Previously virt_addr_valid() was insufficient to validate if virt_to_page()
could be called on an address on arm64. This has since been fixed up so
there is no need for the extra check. Drop it.
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This patch moves the arch_within_stack_frames() return value enum up in
the header files so that per-architecture implementations can reuse the
same return values.
Signed-off-by: Sahara <keun-o.park@darkmatter.ae>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
[kees: adjusted naming and commit log]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/task.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add #include <linux/cred.h> dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h
doing that for them.
Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high,
it's still a net win, because <linux/sched.h> is included in over
2,200 files ...
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The usercopy checking code currently calls __va(__pa(...)) to check for
aliases on symbols. Switch to using lm_alias instead.
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
While running a compile on arm64, I hit a memory exposure
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from fffffc0000f3b1a8 (buffer_head) (1 bytes)
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:75!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT
nf_reject_ipv6 xt_conntrack ip_set nfnetlink ebtable_broute bridge stp
llc ebtable_nat ip6table_security ip6table_raw ip6table_nat
nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_nat_ipv6 ip6table_mangle
iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4
nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack iptable_mangle
ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables vfat fat xgene_edac
xgene_enet edac_core i2c_xgene_slimpro i2c_core at803x realtek xgene_dma
mdio_xgene gpio_dwapb gpio_xgene_sb xgene_rng mailbox_xgene_slimpro nfsd
auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc xfs libcrc32c sdhci_of_arasan
sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core xhci_plat_hcd gpio_keys
CPU: 0 PID: 19744 Comm: updatedb Tainted: G W 4.8.0-rc3-threadinfo+ #1
Hardware name: AppliedMicro X-Gene Mustang Board/X-Gene Mustang Board, BIOS 3.06.12 Aug 12 2016
task: fffffe03df944c00 task.stack: fffffe00d128c000
PC is at __check_object_size+0x70/0x3f0
LR is at __check_object_size+0x70/0x3f0
...
[<fffffc00082b4280>] __check_object_size+0x70/0x3f0
[<fffffc00082cdc30>] filldir64+0x158/0x1a0
[<fffffc0000f327e8>] __fat_readdir+0x4a0/0x558 [fat]
[<fffffc0000f328d4>] fat_readdir+0x34/0x40 [fat]
[<fffffc00082cd8f8>] iterate_dir+0x190/0x1e0
[<fffffc00082cde58>] SyS_getdents64+0x88/0x120
[<fffffc0008082c70>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
fffffc0000f3b1a8 is a module address. Modules may have compiled in
strings which could get copied to userspace. In this instance, it
looks like "." which matches with a size of 1 byte. Extend the
is_vmalloc_addr check to be is_vmalloc_or_module_addr to cover
all possible cases.
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
A custom allocator without __GFP_COMP that copies to userspace has been
found in vmw_execbuf_process[1], so this disables the page-span checker
by placing it behind a CONFIG for future work where such things can be
tracked down later.
[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1373326
Reported-by: Vinson Lee <vlee@freedesktop.org>
Fixes: f5509cc18d ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
check_bogus_address() checked for pointer overflow using this expression,
where 'ptr' has type 'const void *':
ptr + n < ptr
Since pointer wraparound is undefined behavior, gcc at -O2 by default
treats it like the following, which would not behave as intended:
(long)n < 0
Fortunately, this doesn't currently happen for kernel code because kernel
code is compiled with -fno-strict-overflow. But the expression should be
fixed anyway to use well-defined integer arithmetic, since it could be
treated differently by different compilers in the future or could be
reported by tools checking for undefined behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This
is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The
work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port
from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van Riel.
This patch contains the logic for validating several conditions when
performing copy_to_user() and copy_from_user() on the kernel object
being copied to/from:
- address range doesn't wrap around
- address range isn't NULL or zero-allocated (with a non-zero copy size)
- if on the slab allocator:
- object size must be less than or equal to copy size (when check is
implemented in the allocator, which appear in subsequent patches)
- otherwise, object must not span page allocations (excepting Reserved
and CMA ranges)
- if on the stack
- object must not extend before/after the current process stack
- object must be contained by a valid stack frame (when there is
arch/build support for identifying stack frames)
- object must not overlap with kernel text
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
