SELinux: check open perms in dentry_open not inode_permission
Some operations, like searching a directory path or connecting a unix domain socket, make explicit calls into inode_permission. Our choices are to either try to come up with a signature for all of the explicit calls to inode_permission and do not check open on those, or to move the open checks to dentry_open where we know this is always an open operation. This patch moves the checks to dentry_open. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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0da939b005
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1 changed files with 32 additions and 31 deletions
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@ -1686,35 +1686,6 @@ static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
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return av;
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}
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/*
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* Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
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* open permission.
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*/
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static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
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{
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u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
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if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
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/*
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* lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
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*/
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if (S_ISREG(mode))
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av |= FILE__OPEN;
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else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
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av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
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else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
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av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
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else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
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av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
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else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
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av |= DIR__OPEN;
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else
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printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
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"unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
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}
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return av;
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}
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/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
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static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
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{
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@ -1738,6 +1709,36 @@ static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
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return av;
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}
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/*
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* Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
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* open permission.
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*/
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static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
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{
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u32 av = file_to_av(file);
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if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
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mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
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/*
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* lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
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*/
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if (S_ISREG(mode))
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av |= FILE__OPEN;
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else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
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av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
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else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
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av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
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else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
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av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
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else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
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av |= DIR__OPEN;
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else
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printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
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"unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
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}
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return av;
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}
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/* Hook functions begin here. */
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static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
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@ -2654,7 +2655,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
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}
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return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
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open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
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file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
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}
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static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
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@ -3170,7 +3171,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
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* new inode label or new policy.
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* This check is not redundant - do not remove.
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*/
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return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
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return inode_has_perm(current, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
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}
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/* task security operations */
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