[PATCH] dm-crypt: zero key before freeing it
Zap the memory before freeing it so we don't leave crypto information around in memory. Signed-off-by: Stefan Rompf <stefan@loplof.de> Acked-by: Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org> Acked-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
0b56306e56
commit
9d3520a339
1 changed files with 5 additions and 0 deletions
|
@ -690,6 +690,8 @@ static int crypt_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv)
|
|||
bad2:
|
||||
crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
|
||||
bad1:
|
||||
/* Must zero key material before freeing */
|
||||
memset(cc, 0, sizeof(*cc) + cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
|
||||
kfree(cc);
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -706,6 +708,9 @@ static void crypt_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
|
|||
cc->iv_gen_ops->dtr(cc);
|
||||
crypto_free_tfm(cc->tfm);
|
||||
dm_put_device(ti, cc->dev);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Must zero key material before freeing */
|
||||
memset(cc, 0, sizeof(*cc) + cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
|
||||
kfree(cc);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in a new issue