CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the filesystem subsystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Howells 2008-11-14 10:39:05 +11:00 committed by James Morris
parent 82ab8deda7
commit da9592edeb
15 changed files with 38 additions and 36 deletions

View file

@ -154,8 +154,8 @@ static struct inode *anon_inode_mkinode(void)
*/
inode->i_state = I_DIRTY;
inode->i_mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR;
inode->i_uid = current->fsuid;
inode->i_gid = current->fsgid;
inode->i_uid = current_fsuid();
inode->i_gid = current_fsgid();
inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
return inode;
}

View file

@ -29,13 +29,13 @@ int inode_change_ok(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
/* Make sure a caller can chown. */
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
(current->fsuid != inode->i_uid ||
(current_fsuid() != inode->i_uid ||
attr->ia_uid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_CHOWN))
goto error;
/* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
(current->fsuid != inode->i_uid ||
(current_fsuid() != inode->i_uid ||
(!in_group_p(attr->ia_gid) && attr->ia_gid != inode->i_gid)) &&
!capable(CAP_CHOWN))
goto error;

View file

@ -623,10 +623,10 @@ static int create_elf_fdpic_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_BASE, interp_params->elfhdr_addr);
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_FLAGS, 0);
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_ENTRY, exec_params->entry_addr);
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_UID, (elf_addr_t) current->uid);
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EUID, (elf_addr_t) current->euid);
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_GID, (elf_addr_t) current->gid);
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EGID, (elf_addr_t) current->egid);
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_UID, (elf_addr_t) current_uid());
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EUID, (elf_addr_t) current_euid());
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_GID, (elf_addr_t) current_gid());
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EGID, (elf_addr_t) current_egid());
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SECURE, security_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EXECFN, bprm->exec);

View file

@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ static inline int need_print_warning(struct dquot *dquot)
switch (dquot->dq_type) {
case USRQUOTA:
return current->fsuid == dquot->dq_id;
return current_fsuid() == dquot->dq_id;
case GRPQUOTA:
return in_group_p(dquot->dq_id);
}
@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ static void send_warning(const struct dquot *dquot, const char warntype)
MINOR(dquot->dq_sb->s_dev));
if (ret)
goto attr_err_out;
ret = nla_put_u64(skb, QUOTA_NL_A_CAUSED_ID, current->user->uid);
ret = nla_put_u64(skb, QUOTA_NL_A_CAUSED_ID, current_uid());
if (ret)
goto attr_err_out;
genlmsg_end(skb, msg_head);

View file

@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
/* This is the point of no return */
current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid)
if (current_euid() == current_uid() && current_egid() == current_gid())
set_dumpable(current->mm, 1);
else
set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
*/
current->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE;
if (bprm->e_uid != current->euid || bprm->e_gid != current->egid) {
if (bprm->e_uid != current_euid() || bprm->e_gid != current_egid()) {
suid_keys(current);
set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
current->pdeath_signal = 0;
@ -1047,8 +1047,8 @@ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (bprm->file->f_op == NULL)
return -EACCES;
bprm->e_uid = current->euid;
bprm->e_gid = current->egid;
bprm->e_uid = current_euid();
bprm->e_gid = current_egid();
if(!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) {
/* Set-uid? */
@ -1096,7 +1096,7 @@ void compute_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int unsafe;
if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid) {
if (bprm->e_uid != current_uid()) {
suid_keys(current);
current->pdeath_signal = 0;
}
@ -1424,7 +1424,7 @@ static int format_corename(char *corename, long signr)
/* uid */
case 'u':
rc = snprintf(out_ptr, out_end - out_ptr,
"%d", current->uid);
"%d", current_uid());
if (rc > out_end - out_ptr)
goto out;
out_ptr += rc;
@ -1432,7 +1432,7 @@ static int format_corename(char *corename, long signr)
/* gid */
case 'g':
rc = snprintf(out_ptr, out_end - out_ptr,
"%d", current->gid);
"%d", current_gid());
if (rc > out_end - out_ptr)
goto out;
out_ptr += rc;
@ -1709,7 +1709,7 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs)
struct inode * inode;
struct file * file;
int retval = 0;
int fsuid = current->fsuid;
int fsuid = current_fsuid();
int flag = 0;
int ispipe = 0;
unsigned long core_limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur;
@ -1815,7 +1815,7 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs)
* Dont allow local users get cute and trick others to coredump
* into their pre-created files:
*/
if (inode->i_uid != current->fsuid)
if (inode->i_uid != current_fsuid())
goto close_fail;
if (!file->f_op)
goto close_fail;

View file

@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int __f_setown(struct file *filp, struct pid *pid, enum pid_type type,
if (err)
return err;
f_modown(filp, pid, type, current->uid, current->euid, force);
f_modown(filp, pid, type, current_uid(), current_euid(), force);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__f_setown);

View file

@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_inotify_init1(int flags)
goto out_put_fd;
}
user = get_uid(current->user);
user = get_current_user();
if (unlikely(atomic_read(&user->inotify_devs) >=
inotify_max_user_instances)) {
ret = -EMFILE;

View file

@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ static int set_task_ioprio(struct task_struct *task, int ioprio)
int err;
struct io_context *ioc;
if (task->uid != current->euid &&
task->uid != current->uid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
if (task->uid != current_euid() &&
task->uid != current_uid() && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
return -EPERM;
err = security_task_setioprio(task, ioprio);

View file

@ -1349,7 +1349,7 @@ int generic_setlease(struct file *filp, long arg, struct file_lock **flp)
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
int error, rdlease_count = 0, wrlease_count = 0;
if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_LEASE))
if ((current_fsuid() != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_LEASE))
return -EACCES;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EINVAL;

View file

@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
if (current->fsuid == inode->i_uid)
if (current_fsuid() == inode->i_uid)
mode >>= 6;
else {
if (IS_POSIXACL(inode) && (mode & S_IRWXG) && check_acl) {
@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ static int exec_permission_lite(struct inode *inode)
if (inode->i_op && inode->i_op->permission)
return -EAGAIN;
if (current->fsuid == inode->i_uid)
if (current_fsuid() == inode->i_uid)
mode >>= 6;
else if (in_group_p(inode->i_gid))
mode >>= 3;
@ -1334,11 +1334,13 @@ static int user_path_parent(int dfd, const char __user *path,
*/
static inline int check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode)
{
uid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
if (!(dir->i_mode & S_ISVTX))
return 0;
if (inode->i_uid == current->fsuid)
if (inode->i_uid == fsuid)
return 0;
if (dir->i_uid == current->fsuid)
if (dir->i_uid == fsuid)
return 0;
return !capable(CAP_FOWNER);
}

View file

@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ static int mount_is_safe(struct path *path)
if (S_ISLNK(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
return -EPERM;
if (path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) {
if (current->uid != path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid)
if (current_uid() != path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid)
return -EPERM;
}
if (inode_permission(path->dentry->d_inode, MAY_WRITE))

View file

@ -899,8 +899,8 @@ static struct inode * get_pipe_inode(void)
*/
inode->i_state = I_DIRTY;
inode->i_mode = S_IFIFO | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR;
inode->i_uid = current->fsuid;
inode->i_gid = current->fsgid;
inode->i_uid = current_fsuid();
inode->i_gid = current_fsgid();
inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
return inode;

View file

@ -217,11 +217,11 @@ posix_acl_permission(struct inode *inode, const struct posix_acl *acl, int want)
switch(pa->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
/* (May have been checked already) */
if (inode->i_uid == current->fsuid)
if (inode->i_uid == current_fsuid())
goto check_perm;
break;
case ACL_USER:
if (pa->e_id == current->fsuid)
if (pa->e_id == current_fsuid())
goto mask;
break;
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:

View file

@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int generic_quotactl_valid(struct super_block *sb, int type, int cmd, qid
/* Check privileges */
if (cmd == Q_GETQUOTA) {
if (((type == USRQUOTA && current->euid != id) ||
if (((type == USRQUOTA && current_euid() != id) ||
(type == GRPQUOTA && !in_egroup_p(id))) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static int xqm_quotactl_valid(struct super_block *sb, int type, int cmd, qid_t i
/* Check privileges */
if (cmd == Q_XGETQUOTA) {
if (((type == XQM_USRQUOTA && current->euid != id) ||
if (((type == XQM_USRQUOTA && current_euid() != id) ||
(type == XQM_GRPQUOTA && !in_egroup_p(id))) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;

View file

@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ enum {
#define has_fs_excl() atomic_read(&current->fs_excl)
#define is_owner_or_cap(inode) \
((current->fsuid == (inode)->i_uid) || capable(CAP_FOWNER))
((current_fsuid() == (inode)->i_uid) || capable(CAP_FOWNER))
/* not quite ready to be deprecated, but... */
extern void lock_super(struct super_block *);