c8c05a8eec
This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole, an additional authorization check is added for removing security policies and security associations with security contexts. Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the module. LSM changes: The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM interface. Use: The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy, xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete). SELinux changes: The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
68 lines
1.9 KiB
C
68 lines
1.9 KiB
C
/*
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* SELinux support for the XFRM LSM hooks
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*
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* Author : Trent Jaeger, <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
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*/
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#ifndef _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
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#define _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
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int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
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int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new);
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void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
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int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
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int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
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void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
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int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
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int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir);
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/*
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* Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket)
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*/
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static inline struct inode_security_struct *get_sock_isec(struct sock *sk)
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{
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if (!sk->sk_socket)
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return NULL;
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return SOCK_INODE(sk->sk_socket)->i_security;
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}
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static inline u32 selinux_no_sk_sid(struct flowi *fl)
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{
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/* NOTE: no sock occurs on ICMP reply, forwards, ... */
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/* icmp_reply: authorize as kernel packet */
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if (fl && fl->proto == IPPROTO_ICMP) {
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return SECINITSID_KERNEL;
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}
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return SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
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int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
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int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
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u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk);
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u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
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#else
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static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
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{
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return NF_ACCEPT;
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}
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static inline int selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk)
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{
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return SECSID_NULL;
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}
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static inline int selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
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{
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return SECSID_NULL;
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}
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#endif
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#endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
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