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[PATCH] audit: support for object context filters

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This patch introduces object audit filters based on the elements
of the SELinux context.

Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

 kernel/auditfilter.c           |   25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/auditsc.c               |   40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/ss/services.c |   18 +++++++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This commit is contained in:
Darrel Goeddel 2006-06-29 16:57:08 -05:00 committed by Al Viro
parent 3a6b9f85c6
commit 6e5a2d1d32
3 changed files with 82 additions and 1 deletions
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25
kernel/auditfilter.c
View file

@ -475,6 +475,11 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
if (IS_ERR(str))
goto exit_free;
@ -616,6 +621,11 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
break;
@ -659,6 +669,11 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
return 1;
break;
@ -779,6 +794,11 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
&old->fields[i]);
break;
@ -1542,6 +1562,11 @@ static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
return 1;
}
}

40
kernel/auditsc.c
View file

@ -342,6 +342,46 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
ctx);
}
break;
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
also applies here */
if (f->se_rule) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
name->osid, f->type, f->op,
f->se_rule, ctx);
} else if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
ctx->names[j].osid,
f->type, f->op,
f->se_rule, ctx)) {
++result;
break;
}
}
}
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (ctx) {
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
for (aux = ctx->aux; aux;
aux = aux->next) {
if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
++result;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
break;
case AUDIT_ARG0:
case AUDIT_ARG1:
case AUDIT_ARG2:

18
security/selinux/ss/services.c
View file

@ -1848,12 +1848,17 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
/* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
/* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
return -EINVAL;
@ -1875,6 +1880,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
switch (field) {
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
if (!userdatum)
rc = -EINVAL;
@ -1882,6 +1888,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
if (!roledatum)
rc = -EINVAL;
@ -1889,6 +1896,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
if (!typedatum)
rc = -EINVAL;
@ -1897,6 +1905,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
break;
}
@ -1949,6 +1959,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
without a match */
switch (field) {
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
switch (op) {
case AUDIT_EQUAL:
match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
@ -1959,6 +1970,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
}
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
switch (op) {
case AUDIT_EQUAL:
match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
@ -1969,6 +1981,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
}
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
switch (op) {
case AUDIT_EQUAL:
match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
@ -1980,7 +1993,10 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
level = (field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ?
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
&ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
switch (op) {
case AUDIT_EQUAL: