6be5cc5246
EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity attacks. The current patchset maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security xattrs, storing the value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. We anticipate other methods for protecting the security extended attributes. This patch reserves the first byte of 'security.evm' as a place holder for the type of method. Changelog v6: - move evm_ima_xattr_type definition to security/integrity/integrity.h - defined a structure for the EVM xattr called evm_ima_xattr_data (based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion) - removed unnecessary memset Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
186 lines
4.6 KiB
C
186 lines
4.6 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
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*
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* Authors:
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* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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* Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
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*
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* File: evm_crypto.c
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* Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/crypto.h>
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#include <linux/xattr.h>
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#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
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#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
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#include "evm.h"
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#define EVMKEY "evm-key"
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#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
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static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
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static int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
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static int init_desc(struct hash_desc *desc)
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{
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int rc;
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desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(evm_hmac, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
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if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
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pr_info("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n",
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evm_hmac, PTR_ERR(desc->tfm));
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rc = PTR_ERR(desc->tfm);
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return rc;
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}
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desc->flags = 0;
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rc = crypto_hash_setkey(desc->tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
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if (rc)
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goto out;
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rc = crypto_hash_init(desc);
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out:
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if (rc)
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crypto_free_hash(desc->tfm);
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return rc;
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}
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/* Protect against 'cutting & pasting' security.evm xattr, include inode
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* specific info.
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*
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* (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete
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* protection.)
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*/
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static void hmac_add_misc(struct hash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
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char *digest)
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{
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struct h_misc {
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unsigned long ino;
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__u32 generation;
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uid_t uid;
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gid_t gid;
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umode_t mode;
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} hmac_misc;
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struct scatterlist sg[1];
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memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc);
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hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
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hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
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hmac_misc.uid = inode->i_uid;
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hmac_misc.gid = inode->i_gid;
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hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
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sg_init_one(sg, &hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc);
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crypto_hash_update(desc, sg, sizeof hmac_misc);
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crypto_hash_final(desc, digest);
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}
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/*
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* Calculate the HMAC value across the set of protected security xattrs.
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*
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* Instead of retrieving the requested xattr, for performance, calculate
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* the hmac using the requested xattr value. Don't alloc/free memory for
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* each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory.
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*/
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int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
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const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
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char *digest)
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{
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struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
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struct hash_desc desc;
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struct scatterlist sg[1];
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char **xattrname;
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size_t xattr_size = 0;
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char *xattr_value = NULL;
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int error;
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int size;
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if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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error = init_desc(&desc);
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if (error)
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return error;
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error = -ENODATA;
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for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) {
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if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value)
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&& !strcmp(*xattrname, req_xattr_name)) {
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error = 0;
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sg_init_one(sg, req_xattr_value, req_xattr_value_len);
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crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, req_xattr_value_len);
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continue;
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}
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size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, *xattrname,
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&xattr_value, xattr_size, GFP_NOFS);
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if (size == -ENOMEM) {
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error = -ENOMEM;
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goto out;
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}
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if (size < 0)
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continue;
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error = 0;
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xattr_size = size;
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sg_init_one(sg, xattr_value, xattr_size);
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crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, xattr_size);
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}
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hmac_add_misc(&desc, inode, digest);
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kfree(xattr_value);
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out:
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crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
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return error;
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}
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/*
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* Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr
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*
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* Expects to be called with i_mutex locked.
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*/
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int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
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const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
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{
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struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
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struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data;
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int rc = 0;
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rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
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xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest);
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if (rc == 0) {
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xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
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rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
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&xattr_data,
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sizeof(xattr_data), 0);
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}
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else if (rc == -ENODATA)
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rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
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return rc;
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}
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/*
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* Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC
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*/
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int evm_init_key(void)
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{
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struct key *evm_key;
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struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
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int rc = 0;
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evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL);
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if (IS_ERR(evm_key))
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return -ENOENT;
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down_read(&evm_key->sem);
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ekp = evm_key->payload.data;
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if (ekp->decrypted_datalen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
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rc = -EINVAL;
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goto out;
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}
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memcpy(evmkey, ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
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out:
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/* burn the original key contents */
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memset(ekp->decrypted_data, 0, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
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up_read(&evm_key->sem);
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key_put(evm_key);
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return rc;
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}
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