788084aba2
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how much space the LSM should protect. The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR. This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to map some area of low memory. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
28 lines
896 B
Makefile
28 lines
896 B
Makefile
#
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# Makefile for the kernel security code
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#
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obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/
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subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux
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subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack
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subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo
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# always enable default capabilities
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obj-y += commoncap.o min_addr.o
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# Object file lists
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obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o capability.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS) += inode.o
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# Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
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obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o
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ifeq ($(CONFIG_AUDIT),y)
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obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += lsm_audit.o
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endif
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obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG) += root_plug.o
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obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
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# Object integrity file lists
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subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA) += integrity/ima
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obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += integrity/ima/built-in.o
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