[PATCH] proc: Remove bogus proc_task_permission
First we can access every /proc/<tgid>/task/<pid> directory as /proc/<pid> so proc_task_permission is not usefully limiting visibility. Second having related filesystems information should have nothing to do with process visibility. kill does not implement any checks like that. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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1 changed files with 0 additions and 63 deletions
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@ -361,54 +361,6 @@ static int proc_root_link(struct inode *inode, struct dentry **dentry, struct vf
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return result;
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}
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/* Same as proc_root_link, but this addionally tries to get fs from other
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* threads in the group */
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static int proc_task_root_link(struct inode *inode, struct dentry **dentry,
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struct vfsmount **mnt)
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{
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struct fs_struct *fs;
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int result = -ENOENT;
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struct task_struct *leader = proc_task(inode);
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task_lock(leader);
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fs = leader->fs;
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if (fs) {
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atomic_inc(&fs->count);
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task_unlock(leader);
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} else {
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/* Try to get fs from other threads */
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task_unlock(leader);
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read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
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if (pid_alive(leader)) {
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struct task_struct *task = leader;
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while ((task = next_thread(task)) != leader) {
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task_lock(task);
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fs = task->fs;
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if (fs) {
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atomic_inc(&fs->count);
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task_unlock(task);
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break;
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}
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task_unlock(task);
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}
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}
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read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
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}
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if (fs) {
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read_lock(&fs->lock);
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*mnt = mntget(fs->rootmnt);
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*dentry = dget(fs->root);
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read_unlock(&fs->lock);
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result = 0;
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put_fs_struct(fs);
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}
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return result;
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}
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#define MAY_PTRACE(task) \
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(task == current || \
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(task->parent == current && \
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@ -600,20 +552,6 @@ static int proc_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
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return proc_check_root(inode);
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}
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static int proc_task_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
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{
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struct dentry *root;
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struct vfsmount *vfsmnt;
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if (generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL) != 0)
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return -EACCES;
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if (proc_task_root_link(inode, &root, &vfsmnt))
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return -ENOENT;
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return proc_check_chroot(root, vfsmnt);
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}
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extern struct seq_operations proc_pid_maps_op;
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static int maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
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{
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@ -1583,7 +1521,6 @@ static struct inode_operations proc_fd_inode_operations = {
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static struct inode_operations proc_task_inode_operations = {
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.lookup = proc_task_lookup,
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.permission = proc_task_permission,
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};
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
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