Suppliment the smkfsroot mount option with another, smkfstransmute,
that does the same thing but also marks the root inode as
transmutting. This allows a freshly created filesystem to
be mounted with a transmutting heirarchy.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Each Smack label that the kernel has seen is added to a
list of labels. The list of access rules for a given subject
label hangs off of the label list entry for the label.
This patch changes the structures that contain subject
labels to point at the label list entry rather that the
label itself. Doing so removes a label list lookup in
smk_access() that was accounting for the largest single
chunk of Smack overhead.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Smack does not provide access controls on IPv6 communications.
This patch introduces a mechanism for maintaining Smack lables
for local IPv6 communications. It is based on labeling local ports.
The behavior should be compatible with any future "real" IPv6
support as it provides no interfaces for users to manipulate
the labeling. Remote IPv6 connections use the ambient label
the same way that unlabeled IPv4 packets are treated.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This patch fixes kernel Oops because of wrong common_audit_data type
in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir().
When SMACK security module is enabled and SMACK logging is on (/smack/logging
is not zero) and you try to delete the file which
1) you cannot delete due to SMACK rules and logging of failures is on
or
2) you can delete and logging of success is on,
you will see following:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000002d7
[<...>] (strlen+0x0/0x28)
[<...>] (audit_log_untrustedstring+0x14/0x28)
[<...>] (common_lsm_audit+0x108/0x6ac)
[<...>] (smack_log+0xc4/0xe4)
[<...>] (smk_curacc+0x80/0x10c)
[<...>] (smack_inode_unlink+0x74/0x80)
[<...>] (security_inode_unlink+0x2c/0x30)
[<...>] (vfs_unlink+0x7c/0x100)
[<...>] (do_unlinkat+0x144/0x16c)
The function smack_inode_unlink() (and smack_inode_rmdir()) need
to log two structures of different types. First of all it does:
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
This will set common audit data type to LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
and store dentry for auditing (by function smk_curacc(), which in turn calls
dump_common_audit_data(), which is actually uses provided data and logs it).
/*
* You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
*/
rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
if (rc == 0) {
/*
* You also need write access to the containing directory
*/
Then this function wants to log anoter data:
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
The function sets inode field, but don't change common_audit_data type.
rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
}
So the dump_common_audit() function incorrectly interprets inode structure
as dentry, and Oops will happen.
This patch reinitializes common_audit_data structures with correct type.
Also I removed unneeded
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
initialization, because both dentry and inode pointers are stored
in the same union.
Signed-off-by: Igor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Kyungmin Park <kyungmin.park@samsung.com>
The data structure allocations being done in prepare_creds
are duplicated in smack_setprocattr. This results in the
structure allocated in prepare_creds being orphaned and
never freed. The duplicate code is removed from
smack_setprocattr.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On 12/20/2011 11:20 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Allow SIGCHLD to be passed to child process without
> explicit policy. This will help to keep the access
> control policy simple and easily maintainable with
> complex applications that require use of multiple
> security contexts. It will also help to keep them
> as isolated as possible.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
I have a slightly different version that applies to the
current smack-next tree.
Allow SIGCHLD to be passed to child process without
explicit policy. This will help to keep the access
control policy simple and easily maintainable with
complex applications that require use of multiple
security contexts. It will also help to keep them
as isolated as possible.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 37 ++++++++-----------------------------
1 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
Smack is integrated with the POSIX capabilities scheme,
using the capabilities CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_MAC_ADMIN to
determine if a process is allowed to ignore Smack checks or
change Smack related data respectively. Smack provides an
additional restriction that if an onlycap value is set
by writing to /smack/onlycap only tasks with that Smack
label are allowed to use CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE.
This change adds CAP_MAC_ADMIN as a capability that is affected
by the onlycap mechanism.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
In January of 2012 Al Viro pointed out three bits of code that
he titled "new_inode_smack bogosities". This patch repairs these
errors.
1. smack_sb_kern_mount() included a NULL check that is impossible.
The check and NULL case are removed.
2. smack_kb_kern_mount() included pointless locking. The locking is
removed. Since this is the only place that lock was used the lock
is removed from the superblock_smack structure.
3. smk_fill_super() incorrectly and unnecessarily set the Smack label
for the smackfs root inode. The assignment has been removed.
Targeted for git://gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
V4 updated to current linux-security#next
Targeted for git://gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Modern application runtime environments like to use
naming schemes that are structured and generated without
human intervention. Even though the Smack limit of 23
characters for a label name is perfectly rational for
human use there have been complaints that the limit is
a problem in environments where names are composed from
a set or sources, including vendor, author, distribution
channel and application name. Names like
softwarehouse-pgwodehouse-coolappstore-mellowmuskrats
are becoming harder to avoid. This patch introduces long
label support in Smack. Labels are now limited to 255
characters instead of the old 23.
The primary reason for limiting the labels to 23 characters
was so they could be directly contained in CIPSO category sets.
This is still done were possible, but for labels that are too
large a mapping is required. This is perfectly safe for communication
that stays "on the box" and doesn't require much coordination
between boxes beyond what would have been required to keep label
names consistent.
The bulk of this patch is in smackfs, adding and updating
administrative interfaces. Because existing APIs can't be
changed new ones that do much the same things as old ones
have been introduced.
The Smack specific CIPSO data representation has been removed
and replaced with the data format used by netlabel. The CIPSO
header is now computed when a label is imported rather than
on use. This results in improved IP performance. The smack
label is now allocated separately from the containing structure,
allowing for larger strings.
Four new /smack interfaces have been introduced as four
of the old interfaces strictly required labels be specified
in fixed length arrays.
The access interface is supplemented with the check interface:
access "Subject Object rwxat"
access2 "Subject Object rwaxt"
The load interface is supplemented with the rules interface:
load "Subject Object rwxat"
load2 "Subject Object rwaxt"
The load-self interface is supplemented with the self-rules interface:
load-self "Subject Object rwxat"
load-self2 "Subject Object rwaxt"
The cipso interface is supplemented with the wire interface:
cipso "Subject lvl cnt c1 c2 ..."
cipso2 "Subject lvl cnt c1 c2 ..."
The old interfaces are maintained for compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Dave Chinner wrote:
> Yes, because you have no idea what the calling context is except
> for the fact that is from somewhere inside filesystem code and the
> filesystem could be holding locks. Therefore, GFP_NOFS is really the
> only really safe way to allocate memory here.
I see. Thank you.
I'm not sure, but can call trace happen where somewhere inside network
filesystem or stackable filesystem code with locks held invokes operations that
involves GFP_KENREL memory allocation outside that filesystem?
----------
[PATCH] SMACK: Fix incorrect GFP_KERNEL usage.
new_inode_smack() which can be called from smack_inode_alloc_security() needs
to use GFP_NOFS like SELinux's inode_alloc_security() does, for
security_inode_alloc() is called from inode_init_always() and
inode_init_always() is called from xfs_inode_alloc() which is using GFP_NOFS.
smack_inode_init_security() needs to use GFP_NOFS like
selinux_inode_init_security() does, for initxattrs() callback function (e.g.
btrfs_initxattrs()) which is called from security_inode_init_security() is
using GFP_NOFS.
smack_audit_rule_match() needs to use GFP_ATOMIC, for
security_audit_rule_match() can be called from audit_filter_user_rules() and
audit_filter_user_rules() is called from audit_filter_user() with RCU read lock
held.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@cschaufler-intel.(none)>
The transmuting directory feature of Smack requires that
the transmuting attribute be explicitly set in all cases.
It seems the users of this facility would expect that the
transmuting attribute be inherited by subdirectories that
are created in a transmuting directory. This does not seem
to add any additional complexity to the understanding of
how the system works.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
A kernel with Smack enabled will fail if tmpfs has xattr support.
Move the initialization of predefined Smack label
list entries to the LSM initialization from the
smackfs setup. This became an issue when tmpfs
acquired xattr support, but was never correct.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This fixes builds where CONFIG_AUDIT is not defined and
CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK=y.
This got introduced by the stack-usage reducation commit 48c62af68a
("LSM: shrink the common_audit_data data union").
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
After shrinking the common_audit_data stack usage for private LSM data I'm
not going to shrink the data union. To do this I'm going to move anything
larger than 2 void * ptrs to it's own structure and require it to be declared
separately on the calling stack. Thus hot paths which don't need more than
a couple pointer don't have to declare space to hold large unneeded
structures. I could get this down to one void * by dealing with the key
struct and the struct path. We'll see if that is helpful after taking care of
networking.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
On some build configurations PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID symbol was not
found when compiling smack_lsm.c. This patch fixes the issue by
explicitly doing #include <linux/personality.h>.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.j.sakkinen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@cschaufler-intel.(none)>
This patch is targeted for the smack-next tree.
This patch takes advantage of the recent changes for performance
and points the packet labels on UDS connect at the output label of
the far side. This makes getsockopt(...SO_PEERCRED...) function
properly. Without this change the getsockopt does not provide any
information.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
There are a number of comments in the Smack code that
are either malformed or include code. This patch cleans
them up.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Al Viro pointed out that the processing of fcntl done
by Smack appeared poorly designed. He was right. There
are three things that required change. Most obviously,
the list of commands that really imply writing is limited
to those involving file locking and signal handling.
The initialization if the file security blob was
incomplete, requiring use of a heretofore unused LSM hook.
Finally, the audit information coming from a helper
masked the identity of the LSM hook. This patch corrects
all three of these defects.
This is targeted for the smack-next tree pending comments.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This patch is targeted for the smack-next tree.
Smack access checks suffer from two significant performance
issues. In cases where there are large numbers of rules the
search of the single list of rules is wasteful. Comparing the
string values of the smack labels is less efficient than a
numeric comparison would.
These changes take advantage of the Smack label list, which
maintains the mapping of Smack labels to secids and optional
CIPSO labels. Because the labels are kept perpetually, an
access check can be done strictly based on the address of the
label in the list without ever looking at the label itself.
Rather than keeping one global list of rules the rules with
a particular subject label can be based off of that label
list entry. The access check need never look at entries that
do not use the current subject label.
This requires that packets coming off the network with
CIPSO direct Smack labels that have never been seen before
be treated carefully. The only case where they could be
delivered is where the receiving socket has an IPIN star
label, so that case is explicitly addressed.
On a system with 39,800 rules (200 labels in all permutations)
a system with this patch runs an access speed test in 5% of
the time of the old version. That should be a best case
improvement. If all of the rules are associated with the
same subject label and all of the accesses are for processes
with that label (unlikely) the improvement is about 30%.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
My @hp.com will no longer be valid starting August 5, 2011 so an update is
necessary. My new email address is employer independent so we don't have
to worry about doing this again any time soon.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
smack_file_lock has a struct path, so use that instead of only the
dentry.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This patch separates and audit message that only contains a dentry from
one that contains a full path. This allows us to make it harder to
misuse the interfaces or for the interfaces to be implemented wrong.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The lsm common audit code has wacky contortions making sure which pieces
of information are set based on if it was given a path, dentry, or
inode. Split this into path and inode to get rid of some of the code
complexity.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY
is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active.
This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails
RCU walks.
Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires
passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least
the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work
with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY
is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active.
This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails
RCU walks.
Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires
passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least
the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work
with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The mmap policy enforcement checks the access of the
SMACK64MMAP subject against the current subject incorrectly.
The check as written works correctly only if the access
rules involved have the same access. This is the common
case, so initial testing did not find a problem.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The mmap policy enforcement was not properly handling the
interaction between the global and local rule lists.
Instead of going through one and then the other, which
missed the important case where a rule specified that
there should be no access, combine the access limitations
where there is a rule in each list.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created
inodes. We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating
process. This new behavior would also take into account the name of the
new object when deciding the new label. This is not the (supposed) full path,
just the last component of the path.
This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating
/etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these
operations. We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some
difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops
to get things set up correctly. This patch does not implement new
behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it
does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook. If no such name
exists it is fine to pass NULL.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
In the embedded world there are often situations
where libraries are updated from a variety of sources,
for a variety of reasons, and with any number of
security characteristics. These differences
might include privilege required for a given library
provided interface to function properly, as occurs
from time to time in graphics libraries. There are
also cases where it is important to limit use of
libraries based on the provider of the library and
the security aware application may make choices
based on that criteria.
These issues are addressed by providing an additional
Smack label that may optionally be assigned to an object,
the SMACK64MMAP attribute. An mmap operation is allowed
if there is no such attribute.
If there is a SMACK64MMAP attribute the mmap is permitted
only if a subject with that label has all of the access
permitted a subject with the current task label.
Security aware applications may from time to time
wish to reduce their "privilege" to avoid accidental use
of privilege. One case where this arises is the
environment in which multiple sources provide libraries
to perform the same functions. An application may know
that it should eschew services made available from a
particular vendor, or of a particular version.
In support of this a secondary list of Smack rules has
been added that is local to the task. This list is
consulted only in the case where the global list has
approved access. It can only further restrict access.
Unlike the global last, if no entry is found on the
local list access is granted. An application can add
entries to its own list by writing to /smack/load-self.
The changes appear large as they involve refactoring
the list handling to accomodate there being more
than one rule list.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Conflicts:
security/smack/smack_lsm.c
Verified and added fix by Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Ok'd by Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
unix_release() can asynchornously set socket->sk to NULL, and
it does so without holding the unix_state_lock() on "other"
during stream connects.
However, the reverse mapping, sk->sk_socket, is only transitioned
to NULL under the unix_state_lock().
Therefore make the security hooks follow the reverse mapping instead
of the forward mapping.
Reported-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In a situation where Smack access rules allow processes
with multiple labels to write to a directory it is easy
to get into a situation where the directory gets cluttered
with files that the owner can't deal with because while
they could be written to the directory a process at the
label of the directory can't write them. This is generally
the desired behavior, but when it isn't it is a real
issue.
This patch introduces a new attribute SMACK64TRANSMUTE that
instructs Smack to create the file with the label of the directory
under certain circumstances.
A new access mode, "t" for transmute, is made available to
Smack access rules, which are expanded from "rwxa" to "rwxat".
If a file is created in a directory marked as transmutable
and if access was granted to perform the operation by a rule
that included the transmute mode, then the file gets the
Smack label of the directory instead of the Smack label of the
creating process.
Note that this is equivalent to creating an empty file at the
label of the directory and then having the other process write
to it. The transmute scheme requires that both the access rule
allows transmutation and that the directory be explicitly marked.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <ext-jarkko.2.sakkinen@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is
running.
Exception: in smack_task_wait() child task is checked
for write access to parent task using label inherited
from the task that forked it.
Fixed issues from previous submit:
- SMACK64EXEC was not read when SMACK64 was not set.
- inode security blob was not updated after setting
SMACK64EXEC
- inode security blob was not updated when removing
SMACK64EXEC
This patch addresses a number of long standing issues
with the way Smack treats UNIX domain sockets.
All access control was being done based on the label of
the file system object. This is inconsistant with the
internet domain, in which access is done based on the
IPIN and IPOUT attributes of the socket. As a result
of the inode label policy it was not possible to use
a UDS socket for label cognizant services, including
dbus and the X11 server.
Support for SCM_PEERSEC on UDS sockets is also provided.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The addition of CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT resulted in a build
failure when CONFIG_PRINTK=n. This is because the capabilities code
which used the new option was built even though the variable in question
didn't exist.
The patch here fixes this by moving the capabilities checks out of the
LSM and into the caller. All (known) LSMs should have been calling the
capabilities hook already so it actually makes the code organization
better to eliminate the hook altogether.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With the (long ago) interface change to have the secid_to_secctx functions
do the string allocation instead of having the caller do the allocation we
lost the ability to query the security server for the length of the
upcoming string. The SECMARK code would like to allocate a netlink skb
with enough length to hold the string but it is just too unclean to do the
string allocation twice or to do the allocation the first time and hold
onto the string and slen. This patch adds the ability to call
security_secid_to_secctx() with a NULL data pointer and it will just set
the slen pointer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
All security modules shouldn't change sched_param parameter of
security_task_setscheduler(). This is not only meaningless, but also
make a harmful result if caller pass a static variable.
This patch remove policy and sched_param parameter from
security_task_setscheduler() becuase none of security module is
using it.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
