crypto: aead - prevent using AEADs without setting key
Similar to what was done for the hash API, update the AEAD API to track whether each transform has been keyed, and reject encryption/decryption if a key is needed but one hasn't been set. This isn't quite as important as the equivalent fix for the hash API because AEADs always require a key, so are unlikely to be used without one. Still, tracking the key will prevent accidental unkeyed use. algif_aead also had to track the key anyway, so the new flag replaces that and slightly simplifies the algif_aead implementation. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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f8d33fac84
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3 changed files with 23 additions and 11 deletions
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@ -54,11 +54,18 @@ int crypto_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
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const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
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{
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unsigned long alignmask = crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm);
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int err;
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if ((unsigned long)key & alignmask)
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return setkey_unaligned(tfm, key, keylen);
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err = setkey_unaligned(tfm, key, keylen);
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else
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err = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
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return crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
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if (err)
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return err;
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crypto_aead_clear_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY);
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return 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_aead_setkey);
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@ -93,6 +100,8 @@ static int crypto_aead_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
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struct crypto_aead *aead = __crypto_aead_cast(tfm);
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struct aead_alg *alg = crypto_aead_alg(aead);
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crypto_aead_set_flags(aead, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY);
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aead->authsize = alg->maxauthsize;
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if (alg->exit)
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@ -42,7 +42,6 @@
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struct aead_tfm {
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struct crypto_aead *aead;
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bool has_key;
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struct crypto_skcipher *null_tfm;
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};
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@ -398,7 +397,7 @@ static int aead_check_key(struct socket *sock)
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err = -ENOKEY;
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lock_sock_nested(psk, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
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if (!tfm->has_key)
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if (crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm->aead) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
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goto unlock;
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if (!pask->refcnt++)
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@ -523,12 +522,8 @@ static int aead_setauthsize(void *private, unsigned int authsize)
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static int aead_setkey(void *private, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
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{
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struct aead_tfm *tfm = private;
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int err;
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err = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm->aead, key, keylen);
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tfm->has_key = !err;
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return err;
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return crypto_aead_setkey(tfm->aead, key, keylen);
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}
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static void aead_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
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@ -589,7 +584,7 @@ static int aead_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk)
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{
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struct aead_tfm *tfm = private;
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if (!tfm->has_key)
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if (crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm->aead) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
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return -ENOKEY;
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return aead_accept_parent_nokey(private, sk);
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@ -327,7 +327,12 @@ static inline struct crypto_aead *crypto_aead_reqtfm(struct aead_request *req)
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*/
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static inline int crypto_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
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{
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return crypto_aead_alg(crypto_aead_reqtfm(req))->encrypt(req);
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struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
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if (crypto_aead_get_flags(aead) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
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return -ENOKEY;
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return crypto_aead_alg(aead)->encrypt(req);
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}
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/**
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@ -356,6 +361,9 @@ static inline int crypto_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
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{
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struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
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if (crypto_aead_get_flags(aead) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
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return -ENOKEY;
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if (req->cryptlen < crypto_aead_authsize(aead))
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return -EINVAL;
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