Hi,
This patch adds a new type for 3rd party module use and cleans up a deprecated
message type.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fix some issues Steve Grubb had with the way NetLabel was using the audit
subsystem. This should make NetLabel more consistent with other kernel
generated audit messages specifying configuration changes.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch adds audit support to NetLabel, including six new audit message
types shown below.
#define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_ACCEPT 1406
#define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_DENY 1407
#define AUDIT_MAC_CIPSOV4_ADD 1408
#define AUDIT_MAC_CIPSOV4_DEL 1409
#define AUDIT_MAC_MAP_ADD 1410
#define AUDIT_MAC_MAP_DEL 1411
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When an object is created via a symlink into an audited directory, audit misses
the event due to not having collected the inode data for the directory. Modify
__audit_inode_child() to copy the parent inode data if a parent wasn't found in
audit_names[].
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
When the specified path is an existing file or when it is a symlink, audit
collects the wrong inode number, which causes it to miss the open() event.
Adding a second hook to the open() path fixes this.
Also add audit_copy_inode() to consolidate some code.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Allow to tie upper bits of syscall bitmap in audit rules to kernel-defined
sets of syscalls. Infrastructure, a couple of classes (with 32bit counterparts
for biarch targets) and actual tie-in on i386, amd64 and ia64.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch renames some audit constant definitions and adds
additional definitions used by the following patch. The renaming
avoids ambiguity with respect to the new definitions.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
include/linux/audit.h | 15 ++++++++----
kernel/auditfilter.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++----
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 32 +++++++++++++-------------
4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add support for a rule key, which can be used to tie audit records to audit
rules. This is useful when a watched file is accessed through a link or
symlink, as well as for general audit log analysis.
Because this patch uses a string key instead of an integer key, there is a bit
of extra overhead to do the kstrdup() when a rule fires. However, we're also
allocating memory for the audit record buffer, so it's probably not that
significant. I went ahead with a string key because it seems more
user-friendly.
Note that the user must ensure that filterkeys are unique. The kernel only
checks for duplicate rules.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hpd.com>
In this implementation, audit registers inotify watches on the parent
directories of paths specified in audit rules. When audit's inotify
event handler is called, it updates any affected rules based on the
filesystem event. If the parent directory is renamed, removed, or its
filesystem is unmounted, audit removes all rules referencing that
inotify watch.
To keep things simple, this implementation limits location-based
auditing to the directory entries in an existing directory. Given
a path-based rule for /foo/bar/passwd, the following table applies:
passwd modified -- audit event logged
passwd replaced -- audit event logged, rules list updated
bar renamed -- rule removed
foo renamed -- untracked, meaning that the rule now applies to
the new location
Audit users typically want to have many rules referencing filesystem
objects, which can significantly impact filtering performance. This
patch also adds an inode-number-based rule hash to mitigate this
situation.
The patch is relative to the audit git tree:
http://kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current.git;a=summary
and uses the inotify kernel API:
http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/6/1/145
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch adds audit support to POSIX message queues. It applies cleanly to
the lspp.b15 branch of Al Viro's git tree. There are new auxiliary data
structures, and collection and emission routines in kernel/auditsc.c. New hooks
in ipc/mqueue.c collect arguments from the syscalls.
I tested the patch by building the examples from the POSIX MQ library tarball.
Build them -lrt, not against the old MQ library in the tarball. Here's the URL:
http://www.geocities.com/wronski12/posix_ipc/libmqueue-4.41.tar.gz
Do auditctl -a exit,always -S for mq_open, mq_timedsend, mq_timedreceive,
mq_notify, mq_getsetattr. mq_unlink has no new hooks. Please see the
corresponding userspace patch to get correct output from auditd for the new
record types.
[fixes folded]
Signed-off-by: George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The following patch addresses most of the issues with the IPC_SET_PERM
records as described in:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2006-May/msg00010.html
and addresses the comments I received on the record field names.
To summarize, I made the following changes:
1. Changed sys_msgctl() and semctl_down() so that an IPC_SET_PERM
record is emitted in the failure case as well as the success case.
This matches the behavior in sys_shmctl(). I could simplify the
code in sys_msgctl() and semctl_down() slightly but it would mean
that in some error cases we could get an IPC_SET_PERM record
without an IPC record and that seemed odd.
2. No change to the IPC record type, given no feedback on the backward
compatibility question.
3. Removed the qbytes field from the IPC record. It wasn't being
set and when audit_ipc_obj() is called from ipcperms(), the
information isn't available. If we want the information in the IPC
record, more extensive changes will be necessary. Since it only
applies to message queues and it isn't really permission related, it
doesn't seem worth it.
4. Removed the obj field from the IPC_SET_PERM record. This means that
the kern_ipc_perm argument is no longer needed.
5. Removed the spaces and renamed the IPC_SET_PERM field names. Replaced iuid and
igid fields with ouid and ogid in the IPC record.
I tested this with the lspp.22 kernel on an x86_64 box. I believe it
applies cleanly on the latest kernel.
-- ljk
Signed-off-by: Linda Knippers <linda.knippers@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
1) The audit_ipc_perms() function has been split into two different
functions:
- audit_ipc_obj()
- audit_ipc_set_perm()
There's a key shift here... The audit_ipc_obj() collects the uid, gid,
mode, and SElinux context label of the current ipc object. This
audit_ipc_obj() hook is now found in several places. Most notably, it
is hooked in ipcperms(), which is called in various places around the
ipc code permforming a MAC check. Additionally there are several places
where *checkid() is used to validate that an operation is being
performed on a valid object while not necessarily having a nearby
ipcperms() call. In these locations, audit_ipc_obj() is called to
ensure that the information is captured by the audit system.
The audit_set_new_perm() function is called any time the permissions on
the ipc object changes. In this case, the NEW permissions are recorded
(and note that an audit_ipc_obj() call exists just a few lines before
each instance).
2) Support for an AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM audit message type. This allows
for separate auxiliary audit records for normal operations on an IPC
object and permissions changes. Note that the same struct
audit_aux_data_ipcctl is used and populated, however there are separate
audit_log_format statements based on the type of the message. Finally,
the AUDIT_IPC block of code in audit_free_aux() was extended to handle
aux messages of this new type. No more mem leaks I hope ;-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Hi,
The patch below builds upon the patch sent earlier and adds subject label to
all audit events generated via the netlink interface. It also cleans up a few
other minor things.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The following patch provides selinux interfaces that will allow the audit
system to perform filtering based on the process context (user, role, type,
sensitivity, and clearance). These interfaces will allow the selinux
module to perform efficient matches based on lower level selinux constructs,
rather than relying on context retrievals and string comparisons within
the audit module. It also allows for dominance checks on the mls portion
of the contexts that are impossible with only string comparisons.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Don't include <linux/sched.h> outside __KERNEL__, and split the EM_xxx
definitions out of elf.h into elf-em.h so that audit.h can include just
that and not pollute the namespace any further than it needs to.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Hi,
When a network interface goes into promiscuous mode, its an important security
issue. The attached patch is intended to capture that action and send an
event to the audit system.
The patch carves out a new block of numbers for kernel detected anomalies.
These are events that may indicate suspicious activity. Other examples of
potential kernel anomalies would be: exceeding disk quota, rlimit violations,
changes to syscall entry table.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Hi,
The following patch adds a little more information to the add/remove rule message emitted
by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Attached is a patch that hardwires important SE Linux events to the audit
system. Please Apply.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
This fixes the per-user and per-message-type filtering when syscall
auditing isn't enabled.
[AV: folded followup fix from the same author]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch extends existing audit records with subject/object context
information. Audit records associated with filesystem inodes, ipc, and
tasks now contain SELinux label information in the field "subj" if the
item is performing the action, or in "obj" if the item is the receiver
of an action.
These labels are collected via hooks in SELinux and appended to the
appropriate record in the audit code.
This additional information is required for Common Criteria Labeled
Security Protection Profile (LSPP).
[AV: fixed kmalloc flags use]
[folded leak fixes]
[folded cleanup from akpm (kfree(NULL)]
[folded audit_inode_context() leak fix]
[folded akpm's fix for audit_ipc_perm() definition in case of !CONFIG_AUDIT]
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
- Add a new, 5th filter called "exclude".
- And add a new field AUDIT_MSGTYPE.
- Define a new function audit_filter_exclude() that takes a message type
as input and examines all rules in the filter. It returns '1' if the
message is to be excluded, and '0' otherwise.
- Call the audit_filter_exclude() function near the top of
audit_log_start() just after asserting audit_initialized. If the
message type is not to be audited, return NULL very early, before
doing a lot of work.
[combined with followup fix for bug in original patch, Nov 4, same author]
[combined with later renaming AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE->AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE
and audit_filter_exclude() -> audit_filter_type()]
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch augments the collection of inode info during syscall
processing. It represents part of the functionality that was provided
by the auditfs patch included in RHEL4.
Specifically, it:
- Collects information for target inodes created or removed during
syscalls. Previous code only collects information for the target
inode's parent.
- Adds the audit_inode() hook to syscalls that operate on a file
descriptor (e.g. fchown), enabling audit to do inode filtering for
these calls.
- Modifies filtering code to check audit context for either an inode #
or a parent inode # matching a given rule.
- Modifies logging to provide inode # for both parent and child.
- Protect debug info from NULL audit_names.name.
[AV: folded a later typo fix from the same author]
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The attached patch updates various items for the new user space
messages. Please apply.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Currently, audit only supports the "=" and "!=" operators in the -F
filter rules.
This patch reworks the support for "=" and "!=", and adds support
for ">", ">=", "<", and "<=".
This turned out to be a pretty clean, and simply process. I ended up
using the high order bits of the "field", as suggested by Steve and Amy.
This allowed for no changes whatsoever to the netlink communications.
See the documentation within the patch in the include/linux/audit.h
area, where there is a table that explains the reasoning of the bitmask
assignments clearly.
The patch adds a new function, audit_comparator(left, op, right).
This function will perform the specified comparison (op, which defaults
to "==" for backward compatibility) between two values (left and right).
If the negate bit is on, it will negate whatever that result was. This
value is returned.
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
audit_log() also takes an extra argument, although it's a vararg
function so the compiler didn't really notice.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
audit_log_start() seems to take 3 arguments, but its defined to take
only 2 when AUDIT is turned off.
security/selinux/avc.c:553:75: macro "audit_log_start" passed 3 arguments, but takes just 2
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Don't look up the task by its pid and then use the syscall filtering
helper. Just implement our own filter helper which operates solely on
the information in the netlink_skb_parms.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Add a gfp_mask to audit_log_start() and audit_log(), to reduce the
amount of GFP_ATOMIC allocation -- most of it doesn't need to be
GFP_ATOMIC. Also if the mask includes __GFP_WAIT, then wait up to
60 seconds for the auditd backlog to clear instead of immediately
abandoning the message.
The timeout should probably be made configurable, but for now it'll
suffice that it only happens if auditd is actually running.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
If we have enough rules to fill the netlink buffer space, it'll
deadlock because auditctl isn't ever actually going to read from the
socket until we return, and we aren't going to return until it
reads... so we spawn a kernel thread to spew out the list and then
exit.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
When LOOKUP_PARENT is used, the inode which results is not the inode
found at the pathname. Report the flags so that this doesn't generate
misleading audit records.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Turn the field from a bitmask to an enumeration and add a list to allow
filtering of messages generated by userspace. We also define a list for
file system watches in anticipation of that feature.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
