ff
[ commit d3bd7413e0ca40b60cf60d4003246d067cafdeda upstream ] While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer came from two different map values with different map properties such as value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program instead. Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
236 lines
8.1 KiB
C
236 lines
8.1 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
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* License as published by the Free Software Foundation.
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*/
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#ifndef _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H
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#define _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H 1
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#include <linux/bpf.h> /* for enum bpf_reg_type */
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#include <linux/filter.h> /* for MAX_BPF_STACK */
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#include <linux/tnum.h>
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/* Maximum variable offset umax_value permitted when resolving memory accesses.
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* In practice this is far bigger than any realistic pointer offset; this limit
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* ensures that umax_value + (int)off + (int)size cannot overflow a u64.
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*/
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#define BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF (1 << 29)
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/* Maximum variable size permitted for ARG_CONST_SIZE[_OR_ZERO]. This ensures
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* that converting umax_value to int cannot overflow.
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*/
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#define BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ (1 << 29)
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/* Liveness marks, used for registers and spilled-regs (in stack slots).
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* Read marks propagate upwards until they find a write mark; they record that
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* "one of this state's descendants read this reg" (and therefore the reg is
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* relevant for states_equal() checks).
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* Write marks collect downwards and do not propagate; they record that "the
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* straight-line code that reached this state (from its parent) wrote this reg"
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* (and therefore that reads propagated from this state or its descendants
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* should not propagate to its parent).
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* A state with a write mark can receive read marks; it just won't propagate
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* them to its parent, since the write mark is a property, not of the state,
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* but of the link between it and its parent. See mark_reg_read() and
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* mark_stack_slot_read() in kernel/bpf/verifier.c.
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*/
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enum bpf_reg_liveness {
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REG_LIVE_NONE = 0, /* reg hasn't been read or written this branch */
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REG_LIVE_READ, /* reg was read, so we're sensitive to initial value */
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REG_LIVE_WRITTEN, /* reg was written first, screening off later reads */
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};
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struct bpf_reg_state {
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enum bpf_reg_type type;
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union {
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/* valid when type == PTR_TO_PACKET */
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u16 range;
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/* valid when type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP | PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE |
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* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
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*/
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struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
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/* Max size from any of the above. */
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unsigned long raw;
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};
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/* Fixed part of pointer offset, pointer types only */
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s32 off;
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/* For PTR_TO_PACKET, used to find other pointers with the same variable
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* offset, so they can share range knowledge.
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* For PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL this is used to share which map value we
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* came from, when one is tested for != NULL.
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*/
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u32 id;
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/* Ordering of fields matters. See states_equal() */
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/* For scalar types (SCALAR_VALUE), this represents our knowledge of
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* the actual value.
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* For pointer types, this represents the variable part of the offset
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* from the pointed-to object, and is shared with all bpf_reg_states
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* with the same id as us.
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*/
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struct tnum var_off;
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/* Used to determine if any memory access using this register will
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* result in a bad access.
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* These refer to the same value as var_off, not necessarily the actual
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* contents of the register.
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*/
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s64 smin_value; /* minimum possible (s64)value */
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s64 smax_value; /* maximum possible (s64)value */
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u64 umin_value; /* minimum possible (u64)value */
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u64 umax_value; /* maximum possible (u64)value */
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/* Inside the callee two registers can be both PTR_TO_STACK like
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* R1=fp-8 and R2=fp-8, but one of them points to this function stack
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* while another to the caller's stack. To differentiate them 'frameno'
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* is used which is an index in bpf_verifier_state->frame[] array
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* pointing to bpf_func_state.
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* This field must be second to last, for states_equal() reasons.
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*/
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u32 frameno;
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/* This field must be last, for states_equal() reasons. */
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enum bpf_reg_liveness live;
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};
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enum bpf_stack_slot_type {
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STACK_INVALID, /* nothing was stored in this stack slot */
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STACK_SPILL, /* register spilled into stack */
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STACK_MISC, /* BPF program wrote some data into this slot */
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STACK_ZERO, /* BPF program wrote constant zero */
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};
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#define BPF_REG_SIZE 8 /* size of eBPF register in bytes */
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struct bpf_stack_state {
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struct bpf_reg_state spilled_ptr;
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u8 slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE];
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};
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/* state of the program:
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* type of all registers and stack info
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*/
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struct bpf_func_state {
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struct bpf_reg_state regs[MAX_BPF_REG];
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struct bpf_verifier_state *parent;
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/* index of call instruction that called into this func */
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int callsite;
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/* stack frame number of this function state from pov of
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* enclosing bpf_verifier_state.
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* 0 = main function, 1 = first callee.
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*/
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u32 frameno;
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/* subprog number == index within subprog_stack_depth
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* zero == main subprog
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*/
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u32 subprogno;
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/* should be second to last. See copy_func_state() */
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int allocated_stack;
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struct bpf_stack_state *stack;
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};
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#define MAX_CALL_FRAMES 8
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struct bpf_verifier_state {
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/* call stack tracking */
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struct bpf_func_state *frame[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
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struct bpf_verifier_state *parent;
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u32 curframe;
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bool speculative;
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};
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/* linked list of verifier states used to prune search */
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struct bpf_verifier_state_list {
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struct bpf_verifier_state state;
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struct bpf_verifier_state_list *next;
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};
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/* Possible states for alu_state member. */
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#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC 1U
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#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST 2U
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#define BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE (1U << 2)
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#define BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER (1U << 3)
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#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE (BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC | \
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BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST)
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struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
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union {
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enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
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unsigned long map_state; /* pointer/poison value for maps */
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s32 call_imm; /* saved imm field of call insn */
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u32 alu_limit; /* limit for add/sub register with pointer */
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};
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int ctx_field_size; /* the ctx field size for load insn, maybe 0 */
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int sanitize_stack_off; /* stack slot to be cleared */
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bool seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier */
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u8 alu_state; /* used in combination with alu_limit */
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};
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#define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */
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#define BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE 1024
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struct bpf_verifier_log {
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u32 level;
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char kbuf[BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE];
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char __user *ubuf;
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u32 len_used;
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u32 len_total;
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};
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static inline bool bpf_verifier_log_full(const struct bpf_verifier_log *log)
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{
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return log->len_used >= log->len_total - 1;
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}
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static inline bool bpf_verifier_log_needed(const struct bpf_verifier_log *log)
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{
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return log->level && log->ubuf && !bpf_verifier_log_full(log);
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}
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#define BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS 256
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struct bpf_subprog_info {
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u32 start; /* insn idx of function entry point */
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u16 stack_depth; /* max. stack depth used by this function */
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};
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/* single container for all structs
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* one verifier_env per bpf_check() call
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*/
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struct bpf_verifier_env {
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u32 insn_idx;
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u32 prev_insn_idx;
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struct bpf_prog *prog; /* eBPF program being verified */
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const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops;
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struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *head; /* stack of verifier states to be processed */
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int stack_size; /* number of states to be processed */
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bool strict_alignment; /* perform strict pointer alignment checks */
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struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_state; /* current verifier state */
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struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_states; /* search pruning optimization */
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struct bpf_map *used_maps[MAX_USED_MAPS]; /* array of map's used by eBPF program */
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u32 used_map_cnt; /* number of used maps */
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u32 id_gen; /* used to generate unique reg IDs */
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bool allow_ptr_leaks;
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bool seen_direct_write;
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struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux_data; /* array of per-insn state */
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struct bpf_verifier_log log;
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struct bpf_subprog_info subprog_info[BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS + 1];
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u32 subprog_cnt;
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};
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__printf(2, 0) void bpf_verifier_vlog(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
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const char *fmt, va_list args);
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__printf(2, 3) void bpf_verifier_log_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
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const char *fmt, ...);
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static inline struct bpf_reg_state *cur_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
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{
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struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
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return cur->frame[cur->curframe]->regs;
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}
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int bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
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int bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
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int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx);
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#endif /* _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H */
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