6e5882cfa2
Proposed fix for ptep_get_and_clear_full PAE bug. Pte_clear had the same bug, so use the same fix for both. Turns out pmd_clear had it as well, but pgds are not affected. The problem is rather intricate. Page table entries in PAE mode are 64-bits wide, but the only atomic 8-byte write operation available in 32-bit mode is cmpxchg8b, which is expensive (at least on P4), and thus avoided. But it can happen that the processor may prefetch entries into the TLB in the middle of an operation which clears a page table entry. So one must always clear the P-bit in the low word of the page table entry first when clearing it. Since the sequence *ptep = __pte(0) leaves the order of the write dependent on the compiler, it must be coded explicitly as a clear of the low word followed by a clear of the high word. Further, there must be a write memory barrier here to enforce proper ordering by the compiler (and, in the future, by the processor as well). On > 4GB memory machines, the implementation of pte_clear for PAE was clearly deficient, as it could leave virtual mappings of physical memory above 4GB aliased to memory below 4GB in the TLB. The implementation of ptep_get_and_clear_full has a similar bug, although not nearly as likely to occur, since the mappings being cleared are in the process of being destroyed, and should never be dereferenced again. But, as luck would have it, it is possible to trigger bugs even without ever dereferencing these bogus TLB mappings, even if the clear is followed fairly soon after with a TLB flush or invalidation. The problem is that memory above 4GB may now be aliased into the first 4GB of memory, and in fact, may hit a region of memory with non-memory semantics. These regions include AGP and PCI space. As such, these memory regions are not cached by the processor. This introduces the bug. The processor can speculate memory operations, including memory writes, as long as they are committed with the proper ordering. Speculating a memory write to a linear address that has a bogus TLB mapping is possible. Normally, the speculation is harmless. But for cached memory, it does leave the falsely speculated cacheline unmodified, but in a dirty state. This cache line will be eventually written back. If this cacheline happens to intersect a region of memory that is not protected by the cache coherency protocol, it can corrupt data in I/O memory, which is generally a very bad thing to do, and can cause total system failure or just plain undefined behavior. These bugs are extremely unlikely, but the severity is of such magnitude, and the fix so simple that I think fixing them immediately is justified. Also, they are nearly impossible to debug. Signed-off-by: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
69 lines
2.1 KiB
C
69 lines
2.1 KiB
C
#ifndef _I386_PGTABLE_2LEVEL_H
|
|
#define _I386_PGTABLE_2LEVEL_H
|
|
|
|
#include <asm-generic/pgtable-nopmd.h>
|
|
|
|
#define pte_ERROR(e) \
|
|
printk("%s:%d: bad pte %08lx.\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, (e).pte_low)
|
|
#define pgd_ERROR(e) \
|
|
printk("%s:%d: bad pgd %08lx.\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, pgd_val(e))
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Certain architectures need to do special things when PTEs
|
|
* within a page table are directly modified. Thus, the following
|
|
* hook is made available.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define set_pte(pteptr, pteval) (*(pteptr) = pteval)
|
|
#define set_pte_at(mm,addr,ptep,pteval) set_pte(ptep,pteval)
|
|
#define set_pte_atomic(pteptr, pteval) set_pte(pteptr,pteval)
|
|
#define set_pmd(pmdptr, pmdval) (*(pmdptr) = (pmdval))
|
|
|
|
#define pte_clear(mm,addr,xp) do { set_pte_at(mm, addr, xp, __pte(0)); } while (0)
|
|
#define pmd_clear(xp) do { set_pmd(xp, __pmd(0)); } while (0)
|
|
|
|
#define ptep_get_and_clear(mm,addr,xp) __pte(xchg(&(xp)->pte_low, 0))
|
|
#define pte_same(a, b) ((a).pte_low == (b).pte_low)
|
|
#define pte_page(x) pfn_to_page(pte_pfn(x))
|
|
#define pte_none(x) (!(x).pte_low)
|
|
#define pte_pfn(x) ((unsigned long)(((x).pte_low >> PAGE_SHIFT)))
|
|
#define pfn_pte(pfn, prot) __pte(((pfn) << PAGE_SHIFT) | pgprot_val(prot))
|
|
#define pfn_pmd(pfn, prot) __pmd(((pfn) << PAGE_SHIFT) | pgprot_val(prot))
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* All present user pages are user-executable:
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline int pte_exec(pte_t pte)
|
|
{
|
|
return pte_user(pte);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* All present pages are kernel-executable:
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline int pte_exec_kernel(pte_t pte)
|
|
{
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Bits 0, 6 and 7 are taken, split up the 29 bits of offset
|
|
* into this range:
|
|
*/
|
|
#define PTE_FILE_MAX_BITS 29
|
|
|
|
#define pte_to_pgoff(pte) \
|
|
((((pte).pte_low >> 1) & 0x1f ) + (((pte).pte_low >> 8) << 5 ))
|
|
|
|
#define pgoff_to_pte(off) \
|
|
((pte_t) { (((off) & 0x1f) << 1) + (((off) >> 5) << 8) + _PAGE_FILE })
|
|
|
|
/* Encode and de-code a swap entry */
|
|
#define __swp_type(x) (((x).val >> 1) & 0x1f)
|
|
#define __swp_offset(x) ((x).val >> 8)
|
|
#define __swp_entry(type, offset) ((swp_entry_t) { ((type) << 1) | ((offset) << 8) })
|
|
#define __pte_to_swp_entry(pte) ((swp_entry_t) { (pte).pte_low })
|
|
#define __swp_entry_to_pte(x) ((pte_t) { (x).val })
|
|
|
|
void vmalloc_sync_all(void);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* _I386_PGTABLE_2LEVEL_H */
|