This patch adds support for the "direct_io" mount option of FUSE.
When this mount option is specified, the page cache is bypassed for
read and write operations. This is useful for example, if the
filesystem doesn't know the size of files before reading them, or when
any kind of caching is harmful.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Check for the presence of all mandatory mount options.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch tightens the check for allowing processes to access non-privileged
mounts. The rational is that the filesystem implementation can control the
behavior or get otherwise unavailable information of the filesystem user. If
the filesystem user process has the same uid, gid, and is not suid or sgid
application, then access is safe. Otherwise access is not allowed unless the
"allow_other" mount option is given (for which policy is controlled by the
userspace mount utility).
Thanks to everyone linux-fsdevel, especially Martin Mares who helped uncover
problems with the previous approach.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch adds readpages support to FUSE.
With the help of the readpages() operation multiple reads are bundled
together and sent as a single request to userspace. This can improve
reading performace.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch adds the extended attribute operations to FUSE.
The following operations are added:
o getxattr
o setxattr
o listxattr
o removexattr
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch adds miscellaneous mount options to the FUSE filesystem.
The following mount options are added:
o default_permissions: check permissions with generic_permission()
o allow_other: allow other users to access files
o allow_root: allow root to access files
o kernel_cache: don't invalidate page cache on open
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch adds the file operations of FUSE.
The following operations are added:
o open
o flush
o release
o fsync
o readpage
o commit_write
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch adds the write filesystem operations of FUSE.
The following operations are added:
o setattr
o symlink
o mknod
o mkdir
o create
o unlink
o rmdir
o rename
o link
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch adds the read-only filesystem operations of FUSE.
This contains the following files:
o dir.c
- directory, symlink and file-inode operations
The following operations are added:
o lookup
o getattr
o readlink
o follow_link
o directory open
o readdir
o directory release
o permission
o dentry revalidate
o statfs
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This adds the FUSE device handling functions.
This contains the following files:
o dev.c
- fuse device operations (read, write, release, poll)
- registers misc device
- support for sending requests to userspace
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch adds FUSE core.
This contains the following files:
o inode.c
- superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode,
clear_inode, put_super, show_options)
- registers FUSE filesystem
o fuse_i.h
- private header file
Requirements
============
The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is
the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace
process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the
kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated
privileges.
The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must
not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious
requirements arising from this are:
- mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the
help of the mounted filesystem
- mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in
other users' or the super user's processes
- mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from
other users' and the super user's processes
These are currently ensured with the following constraints:
1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner
can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for
directories)
2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced
3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied
all access to the filesystem
1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a
setuid root application doing the actual mount operation.
3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel
I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph
H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into
mainline in this form.
The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their
current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as
discussed in this thread).
Suggested improvements that would address these limitations:
- implement shared subtrees
- allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces
first-class objects)
- implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module
With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may
be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the
security requirements.
Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even
to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact
order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some
ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is
not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs
setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current
approach too.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
