# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
menu "Kernel hardening options"

config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
	bool
	help
	  While the kernel is built with warnings enabled for any missed
	  stack variable initializations, this warning is silenced for
	  anything passed by reference to another function, under the
	  occasionally misguided assumption that the function will do
	  the initialization. As this regularly leads to exploitable
	  flaws, this plugin is available to identify and zero-initialize
	  such variables, depending on the chosen level of coverage.

	  This plugin was originally ported from grsecurity/PaX. More
	  information at:
	   * https://grsecurity.net/
	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/

menu "Memory initialization"

config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
	def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern)

choice
	prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry"
	default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS
	default INIT_STACK_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
	default INIT_STACK_NONE
	help
	  This option enables initialization of stack variables at
	  function entry time. This has the possibility to have the
	  greatest coverage (since all functions can have their
	  variables initialized), but the performance impact depends
	  on the function calling complexity of a given workload's
	  syscalls.

	  This chooses the level of coverage over classes of potentially
	  uninitialized variables. The selected class will be
	  initialized before use in a function.

	config INIT_STACK_NONE
		bool "no automatic initialization (weakest)"
		help
		  Disable automatic stack variable initialization.
		  This leaves the kernel vulnerable to the standard
		  classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits
		  and information exposures.

	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
		bool "zero-init anything passed by reference (very strong)"
		depends on GCC_PLUGINS
		select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
		help
		  Zero-initialize any stack variables that may be passed
		  by reference and had not already been explicitly
		  initialized. This is intended to eliminate all classes
		  of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
		  exposures.

	config INIT_STACK_ALL
		bool "0xAA-init everything on the stack (strongest)"
		depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
		help
		  Initializes everything on the stack with a 0xAA
		  pattern. This is intended to eliminate all classes
		  of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
		  exposures, even variables that were warned to have been
		  left uninitialized.

endchoice

config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
	bool "Report forcefully initialized variables"
	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
	depends on !COMPILE_TEST	# too noisy
	help
	  This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the
	  structleak plugin finds a variable it thinks needs to be
	  initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected
	  by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings.

config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON
	bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on allocation by default"
	help
	  This has the effect of setting "init_on_alloc=1" on the kernel
	  command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_alloc=0".
	  When "init_on_alloc" is enabled, all page allocator and slab
	  allocator memory will be zeroed when allocated, eliminating
	  many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory" flaws, especially
	  heap content exposures. The performance impact varies by
	  workload, but most cases see <1% impact. Some synthetic
	  workloads have measured as high as 7%.

config INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
	bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on free by default"
	help
	  This has the effect of setting "init_on_free=1" on the kernel
	  command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_free=0".
	  Similar to "init_on_alloc", when "init_on_free" is enabled,
	  all page allocator and slab allocator memory will be zeroed
	  when freed, eliminating many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory"
	  flaws, especially heap content exposures. The primary difference
	  with "init_on_free" is that data lifetime in memory is reduced,
	  as anything freed is wiped immediately, making live forensics or
	  cold boot memory attacks unable to recover freed memory contents.
	  The performance impact varies by workload, but is more expensive
	  than "init_on_alloc" due to the negative cache effects of
	  touching "cold" memory areas. Most cases see 3-5% impact. Some
	  synthetic workloads have measured as high as 8%.

endmenu

endmenu