Techwizz/kernel-fxtec-pro1x
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity

net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities

Browse source 
[ Upstream commit 899537b73557aafbdd11050b501cf54b4f5c45af ]

arg is controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

net/atm/lec.c:715 lec_mcast_attach() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev_lec' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing arg before using it to index dev_lec.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Gustavo A. R. Silva 2019-04-15 15:57:23 -05:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent fae6053d76
commit bcb964012d
1 changed files with 5 additions and 1 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

6
net/atm/lec.c
View file

@ -710,7 +710,10 @@ static int lec_vcc_attach(struct atm_vcc *vcc, void __user *arg)
static int lec_mcast_attach(struct atm_vcc *vcc, int arg)
{
if (arg < 0 || arg >= MAX_LEC_ITF || !dev_lec[arg])
if (arg < 0 || arg >= MAX_LEC_ITF)
return -EINVAL;
arg = array_index_nospec(arg, MAX_LEC_ITF);
if (!dev_lec[arg])
return -EINVAL;
vcc->proto_data = dev_lec[arg];
return lec_mcast_make(netdev_priv(dev_lec[arg]), vcc);
@ -728,6 +731,7 @@ static int lecd_attach(struct atm_vcc *vcc, int arg)
i = arg;
if (arg >= MAX_LEC_ITF)
return -EINVAL;
i = array_index_nospec(arg, MAX_LEC_ITF);
if (!dev_lec[i]) {
int size;