drm: stop information leak of old kernel stack.
non-critical issue, CVE-2010-2803 Userspace controls the amount of memory to be allocate, so it can get the ioctl to allocate more memory than the kernel uses, and get access to kernel stack. This can only be done for processes authenticated to the X server for DRI access, and if the user has DRI access. Fix is to just memset the data to 0 if the user doesn't copy into it in the first place. Reported-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
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@ -477,7 +477,9 @@ long drm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
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retcode = -EFAULT;
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goto err_i1;
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}
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}
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} else
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memset(kdata, 0, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
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if (ioctl->flags & DRM_UNLOCKED)
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retcode = func(dev, kdata, file_priv);
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else {
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