CacheFiles: Fix the documentation to use the correct credential pointer names
Adjust the CacheFiles documentation to use the correct names of the credential pointers in task_struct. The documentation was using names from the old versions of the credentials patches. Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ A NOTE ON SECURITY
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==================
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CacheFiles makes use of the split security in the task_struct. It allocates
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its own task_security structure, and redirects current->act_as to point to it
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its own task_security structure, and redirects current->cred to point to it
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when it acts on behalf of another process, in that process's context.
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The reason it does this is that it calls vfs_mkdir() and suchlike rather than
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@ -429,9 +429,9 @@ This means it may lose signals or ptrace events for example, and affects what
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the process looks like in /proc.
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So CacheFiles makes use of a logical split in the security between the
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objective security (task->sec) and the subjective security (task->act_as). The
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objective security holds the intrinsic security properties of a process and is
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never overridden. This is what appears in /proc, and is what is used when a
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objective security (task->real_cred) and the subjective security (task->cred).
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The objective security holds the intrinsic security properties of a process and
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is never overridden. This is what appears in /proc, and is what is used when a
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process is the target of an operation by some other process (SIGKILL for
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example).
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