x86/asm/entry: Add user_mode_ignore_vm86()
user_mode() is dangerous and user_mode_vm() has a confusing name. Add user_mode_ignore_vm86() (equivalent to current user_mode()). We'll change the small number of legitimate users of user_mode() to user_mode_ignore_vm86(). Inspired by grsec, although this works rather differently. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/202c56ca63823c338af8e2e54948dbe222da6343.1426728647.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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@ -121,6 +121,23 @@ static inline int user_mode_vm(struct pt_regs *regs)
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#endif
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#endif
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}
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}
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/*
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* This is the fastest way to check whether regs come from user space.
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* It is unsafe if regs might come from vm86 mode, though -- in vm86
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* mode, all bits of CS and SS are completely under the user's control.
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* The CPU considers vm86 mode to be CPL 3 regardless of CS and SS.
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*
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* Do NOT use this function unless you have already ruled out the
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* possibility that regs came from vm86 mode.
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*
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* We check for RPL != 0 instead of RPL == 3 because we don't use rings
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* 1 or 2 and this is more efficient.
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*/
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static inline int user_mode_ignore_vm86(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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return (regs->cs & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK) != 0;
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}
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static inline int v8086_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
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static inline int v8086_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
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