rps: fix insufficient bounds checking in store_rps_dev_flow_table_cnt()
Setting a large rps_flow_cnt like (1 << 30) on 32-bit platform will cause a kernel oops due to insufficient bounds checking. if (count > 1<<30) { /* Enforce a limit to prevent overflow */ return -EINVAL; } count = roundup_pow_of_two(count); table = vmalloc(RPS_DEV_FLOW_TABLE_SIZE(count)); Note that the macro RPS_DEV_FLOW_TABLE_SIZE(count) is defined as: ... + (count * sizeof(struct rps_dev_flow)) where sizeof(struct rps_dev_flow) is 8. (1 << 30) * 8 will overflow 32 bits. This patch replaces the magic number (1 << 30) with a symbolic bound. Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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1 changed files with 5 additions and 2 deletions
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@ -665,11 +665,14 @@ static ssize_t store_rps_dev_flow_table_cnt(struct netdev_rx_queue *queue,
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if (count) {
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int i;
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if (count > 1<<30) {
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if (count > INT_MAX)
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return -EINVAL;
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count = roundup_pow_of_two(count);
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if (count > (ULONG_MAX - sizeof(struct rps_dev_flow_table))
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/ sizeof(struct rps_dev_flow)) {
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/* Enforce a limit to prevent overflow */
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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count = roundup_pow_of_two(count);
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table = vmalloc(RPS_DEV_FLOW_TABLE_SIZE(count));
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if (!table)
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return -ENOMEM;
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