The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct
cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise
would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are
here as well.
Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply:
1. The task pins the user struct.
2. The user struct pins its user namespace.
3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it.
User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns
is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code
duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user
namespaces).
When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty
keyrings and a clean group_info.
This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here
is his original patch description:
>I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following
>changes:
>
> (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user
> namespace.
>
> (2) Fixes eCryptFS.
>
> (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent
> with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is
> superfluous.
>
> (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the
> beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts
> at allocation.
>
> (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds
> to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine
> the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred
> struct.
>
> This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the
> reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be
> transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer.
>
> (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under
> preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds().
>
>David
>Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Changelog:
Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments
1. leave thread_keyring alone
2. use current_user_ns() in set_user()
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Surprisingly, but (spotted by Alexey Dobriyan) the uid hash still uses
list_heads, thus occupying twice as much place as it could. Convert it to
hlist_heads.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When a CONFIG_USER_NS=n and a user tries to unshare some namespace other
than the user namespace, the dummy copy_user_ns returns NULL rather than
the old_ns.
This value then gets assigned to task->nsproxy->user_ns, so that a
subsequent setuid, which uses task->nsproxy->user_ns, causes a NULL
pointer deref.
Fix this by returning old_ns.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch enables the unshare of user namespaces.
It adds a new clone flag CLONE_NEWUSER and implements copy_user_ns() which
resets the current user_struct and adds a new root user (uid == 0)
For now, unsharing the user namespace allows a process to reset its
user_struct accounting and uid 0 in the new user namespace should be contained
using appropriate means, for instance selinux
The plan, when the full support is complete (all uid checks covered), is to
keep the original user's rights in the original namespace, and let a process
become uid 0 in the new namespace, with full capabilities to the new
namespace.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at>
Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <agm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Basically, it will allow a process to unshare its user_struct table,
resetting at the same time its own user_struct and all the associated
accounting.
A new root user (uid == 0) is added to the user namespace upon creation.
Such root users have full privileges and it seems that theses privileges
should be controlled through some means (process capabilities ?)
The unshare is not included in this patch.
Changes since [try #4]:
- Updated get_user_ns and put_user_ns to accept NULL, and
get_user_ns to return the namespace.
Changes since [try #3]:
- moved struct user_namespace to files user_namespace.{c,h}
Changes since [try #2]:
- removed struct user_namespace* argument from find_user()
Changes since [try #1]:
- removed struct user_namespace* argument from find_user()
- added a root_user per user namespace
Signed-off-by: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at>
Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <agm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
