Revert "SELinux: use SECINITSID_NETMSG instead of SECINITSID_UNLABELED for NetLabel"
This reverts commit 9faf65fb6e
.
It bit people like Michal Piotrowski:
"My system is too secure, I can not login :)"
because it changed how CONFIG_NETLABEL worked, and broke older SElinux
policies.
As a result, quoth James Morris:
"Can you please revert this patch?
We thought it only affected people running MLS, but it will affect others.
Sorry for the hassle."
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Michal Piotrowski <michal.k.k.piotrowski@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
16cefa8c38
commit
8d9107e8c5
2 changed files with 31 additions and 24 deletions
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@ -3129,19 +3129,17 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
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/**
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* selinux_skb_extlbl_sid - Determine the external label of a packet
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* @skb: the packet
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* @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only external labels
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* @sid: the packet's SID
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*
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* Description:
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* Check the various different forms of external packet labeling and determine
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* the external SID for the packet. If only one form of external labeling is
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* present then it is used, if both labeled IPsec and NetLabel labels are
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* present then the SELinux type information is taken from the labeled IPsec
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* SA and the MLS sensitivity label information is taken from the NetLabel
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* security attributes. This bit of "magic" is done in the call to
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* selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid().
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* the external SID for the packet.
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*
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*/
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static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
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static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
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u32 base_sid,
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u32 *sid)
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{
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u32 xfrm_sid;
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u32 nlbl_sid;
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@ -3149,9 +3147,10 @@ static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
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selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
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if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
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(xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL ?
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SECINITSID_NETMSG : xfrm_sid),
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base_sid : xfrm_sid),
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&nlbl_sid) != 0)
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nlbl_sid = SECSID_NULL;
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*sid = (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL ? xfrm_sid : nlbl_sid);
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}
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@ -3696,7 +3695,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
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if (sock && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
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selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
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else if (skb)
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selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peer_secid);
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selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peer_secid);
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if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
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err = -EINVAL;
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@ -3757,7 +3756,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
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u32 newsid;
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u32 peersid;
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selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peersid);
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selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peersid);
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if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
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req->secid = sksec->sid;
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req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
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@ -3795,7 +3794,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
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{
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struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
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selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &sksec->peer_sid);
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selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &sksec->peer_sid);
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}
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static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
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@ -158,7 +158,9 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid)
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netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
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rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, &secattr);
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if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
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rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr, base_sid, sid);
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rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr,
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base_sid,
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sid);
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else
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*sid = SECSID_NULL;
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netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
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@ -196,7 +198,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
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if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 &&
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secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE &&
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security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr,
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SECINITSID_NETMSG,
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SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
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&nlbl_peer_sid) == 0)
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sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid;
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netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
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@ -293,32 +295,38 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
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struct avc_audit_data *ad)
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{
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int rc;
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u32 nlbl_sid;
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u32 perm;
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u32 netlbl_sid;
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u32 recv_perm;
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rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, SECINITSID_NETMSG, &nlbl_sid);
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rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
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SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
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&netlbl_sid);
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if (rc != 0)
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return rc;
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if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL)
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nlbl_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
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if (netlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL)
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return 0;
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switch (sksec->sclass) {
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case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
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perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
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recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
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break;
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case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
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perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
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recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
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break;
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default:
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perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
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recv_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
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}
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rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, nlbl_sid, sksec->sclass, perm, ad);
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rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid,
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netlbl_sid,
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sksec->sclass,
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recv_perm,
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ad);
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if (rc == 0)
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return 0;
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if (nlbl_sid != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
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netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc);
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netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc);
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return rc;
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}
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