a511e1af8b
Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to __key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not. What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring. Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the trustworthiness of a new key. With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through one of the contained keys. Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could be secondarily linked. To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data. If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted() resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code still works correctly with this as it was previously using KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there is no system keyring against which trust can be determined. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
60 lines
2.3 KiB
C
60 lines
2.3 KiB
C
/* X.509 certificate parser internal definitions
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
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*/
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#include <linux/time.h>
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#include <crypto/public_key.h>
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#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
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struct x509_certificate {
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struct x509_certificate *next;
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struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Certificate that signed this one */
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struct public_key *pub; /* Public key details */
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struct public_key_signature *sig; /* Signature parameters */
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char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */
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char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */
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struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Issuer + Serial number */
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struct asymmetric_key_id *skid; /* Subject + subjectKeyId (optional) */
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time64_t valid_from;
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time64_t valid_to;
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const void *tbs; /* Signed data */
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unsigned tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */
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unsigned raw_sig_size; /* Size of sigature */
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const void *raw_sig; /* Signature data */
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const void *raw_serial; /* Raw serial number in ASN.1 */
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unsigned raw_serial_size;
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unsigned raw_issuer_size;
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const void *raw_issuer; /* Raw issuer name in ASN.1 */
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const void *raw_subject; /* Raw subject name in ASN.1 */
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unsigned raw_subject_size;
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unsigned raw_skid_size;
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const void *raw_skid; /* Raw subjectKeyId in ASN.1 */
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unsigned index;
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bool seen; /* Infinite recursion prevention */
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bool verified;
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bool self_signed; /* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */
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bool unsupported_key; /* T if key uses unsupported crypto */
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bool unsupported_sig; /* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */
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};
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/*
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* x509_cert_parser.c
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*/
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extern void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert);
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extern struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen);
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extern int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen);
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/*
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* x509_public_key.c
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*/
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extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert);
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extern int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert);
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