Techwizz/kernel-fxtec-pro1x
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity

Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.c

Browse source 
Currently we duplicate the mmap_min_addr test in cap_file_mmap and in
security_file_mmap if !CONFIG_SECURITY.  This patch moves cap_file_mmap
into commoncap.c and then calls that function directly from
security_file_mmap ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY like all of the other capability
checks are done.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This commit is contained in:
Eric Paris 2009-07-31 12:53:58 -04:00 committed by James Morris
parent 012a5299a2
commit 7c73875e7d
3 changed files with 34 additions and 12 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

7
include/linux/security.h
View file

@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only);
extern int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags);
extern int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
@ -2197,9 +2200,7 @@ static inline int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned long addr_only)
{
if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
return -EACCES;
return 0;
return cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
}
static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,

9
security/capability.c
View file

@ -330,15 +330,6 @@ static int cap_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int command,
return 0;
}
static int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
{
if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
return -EACCES;
return 0;
}
static int cap_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot)
{

30
security/commoncap.c
View file

@ -984,3 +984,33 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
}
/*
* cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr
* @file: unused
* @reqprot: unused
* @prot: unused
* @flags: unused
* @addr: address attempting to be mapped
* @addr_only: unused
*
* If the process is attempting to map memory below mmap_min_addr they need
* CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the
* capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
* -EPERM if not.
*/
int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
{
int ret = 0;
if (addr < mmap_min_addr) {
ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
if (ret == 0)
current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
}
return ret;
}