MODSIGN: Fix 32-bit overflow in X.509 certificate validity date checking
The current choice of lifetime for the autogenerated X.509 of 100 years, putting the validTo date in 2112, causes problems on 32-bit systems where a 32-bit time_t wraps in 2106. 64-bit x86_64 systems seem to be unaffected. This can result in something like: Loading module verification certificates X.509: Cert 6e03943da0f3b015ba6ed7f5e0cac4fe48680994 has expired MODSIGN: Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (-127) Or: X.509: Cert 6e03943da0f3b015ba6ed7f5e0cac4fe48680994 is not yet valid MODSIGN: Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (-129) Instead of turning the dates into time_t values and comparing, turn the system clock and the ASN.1 dates into tm structs and compare those piecemeal instead. Reported-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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3 changed files with 51 additions and 20 deletions
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@ -434,11 +434,10 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
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/*
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* Record a certificate time.
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*/
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static int x509_note_time(time_t *_time, size_t hdrlen,
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static int x509_note_time(struct tm *tm, size_t hdrlen,
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unsigned char tag,
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const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen)
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{
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unsigned YY, MM, DD, hh, mm, ss;
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const unsigned char *p = value;
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#define dec2bin(X) ((X) - '0')
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@ -448,30 +447,30 @@ static int x509_note_time(time_t *_time, size_t hdrlen,
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/* UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ */
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if (vlen != 13)
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goto unsupported_time;
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YY = DD2bin(p);
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if (YY > 50)
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YY += 1900;
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tm->tm_year = DD2bin(p);
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if (tm->tm_year >= 50)
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tm->tm_year += 1900;
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else
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YY += 2000;
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tm->tm_year += 2000;
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} else if (tag == ASN1_GENTIM) {
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/* GenTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ */
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if (vlen != 15)
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goto unsupported_time;
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YY = DD2bin(p) * 100 + DD2bin(p);
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tm->tm_year = DD2bin(p) * 100 + DD2bin(p);
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} else {
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goto unsupported_time;
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}
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MM = DD2bin(p);
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DD = DD2bin(p);
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hh = DD2bin(p);
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mm = DD2bin(p);
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ss = DD2bin(p);
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tm->tm_year -= 1900;
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tm->tm_mon = DD2bin(p) - 1;
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tm->tm_mday = DD2bin(p);
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tm->tm_hour = DD2bin(p);
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tm->tm_min = DD2bin(p);
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tm->tm_sec = DD2bin(p);
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if (*p != 'Z')
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goto unsupported_time;
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*_time = mktime(YY, MM, DD, hh, mm, ss);
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return 0;
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unsupported_time:
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@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ struct x509_certificate {
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char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */
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char *fingerprint; /* Key fingerprint as hex */
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char *authority; /* Authority key fingerprint as hex */
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time_t valid_from;
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time_t valid_to;
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struct tm valid_from;
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struct tm valid_to;
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enum pkey_algo pkey_algo : 8; /* Public key algorithm */
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enum pkey_algo sig_pkey_algo : 8; /* Signature public key algorithm */
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enum pkey_hash_algo sig_hash_algo : 8; /* Signature hash algorithm */
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@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
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static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
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{
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struct x509_certificate *cert;
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time_t now;
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struct tm now;
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size_t srlen, sulen;
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char *desc = NULL;
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int ret;
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@ -118,7 +118,14 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
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pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
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pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject);
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pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo[cert->pkey_algo]);
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pr_devel("Cert Valid: %lu - %lu\n", cert->valid_from, cert->valid_to);
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printk("Cert Valid From: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
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cert->valid_from.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_from.tm_mon + 1,
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cert->valid_from.tm_mday, cert->valid_from.tm_hour,
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cert->valid_from.tm_min, cert->valid_from.tm_sec);
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printk("Cert Valid To: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
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cert->valid_to.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_to.tm_mon + 1,
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cert->valid_to.tm_mday, cert->valid_to.tm_hour,
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cert->valid_to.tm_min, cert->valid_to.tm_sec);
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pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
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pkey_algo[cert->sig_pkey_algo],
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pkey_hash_algo[cert->sig_hash_algo]);
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@ -130,13 +137,38 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
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goto error_free_cert;
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}
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now = CURRENT_TIME.tv_sec;
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if (now < cert->valid_from) {
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time_to_tm(CURRENT_TIME.tv_sec, 0, &now);
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printk("Now: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
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now.tm_year + 1900, now.tm_mon + 1, now.tm_mday,
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now.tm_hour, now.tm_min, now.tm_sec);
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if (now.tm_year < cert->valid_from.tm_year ||
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(now.tm_year == cert->valid_from.tm_year &&
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(now.tm_mon < cert->valid_from.tm_mon ||
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(now.tm_mon == cert->valid_from.tm_mon &&
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(now.tm_mday < cert->valid_from.tm_mday ||
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(now.tm_mday == cert->valid_from.tm_mday &&
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(now.tm_hour < cert->valid_from.tm_hour ||
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(now.tm_hour == cert->valid_from.tm_hour &&
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(now.tm_min < cert->valid_from.tm_min ||
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(now.tm_min == cert->valid_from.tm_min &&
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(now.tm_sec < cert->valid_from.tm_sec
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))))))))))) {
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pr_warn("Cert %s is not yet valid\n", cert->fingerprint);
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ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
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goto error_free_cert;
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}
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if (now >= cert->valid_to) {
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if (now.tm_year > cert->valid_to.tm_year ||
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(now.tm_year == cert->valid_to.tm_year &&
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(now.tm_mon > cert->valid_to.tm_mon ||
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(now.tm_mon == cert->valid_to.tm_mon &&
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(now.tm_mday > cert->valid_to.tm_mday ||
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(now.tm_mday == cert->valid_to.tm_mday &&
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(now.tm_hour > cert->valid_to.tm_hour ||
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(now.tm_hour == cert->valid_to.tm_hour &&
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(now.tm_min > cert->valid_to.tm_min ||
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(now.tm_min == cert->valid_to.tm_min &&
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(now.tm_sec > cert->valid_to.tm_sec
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))))))))))) {
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pr_warn("Cert %s has expired\n", cert->fingerprint);
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ret = -EKEYEXPIRED;
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goto error_free_cert;
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