tracing: limit the number of loops the ring buffer self test can make
Impact: prevent deadlock if ring buffer gets corrupted This patch adds a paranoid check to make sure the ring buffer consumer does not go into an infinite loop. Since the ring buffer has been set to read only, the consumer should not loop for more than the ring buffer size. A check is added to make sure the consumer does not loop more than the ring buffer size. Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com>
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@ -23,10 +23,20 @@ static int trace_test_buffer_cpu(struct trace_array *tr, int cpu)
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{
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struct ring_buffer_event *event;
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struct trace_entry *entry;
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unsigned int loops = 0;
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while ((event = ring_buffer_consume(tr->buffer, cpu, NULL))) {
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entry = ring_buffer_event_data(event);
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/*
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* The ring buffer is a size of trace_buf_size, if
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* we loop more than the size, there's something wrong
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* with the ring buffer.
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*/
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if (loops++ > trace_buf_size) {
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printk(KERN_CONT ".. bad ring buffer ");
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goto failed;
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}
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if (!trace_valid_entry(entry)) {
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printk(KERN_CONT ".. invalid entry %d ",
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entry->type);
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