commit 6a1faa4a43f5fabf9cbeaa742d916e7b5e73120f upstream.
CCM instances can be created by either the "ccm" template, which only
allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "ccm(aes)"; or by "ccm_base",
which allows choosing the ctr and cbcmac implementations, e.g.
"ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
However, a "ccm_base" instance prevents a "ccm" instance from being
registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be
found by lookups of "ccm". This can be used as a denial of service.
Moreover, "ccm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto
self-tests, even if there are compatible "ccm" tests.
The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates
use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making
"ccm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "ccm" instances, e.g.
"ccm(aes)" instead of "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr
and cbcmac algorithms. It also requires starting to verify that the
algorithms are really ctr and cbcmac using the same block cipher, not
something else entirely. But it would be bizarre if anyone were
actually using non-ccm-compatible algorithms with ccm_base, so this
shouldn't break anyone in practice.
Fixes: 4a49b499df ("[CRYPTO] ccm: Added CCM mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f699594d436960160f6d5ba84ed4a222f20d11cd upstream.
GCM instances can be created by either the "gcm" template, which only
allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "gcm(aes)"; or by "gcm_base",
which allows choosing the ctr and ghash implementations, e.g.
"gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)".
However, a "gcm_base" instance prevents a "gcm" instance from being
registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be
found by lookups of "gcm". This can be used as a denial of service.
Moreover, "gcm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto
self-tests, even if there are compatible "gcm" tests.
The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates
use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making
"gcm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "gcm" instances, e.g.
"gcm(aes)" instead of "gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)".
This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr
algorithm. It also requires starting to verify that the algorithms are
really ctr and ghash, not something else entirely. But it would be
bizarre if anyone were actually using non-gcm-compatible algorithms with
gcm_base, so this shouldn't break anyone in practice.
Fixes: d00aa19b50 ("[CRYPTO] gcm: Allow block cipher parameter")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 307508d1072979f4435416f87936f87eaeb82054 upstream.
The ->digest() method of crct10dif-generic reads the current CRC value
from the shash_desc context. But this value is uninitialized, causing
crypto_shash_digest() to compute the wrong result. Fix it.
Probably this wasn't noticed before because lib/crc-t10dif.c only uses
crypto_shash_update(), not crypto_shash_digest(). Likewise,
crypto_shash_digest() is not yet tested by the crypto self-tests because
those only test the ahash API which only uses shash init/update/final.
This bug was detected by my patches that improve testmgr to fuzz
algorithms against their generic implementation.
Fixes: 2d31e518a4 ("crypto: crct10dif - Wrap crc_t10dif function all to use crypto transform framework")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dcaca01a42cc2c425154a13412b4124293a6e11e upstream.
skcipher_walk_done() assumes it's a bug if, after the "slow" path is
executed where the next chunk of data is processed via a bounce buffer,
the algorithm says it didn't process all bytes. Thus it WARNs on this.
However, this can happen legitimately when the message needs to be
evenly divisible into "blocks" but isn't, and the algorithm has a
'walksize' greater than the block size. For example, ecb-aes-neonbs
sets 'walksize' to 128 bytes and only supports messages evenly divisible
into 16-byte blocks. If, say, 17 message bytes remain but they straddle
scatterlist elements, the skcipher_walk code will take the "slow" path
and pass the algorithm all 17 bytes in the bounce buffer. But the
algorithm will only be able to process 16 bytes, triggering the WARN.
Fix this by just removing the WARN_ON(). Returning -EINVAL, as the code
already does, is the right behavior.
This bug was detected by my patches that improve testmgr to fuzz
algorithms against their generic implementation.
Fixes: b286d8b1a6 ("crypto: skcipher - Add skcipher walk interface")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5e27f38f1f3f45a0c938299c3a34a2d2db77165a upstream.
If the rfc7539 template is instantiated with specific implementations,
e.g. "rfc7539(chacha20-generic,poly1305-generic)" rather than
"rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)", then the implementation names end up
included in the instance's cra_name. This is incorrect because it then
prevents all users from allocating "rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)", if the
highest priority implementations of chacha20 and poly1305 were selected.
Also, the self-tests aren't run on an instance allocated in this way.
Fix it by setting the instance's cra_name from the underlying
algorithms' actual cra_names, rather than from the requested names.
This matches what other templates do.
Fixes: 71ebc4d1b2 ("crypto: chacha20poly1305 - Add a ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD construction, RFC7539")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
Cc: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit edaf28e996af69222b2cb40455dbb5459c2b875a upstream.
If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv. But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.
salsa20-generic doesn't set an alignmask, so currently it isn't affected
by this despite unconditionally accessing walk.iv. However this is more
subtle than desired, and it was actually broken prior to the alignmask
being removed by commit b62b3db76f ("crypto: salsa20-generic - cleanup
and convert to skcipher API").
Since salsa20-generic does not update the IV and does not need any IV
alignment, update it to use req->iv instead of walk.iv.
Fixes: 2407d60872 ("[CRYPTO] salsa20: Salsa20 stream cipher")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 678cce4019d746da6c680c48ba9e6d417803e127 upstream.
The x86_64 implementation of Poly1305 produces the wrong result on some
inputs because poly1305_4block_avx2() incorrectly assumes that when
partially reducing the accumulator, the bits carried from limb 'd4' to
limb 'h0' fit in a 32-bit integer. This is true for poly1305-generic
which processes only one block at a time. However, it's not true for
the AVX2 implementation, which processes 4 blocks at a time and
therefore can produce intermediate limbs about 4x larger.
Fix it by making the relevant calculations use 64-bit arithmetic rather
than 32-bit. Note that most of the carries already used 64-bit
arithmetic, but the d4 -> h0 carry was different for some reason.
To be safe I also made the same change to the corresponding SSE2 code,
though that only operates on 1 or 2 blocks at a time. I don't think
it's really needed for poly1305_block_sse2(), but it doesn't hurt
because it's already x86_64 code. It *might* be needed for
poly1305_2block_sse2(), but overflows aren't easy to reproduce there.
This bug was originally detected by my patches that improve testmgr to
fuzz algorithms against their generic implementation. But also add a
test vector which reproduces it directly (in the AVX2 case).
Fixes: b1ccc8f4b6 ("crypto: poly1305 - Add a four block AVX2 variant for x86_64")
Fixes: c70f4abef0 ("crypto: poly1305 - Add a SSE2 SIMD variant for x86_64")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.3+
Cc: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit eb5e6730db98fcc4b51148b4a819fa4bf864ae54 upstream.
Instantiating "cryptd(crc32c)" causes a crypto self-test failure because
the crypto_alloc_shash() in alg_test_crc32c() fails. This is because
cryptd(crc32c) is an ahash algorithm, not a shash algorithm; so it can
only be accessed through the ahash API, unlike shash algorithms which
can be accessed through both the ahash and shash APIs.
As the test is testing the shash descriptor format which is only
applicable to shash algorithms, skip it for ahash algorithms.
(Note that it's still important to fix crypto self-test failures even
for weird algorithm instantiations like cryptd(crc32c) that no one
would really use; in fips_enabled mode unprivileged users can use them
to panic the kernel, and also they prevent treating a crypto self-test
failure as a bug when fuzzing the kernel.)
Fixes: 8e3ee85e68 ("crypto: crc32c - Test descriptor context format")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b1f6b4bf416b49f00f3abc49c639371cdecaaad1 upstream.
Some algorithms have a ->setkey() method that is not atomic, in the
sense that setting a key can fail after changes were already made to the
tfm context. In this case, if a key was already set the tfm can end up
in a state that corresponds to neither the old key nor the new key.
For example, in lrw.c, if gf128mul_init_64k_bbe() fails due to lack of
memory, then priv::table will be left NULL. After that, encryption with
that tfm will cause a NULL pointer dereference.
It's not feasible to make all ->setkey() methods atomic, especially ones
that have to key multiple sub-tfms. Therefore, make the crypto API set
CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails and the algorithm requires a
key, to prevent the tfm from being used until a new key is set.
[Cc stable mainly because when introducing the NEED_KEY flag I changed
AF_ALG to rely on it; and unlike in-kernel crypto API users, AF_ALG
previously didn't have this problem. So these "incompletely keyed"
states became theoretically accessible via AF_ALG -- though, the
opportunities for causing real mischief seem pretty limited.]
Fixes: f8d33fac84 ("crypto: skcipher - prevent using skciphers without setting key")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.16+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 251b7aea34ba3c4d4fdfa9447695642eb8b8b098 upstream.
The memcpy()s in the PCBC implementation use walk->iv as both the source
and destination, which has undefined behavior. These memcpy()'s are
actually unneeded, because walk->iv is already used to hold the previous
plaintext block XOR'd with the previous ciphertext block. Thus,
walk->iv is already updated to its final value.
So remove the broken and unnecessary memcpy()s.
Fixes: 91652be5d1 ("[CRYPTO] pcbc: Add Propagated CBC template")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.21+
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d644f1c8746ed24f81075480f9e9cb3777ae8d65 upstream.
The generic MORUS implementations all fail the improved AEAD tests
because they produce the wrong result with some data layouts. The issue
is that they assume that if the skcipher_walk API gives 'nbytes' not
aligned to the walksize (a.k.a. walk.stride), then it is the end of the
data. In fact, this can happen before the end. Fix them.
Fixes: 396be41f16 ("crypto: morus - Add generic MORUS AEAD implementations")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ba7d7433a0e998c902132bd47330e355a1eaa894 upstream.
Some algorithms have a ->setkey() method that is not atomic, in the
sense that setting a key can fail after changes were already made to the
tfm context. In this case, if a key was already set the tfm can end up
in a state that corresponds to neither the old key nor the new key.
It's not feasible to make all ->setkey() methods atomic, especially ones
that have to key multiple sub-tfms. Therefore, make the crypto API set
CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails and the algorithm requires a
key, to prevent the tfm from being used until a new key is set.
Note: we can't set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY for OPTIONAL_KEY algorithms, so
->setkey() for those must nevertheless be atomic. That's fine for now
since only the crc32 and crc32c algorithms set OPTIONAL_KEY, and it's
not intended that OPTIONAL_KEY be used much.
[Cc stable mainly because when introducing the NEED_KEY flag I changed
AF_ALG to rely on it; and unlike in-kernel crypto API users, AF_ALG
previously didn't have this problem. So these "incompletely keyed"
states became theoretically accessible via AF_ALG -- though, the
opportunities for causing real mischief seem pretty limited.]
Fixes: 9fa68f6200 ("crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0f533e67d26f228ea5dfdacc8a4bdeb487af5208 upstream.
The generic AEGIS implementations all fail the improved AEAD tests
because they produce the wrong result with some data layouts. The issue
is that they assume that if the skcipher_walk API gives 'nbytes' not
aligned to the walksize (a.k.a. walk.stride), then it is the end of the
data. In fact, this can happen before the end. Fix them.
Fixes: f606a88e58 ("crypto: aegis - Add generic AEGIS AEAD implementations")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6ebc97006b196aafa9df0497fdfa866cf26f259b upstream.
Some algorithms have a ->setkey() method that is not atomic, in the
sense that setting a key can fail after changes were already made to the
tfm context. In this case, if a key was already set the tfm can end up
in a state that corresponds to neither the old key nor the new key.
For example, in gcm.c, if the kzalloc() fails due to lack of memory,
then the CTR part of GCM will have the new key but GHASH will not.
It's not feasible to make all ->setkey() methods atomic, especially ones
that have to key multiple sub-tfms. Therefore, make the crypto API set
CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails, to prevent the tfm from being
used until a new key is set.
[Cc stable mainly because when introducing the NEED_KEY flag I changed
AF_ALG to rely on it; and unlike in-kernel crypto API users, AF_ALG
previously didn't have this problem. So these "incompletely keyed"
states became theoretically accessible via AF_ALG -- though, the
opportunities for causing real mischief seem pretty limited.]
Fixes: dc26c17f74 ("crypto: aead - prevent using AEADs without setting key")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.16+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 77568e535af7c4f97eaef1e555bf0af83772456c upstream.
Hash algorithms with an alignmask set, e.g. "xcbc(aes-aesni)" and
"michael_mic", fail the improved hash tests because they sometimes
produce the wrong digest. The bug is that in the case where a
scatterlist element crosses pages, not all the data is actually hashed
because the scatterlist walk terminates too early. This happens because
the 'nbytes' variable in crypto_hash_walk_done() is assigned the number
of bytes remaining in the page, then later interpreted as the number of
bytes remaining in the scatterlist element. Fix it.
Fixes: 900a081f69 ("crypto: ahash - Fix early termination in hash walk")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6c2e322b3621dc8be72e5c86d4fdb587434ba625 upstream.
The memcpy() in crypto_cfb_decrypt_inplace() uses walk->iv as both the
source and destination, which has undefined behavior. It is unneeded
because walk->iv is already used to hold the previous ciphertext block;
thus, walk->iv is already updated to its final value. So, remove it.
Also, note that in-place decryption is the only case where the previous
ciphertext block is not directly available. Therefore, as a related
cleanup I also updated crypto_cfb_encrypt_segment() to directly use the
previous ciphertext block rather than save it into walk->iv. This makes
it consistent with in-place encryption and out-of-place decryption; now
only in-place decryption is different, because it has to be.
Fixes: a7d85e06ed ("crypto: cfb - add support for Cipher FeedBack mode")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.17+
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 394a9e044702e6a8958a5e89d2a291605a587a2a upstream.
Like some other block cipher mode implementations, the CFB
implementation assumes that while walking through the scatterlist, a
partial block does not occur until the end. But the walk is incorrectly
being done with a blocksize of 1, as 'cra_blocksize' is set to 1 (since
CFB is a stream cipher) but no 'chunksize' is set. This bug causes
incorrect encryption/decryption for some scatterlist layouts.
Fix it by setting the 'chunksize'. Also extend the CFB test vectors to
cover this bug as well as cases where the message length is not a
multiple of the block size.
Fixes: a7d85e06ed ("crypto: cfb - add support for Cipher FeedBack mode")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.17+
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 0a6a40c2a8c184a2fb467efacfb1cd338d719e0b ]
In the "aes-fixed-time" AES implementation, disable interrupts while
accessing the S-box, in order to make cache-timing attacks more
difficult. Previously it was possible for the CPU to be interrupted
while the S-box was loaded into L1 cache, potentially evicting the
cachelines and causing later table lookups to be time-variant.
In tests I did on x86 and ARM, this doesn't affect performance
significantly. Responsiveness is potentially a concern, but interrupts
are only disabled for a single AES block.
Note that even after this change, the implementation still isn't
necessarily guaranteed to be constant-time; see
https://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf for a discussion
of the many difficulties involved in writing truly constant-time AES
software. But it's valuable to make such attacks more difficult.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3da2c1dfdb802b184eea0653d1e589515b52d74b ]
ecc_point_mult is supposed to be used with a regularized scalar,
otherwise, it's possible to deduce the position of the top bit of the
scalar with timing attack. This is important when the scalar is a
private key.
ecc_point_mult is already using a regular algorithm (i.e. having an
operation flow independent of the input scalar) but regularization step
is not implemented.
Arrange scalar to always have fixed top bit by adding a multiple of the
curve order (n).
References:
The constant time regularization step is based on micro-ecc by Kenneth
MacKay and also referenced in the literature (Bernstein, D. J., & Lange,
T. (2017). Montgomery curves and the Montgomery ladder. (Cryptology
ePrint Archive; Vol. 2017/293). s.l.: IACR. Chapter 4.6.2.)
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 8f9c469348487844328e162db57112f7d347c49f upstream.
Keys for "authenc" AEADs are formatted as an rtattr containing a 4-byte
'enckeylen', followed by an authentication key and an encryption key.
crypto_authenc_extractkeys() parses the key to find the inner keys.
However, it fails to consider the case where the rtattr's payload is
longer than 4 bytes but not 4-byte aligned, and where the key ends
before the next 4-byte aligned boundary. In this case, 'keylen -=
RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);' underflows to a value near UINT_MAX. This
causes a buffer overread and crash during crypto_ahash_setkey().
Fix it by restricting the rtattr payload to the expected size.
Reproducer using AF_ALG:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main()
{
int fd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "aead",
.salg_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
};
struct {
struct rtattr attr;
__be32 enckeylen;
char keys[1];
} __attribute__((packed)) key = {
.attr.rta_len = sizeof(key),
.attr.rta_type = 1 /* CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM */,
};
fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, &key, sizeof(key));
}
It caused:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88007ffdc000
PGD 2e01067 P4D 2e01067 PUD 2e04067 PMD 2e05067 PTE 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 883 Comm: authenc Not tainted 4.20.0-rc1-00108-g00c9fe37a7f27 #13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-20181126_142135-anatol 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:sha256_ni_transform+0xb3/0x330 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S:155
[...]
Call Trace:
sha256_ni_finup+0x10/0x20 arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c:321
crypto_shash_finup+0x1a/0x30 crypto/shash.c:178
shash_digest_unaligned+0x45/0x60 crypto/shash.c:186
crypto_shash_digest+0x24/0x40 crypto/shash.c:202
hmac_setkey+0x135/0x1e0 crypto/hmac.c:66
crypto_shash_setkey+0x2b/0xb0 crypto/shash.c:66
shash_async_setkey+0x10/0x20 crypto/shash.c:223
crypto_ahash_setkey+0x2d/0xa0 crypto/ahash.c:202
crypto_authenc_setkey+0x68/0x100 crypto/authenc.c:96
crypto_aead_setkey+0x2a/0xc0 crypto/aead.c:62
aead_setkey+0xc/0x10 crypto/algif_aead.c:526
alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:223 [inline]
alg_setsockopt+0xfe/0x130 crypto/af_alg.c:256
__sys_setsockopt+0x6d/0xd0 net/socket.c:1902
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1913 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1910 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x1f/0x30 net/socket.c:1910
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x180 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes: e236d4a89a ("[CRYPTO] authenc: Move enckeylen into key itself")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.25+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d45a90cb5d061fa7d411b974b950fe0b8bc5f265 upstream.
sm3_compress() calls rol32() with shift >= 32, which causes undefined
behavior. This is easily detected by enabling CONFIG_UBSAN.
Explicitly AND with 31 to make the behavior well defined.
Fixes: 4f0fc1600e ("crypto: sm3 - add OSCCA SM3 secure hash")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.15+
Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fa4600734b74f74d9169c3015946d4722f8bcf79 upstream.
crypto_cfb_decrypt_segment() incorrectly XOR'ed generated keystream with
IV, rather than with data stream, resulting in incorrect decryption.
Test vectors will be added in the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dbaryshkov@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e5bde04ccce64d808f8b00a489a1fe5825d285cb upstream.
In multiple functions, the algorithm fields are read after its reference
is dropped through crypto_mod_put. In this case, the algorithm memory
may be freed, resulting in use-after-free bugs. This patch delays the
put operation until the algorithm is never used.
Fixes: 79c65d179a ("crypto: cbc - Convert to skcipher")
Fixes: a7d85e06ed ("crypto: cfb - add support for Cipher FeedBack mode")
Fixes: 043a44001b ("crypto: pcbc - Convert to skcipher")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 508a1c4df085a547187eed346f1bfe5e381797f1 ]
The simd wrapper's skcipher request context structure consists
of a single subrequest whose size is taken from the subordinate
skcipher. However, in simd_skcipher_init(), the reqsize that is
retrieved is not from the subordinate skcipher but from the
cryptd request structure, whose size is completely unrelated to
the actual wrapped skcipher.
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@gmx.us>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@gmx.us>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit f43f39958beb206b53292801e216d9b8a660f087 upstream.
All bytes of the NETLINK_CRYPTO report structures must be initialized,
since they are copied to userspace. The change from strncpy() to
strlcpy() broke this. As a minimal fix, change it back.
Fixes: 4473710df1 ("crypto: user - Prepare for CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME expansion")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 578bdaabd015b9b164842c3e8ace9802f38e7ecc upstream.
These are unused, undesired, and have never actually been used by
anybody. The original authors of this code have changed their mind about
its inclusion. While originally proposed for disk encryption on low-end
devices, the idea was discarded [1] in favor of something else before
that could really get going. Therefore, this patch removes Speck.
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=153359499015659
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4a34e3c2f2f48f47213702a84a123af0fe21ad60 upstream.
Use the correct __le32 annotation and accessors to perform the
single round of AES encryption performed inside the AEGIS transform.
Otherwise, tcrypt reports:
alg: aead: Test 1 failed on encryption for aegis128-generic
00000000: 6c 25 25 4a 3c 10 1d 27 2b c1 d4 84 9a ef 7f 6e
alg: aead: Test 1 failed on encryption for aegis128l-generic
00000000: cd c6 e3 b8 a0 70 9d 8e c2 4f 6f fe 71 42 df 28
alg: aead: Test 1 failed on encryption for aegis256-generic
00000000: aa ed 07 b1 96 1d e9 e6 f2 ed b5 8e 1c 5f dc 1c
Fixes: f606a88e58 ("crypto: aegis - Add generic AEGIS AEAD implementations")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5a8dedfa3276e88c5865f265195d63d72aec3e72 upstream.
Omit the endian swabbing when folding the lengths of the assoc and
crypt input buffers into the state to finalize the tag. This is not
necessary given that the memory representation of the state is in
machine native endianness already.
This fixes an error reported by tcrypt running on a big endian system:
alg: aead: Test 2 failed on encryption for morus640-generic
00000000: a8 30 ef fb e6 26 eb 23 b0 87 dd 98 57 f3 e1 4b
00000010: 21
alg: aead: Test 2 failed on encryption for morus1280-generic
00000000: 88 19 1b fb 1c 29 49 0e ee 82 2f cb 97 a6 a5 ee
00000010: 5f
Fixes: 396be41f16 ("crypto: morus - Add generic MORUS AEAD implementations")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fbe1a850b3b1522e9fc22319ccbbcd2ab05328d2 upstream.
When the LRW block counter overflows, the current implementation returns
128 as the index to the precomputed multiplication table, which has 128
entries. This patch fixes it to return the correct value (127).
Fixes: 64470f1b85 ("[CRYPTO] lrw: Liskov Rivest Wagner, a tweakable narrow block cipher mode")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.20+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 89ab066d4229acd32e323f1569833302544a4186 ]
This reverts commit dd979b4df8.
This broke tcp_poll for SMC fallback: An AF_SMC socket establishes an
internal TCP socket for the initial handshake with the remote peer.
Whenever the SMC connection can not be established this TCP socket is
used as a fallback. All socket operations on the SMC socket are then
forwarded to the TCP socket. In case of poll, the file->private_data
pointer references the SMC socket because the TCP socket has no file
assigned. This causes tcp_poll to wait on the wrong socket.
Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This round brings couple of framework changes, a new driver and usual driver
updates:
- New managed helper for dmaengine framework registration
- Split dmaengine pause capability to pause and resume and allow drivers to
report that individually
- Update dma_request_chan_by_mask() to handle deferred probing
- Move imx-sdma to use virt-dma
- New driver for Actions Semi Owl family S900 controller
- Minor updates to intel, renesas, mv_xor, pl330 etc
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Merge tag 'dmaengine-4.19-rc1' of git://git.infradead.org/users/vkoul/slave-dma
Pull DMAengine updates from Vinod Koul:
"This round brings couple of framework changes, a new driver and usual
driver updates:
- new managed helper for dmaengine framework registration
- split dmaengine pause capability to pause and resume and allow
drivers to report that individually
- update dma_request_chan_by_mask() to handle deferred probing
- move imx-sdma to use virt-dma
- new driver for Actions Semi Owl family S900 controller
- minor updates to intel, renesas, mv_xor, pl330 etc"
* tag 'dmaengine-4.19-rc1' of git://git.infradead.org/users/vkoul/slave-dma: (46 commits)
dmaengine: Add Actions Semi Owl family S900 DMA driver
dt-bindings: dmaengine: Add binding for Actions Semi Owl SoCs
dmaengine: sh: rcar-dmac: Should not stop the DMAC by rcar_dmac_sync_tcr()
dmaengine: mic_x100_dma: use the new helper to simplify the code
dmaengine: add a new helper dmaenginem_async_device_register
dmaengine: imx-sdma: add memcpy interface
dmaengine: imx-sdma: add SDMA_BD_MAX_CNT to replace '0xffff'
dmaengine: dma_request_chan_by_mask() to handle deferred probing
dmaengine: pl330: fix irq race with terminate_all
dmaengine: Revert "dmaengine: mv_xor_v2: enable COMPILE_TEST"
dmaengine: mv_xor_v2: use {lower,upper}_32_bits to configure HW descriptor address
dmaengine: mv_xor_v2: enable COMPILE_TEST
dmaengine: mv_xor_v2: move unmap to before callback
dmaengine: mv_xor_v2: convert callback to helper function
dmaengine: mv_xor_v2: kill the tasklets upon exit
dmaengine: mv_xor_v2: explicitly freeup irq
dmaengine: sh: rcar-dmac: Add dma_pause operation
dmaengine: sh: rcar-dmac: add a new function to clear CHCR.DE with barrier
dmaengine: idma64: Support dmaengine_terminate_sync()
dmaengine: hsu: Support dmaengine_terminate_sync()
...
Replace the use of a magic number that indicates that verify_*_signature()
should use the secondary keyring with a symbol.
Signed-off-by: Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@sembritzki.me>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"This adds support for EVM signatures based on larger digests, contains
a new audit record AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to differentiate the
IMA policy rules from the IMA-audit messages, addresses two deadlocks
due to either loading or searching for crypto algorithms, and cleans
up the audit messages"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
EVM: fix return value check in evm_write_xattrs()
integrity: prevent deadlock during digsig verification.
evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures
evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is unavailable
integrity: silence warning when CONFIG_SECURITYFS is not enabled
ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
ima: Do not audit if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT is not set
ima: Use audit_log_format() rather than audit_log_string()
ima: Call audit_log_string() rather than logging it untrusted
Make it return -EINVAL if crypto_dh_key_len() is incorrect rather than
overflowing the buffer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
It was forgotten to increase DH_KPP_SECRET_MIN_SIZE to include 'q_size',
causing an out-of-bounds write of 4 bytes in crypto_dh_encode_key(), and
an out-of-bounds read of 4 bytes in crypto_dh_decode_key(). Fix it, and
fix the lengths of the test vectors to match this.
Reported-by: syzbot+6d38d558c25b53b8f4ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: e3fe0ae129 ("crypto: dh - add public key verification test")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Like the skcipher_walk and blkcipher_walk cases:
scatterwalk_done() is only meant to be called after a nonzero number of
bytes have been processed, since scatterwalk_pagedone() will flush the
dcache of the *previous* page. But in the error case of
ablkcipher_walk_done(), e.g. if the input wasn't an integer number of
blocks, scatterwalk_done() was actually called after advancing 0 bytes.
This caused a crash ("BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request")
during '!PageSlab(page)' on architectures like arm and arm64 that define
ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE, provided that the input was
page-aligned as in that case walk->offset == 0.
Fix it by reorganizing ablkcipher_walk_done() to skip the
scatterwalk_advance() and scatterwalk_done() if an error has occurred.
Reported-by: Liu Chao <liuchao741@huawei.com>
Fixes: bf06099db1 ("crypto: skcipher - Add ablkcipher_walk interfaces")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.35+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Like the skcipher_walk case:
scatterwalk_done() is only meant to be called after a nonzero number of
bytes have been processed, since scatterwalk_pagedone() will flush the
dcache of the *previous* page. But in the error case of
blkcipher_walk_done(), e.g. if the input wasn't an integer number of
blocks, scatterwalk_done() was actually called after advancing 0 bytes.
This caused a crash ("BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request")
during '!PageSlab(page)' on architectures like arm and arm64 that define
ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE, provided that the input was
page-aligned as in that case walk->offset == 0.
Fix it by reorganizing blkcipher_walk_done() to skip the
scatterwalk_advance() and scatterwalk_done() if an error has occurred.
This bug was found by syzkaller fuzzing.
Reproducer, assuming ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main()
{
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "skcipher",
.salg_name = "ecb(aes-generic)",
};
char buffer[4096] __attribute__((aligned(4096))) = { 0 };
int fd;
fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, buffer, 16);
fd = accept(fd, NULL, NULL);
write(fd, buffer, 15);
read(fd, buffer, 15);
}
Reported-by: Liu Chao <liuchao741@huawei.com>
Fixes: 5cde0af2a9 ("[CRYPTO] cipher: Added block cipher type")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.19+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
scatterwalk_done() is only meant to be called after a nonzero number of
bytes have been processed, since scatterwalk_pagedone() will flush the
dcache of the *previous* page. But in the error case of
skcipher_walk_done(), e.g. if the input wasn't an integer number of
blocks, scatterwalk_done() was actually called after advancing 0 bytes.
This caused a crash ("BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request")
during '!PageSlab(page)' on architectures like arm and arm64 that define
ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE, provided that the input was
page-aligned as in that case walk->offset == 0.
Fix it by reorganizing skcipher_walk_done() to skip the
scatterwalk_advance() and scatterwalk_done() if an error has occurred.
This bug was found by syzkaller fuzzing.
Reproducer, assuming ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main()
{
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "skcipher",
.salg_name = "cbc(aes-generic)",
};
char buffer[4096] __attribute__((aligned(4096))) = { 0 };
int fd;
fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, buffer, 16);
fd = accept(fd, NULL, NULL);
write(fd, buffer, 15);
read(fd, buffer, 15);
}
Reported-by: Liu Chao <liuchao741@huawei.com>
Fixes: b286d8b1a6 ("crypto: skcipher - Add skcipher walk interface")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Setting 'walk->nbytes = walk->total' in skcipher_walk_first() doesn't
make sense because actually walk->nbytes needs to be set to the length
of the first step in the walk, which may be less than walk->total. This
is done by skcipher_walk_next() which is called immediately afterwards.
Also walk->nbytes was already set to 0 in skcipher_walk_skcipher(),
which is a better default value in case it's forgotten to be set later.
Therefore, remove the unnecessary assignment to walk->nbytes.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
All callers pass chain=0 to scatterwalk_crypto_chain().
Remove this unneeded parameter.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The ALIGN() macro needs to be passed the alignment, not the alignmask
(which is the alignment minus 1).
Fixes: b286d8b1a6 ("crypto: skcipher - Add skcipher walk interface")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Avoid RCU stalls in the case of non-preemptible kernel and lengthy
speed tests by rescheduling when advancing from one block size
to another.
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The wait_address argument is always directly derived from the filp
argument, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
