With the introduction of 'rustynat' in 2.6.11, the old tricks of preventing
NAT of 'untracked' connections (e.g. NOTRACK target in 'raw' table) are no
longer sufficient.
The ip_conntrack_untracked.status |= IPS_NAT_DONE_MASK effectively
prevents iteration of the 'nat' table, but doesn't prevent nat_packet()
to be executed. Since nr_manips is gone in 'rustynat', nat_packet() now
implicitly thinks that it has to do NAT on the packet.
This patch fixes that problem by explicitly checking for
ip_conntrack_untracked in ip_nat_fn().
Signed-off-by: Harald Welte <laforge@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
masq_index is used for cleanup in case the interface address changes
(such as a dialup ppp link with dynamic addreses). Without this patch,
slave connections are not evicted in such a case, since they don't inherit
masq_index.
Signed-off-by: Harald Welte <laforge@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The portptr pointing to the port in the conntrack tuple is declared static,
which could result in memory corruption when two packets of the same
protocol are NATed at the same time and one conntrack goes away.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If a connection tracking helper tells us to expect a connection, and
we're already expecting that connection, we simply free the one they
gave us and return success.
The problem is that NAT helpers (eg. FTP) have to allocate the
expectation first (to see what port is available) then rewrite the
packet. If that rewrite fails, they try to remove the expectation,
but it was freed in ip_conntrack_expect_related.
This is one example of a larger problem: having registered the
expectation, the pointer is no longer ours to use. Reference counting
is needed for ctnetlink anyway, so introduce it now.
To have a single "put" path, we need to grab the reference to the
connection on creation, rather than open-coding it in the caller.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Revert the nf_reset change that caused so much trouble, drop conntrack
references manually before packets are queued to packet sockets.
Signed-off-by: Phil Oester <kernel@linuxace.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch adds mangling of ARP requests (in addition to replies),
since ARP caches are made from snooping both requests and replies.
Signed-off-by: Harald Welte <laforge@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <Keir.Fraser@xl.cam.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Since expectation timeouts were made compulsory [1], there is no need to
check for them in ip_conntrack_expect_insert.
[1] https://lists.netfilter.org/pipermail/netfilter-devel/2005-January/018143.html
Signed-off-by: Phil Oester <kernel@linuxace.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This fixes various crashes on 64-bit when using this module.
Based upon a patch by Juergen Kreileder <jk@blackdown.de>.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
ACKed-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
When we have ip_queue being used from LOCAL_IN, then we end up with a
situation where the verdicts coming back from userspace traverse the TCP
input path from syscall context. While this seems to work most of the
time, there's an ugly deadlock:
syscall context is interrupted by the timer interrupt. When the timer
interrupt leaves, the timer softirq get's scheduled and calls
tcp_delack_timer() and alike. They themselves do bh_lock_sock(sk),
which is already held from somewhere else -> boom.
I've now tested the suggested solution by Patrick McHardy and Herbert Xu to
simply use local_bh_{en,dis}able().
Signed-off-by: Harald Welte <laforge@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Let's recap the problem. The current asynchronous netlink kernel
message processing is vulnerable to these attacks:
1) Hit and run: Attacker sends one or more messages and then exits
before they're processed. This may confuse/disable the next netlink
user that gets the netlink address of the attacker since it may
receive the responses to the attacker's messages.
Proposed solutions:
a) Synchronous processing.
b) Stream mode socket.
c) Restrict/prohibit binding.
2) Starvation: Because various netlink rcv functions were written
to not return until all messages have been processed on a socket,
it is possible for these functions to execute for an arbitrarily
long period of time. If this is successfully exploited it could
also be used to hold rtnl forever.
Proposed solutions:
a) Synchronous processing.
b) Stream mode socket.
Firstly let's cross off solution c). It only solves the first
problem and it has user-visible impacts. In particular, it'll
break user space applications that expect to bind or communicate
with specific netlink addresses (pid's).
So we're left with a choice of synchronous processing versus
SOCK_STREAM for netlink.
For the moment I'm sticking with the synchronous approach as
suggested by Alexey since it's simpler and I'd rather spend
my time working on other things.
However, it does have a number of deficiencies compared to the
stream mode solution:
1) User-space to user-space netlink communication is still vulnerable.
2) Inefficient use of resources. This is especially true for rtnetlink
since the lock is shared with other users such as networking drivers.
The latter could hold the rtnl while communicating with hardware which
causes the rtnetlink user to wait when it could be doing other things.
3) It is still possible to DoS all netlink users by flooding the kernel
netlink receive queue. The attacker simply fills the receive socket
with a single netlink message that fills up the entire queue. The
attacker then continues to call sendmsg with the same message in a loop.
Point 3) can be countered by retransmissions in user-space code, however
it is pretty messy.
In light of these problems (in particular, point 3), we should implement
stream mode netlink at some point. In the mean time, here is a patch
that implements synchronous processing.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In the event a raw socket is created for sending purposes only, the creator
never bothers to check the socket's receive queue. But we continue to
add skbs to its queue until it fills up.
Unfortunately, if ip_conntrack is loaded on the box, each skb we add to the
queue potentially holds a reference to a conntrack. If the user attempts
to unload ip_conntrack, we will spin around forever since the queued skbs
are pinned.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Yasuyuki KOZAKAI <yasuyuki.kozkaai@toshiba.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The NAT changes in 2.6.11 changed the position where helpers
are called and perform packet mangling. Before 2.6.11, a NAT
helper was called before the packet was NATed and had its
sequence number adjusted. Since 2.6.11, the helpers get packets
with already adjusted sequence numbers.
This breaks sequence number adjustment, adjust_tcp_sequence()
needs the original sequence number to determine whether
a packet was a retransmission and to store it for further
corrections. It can't be reconstructed without more information
than available, so this patch restores the old order by
calling helpers from a new conntrack hook two priorities
below ip_conntrack_confirm() and adjusting the sequence number
from a new NAT hook one priority below ip_conntrack_confirm().
Tracked down by Phil Oester <kernel@linuxace.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
