[TCP]: skb is unexpectedly freed.
I encountered a kernel panic with my test program, which is a very simple IPv6 client-server program. The server side sets IPV6_RECVPKTINFO on a listening socket, and the client side just sends a message to the server. Then the kernel panic occurs on the server. (If you need the test program, please let me know. I can provide it.) This problem happens because a skb is forcibly freed in tcp_rcv_state_process(). When a socket in listening state(TCP_LISTEN) receives a syn packet, then tcp_v6_conn_request() will be called from tcp_rcv_state_process(). If the tcp_v6_conn_request() successfully returns, the skb would be discarded by __kfree_skb(). However, in case of a listening socket which was already set IPV6_RECVPKTINFO, an address of the skb will be stored in treq->pktopts and a ref count of the skb will be incremented in tcp_v6_conn_request(). But, even if the skb is still in use, the skb will be freed. Then someone still using the freed skb will cause the kernel panic. I suggest to use kfree_skb() instead of __kfree_skb(). Signed-off-by: Masayuki Nakagawa <nakagawa.msy@ncos.nec.co.jp> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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@ -4420,9 +4420,11 @@ int tcp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
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* But, this leaves one open to an easy denial of
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* But, this leaves one open to an easy denial of
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* service attack, and SYN cookies can't defend
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* service attack, and SYN cookies can't defend
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* against this problem. So, we drop the data
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* against this problem. So, we drop the data
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* in the interest of security over speed.
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* in the interest of security over speed unless
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* it's still in use.
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*/
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*/
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goto discard;
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kfree_skb(skb);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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goto discard;
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goto discard;
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