aio: check for multiplication overflow in do_io_submit
Tavis Ormandy pointed out that do_io_submit does not do proper bounds checking on the passed-in iocb array: if (unlikely(nr < 0)) return -EINVAL; if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(iocbpp))))) return -EFAULT; ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ The attached patch checks for overflow, and if it is detected, the number of iocbs submitted is scaled down to a number that will fit in the long. This is an ok thing to do, as sys_io_submit is documented as returning the number of iocbs submitted, so callers should handle a return value of less than the 'nr' argument passed in. Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@cmpxchg8b.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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fs/aio.c
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fs/aio.c
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@ -1659,6 +1659,9 @@ long do_io_submit(aio_context_t ctx_id, long nr,
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if (unlikely(nr < 0))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (unlikely(nr > LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp)))
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nr = LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp);
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if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(*iocbpp)))))
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return -EFAULT;
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