KEYS: restrict /proc/keys by credentials at open time
When checking for permission to view keys whilst reading from
/proc/keys, we should use the credentials with which the /proc/keys file
was opened. This is because, in a classic type of exploit, it can be
possible to bypass checks for the *current* credentials by passing the
file descriptor to a suid program.
Following commit 34dbbcdbf6
("Make file credentials available to the
seqfile interfaces") we can finally fix it. So let's do it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
8f674565d4
commit
4aa68e07d8
1 changed files with 2 additions and 6 deletions
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@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
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struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
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struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
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.index_key.type = key->type,
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.index_key.type = key->type,
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.index_key.description = key->description,
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.index_key.description = key->description,
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.cred = current_cred(),
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.cred = m->file->f_cred,
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.match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed,
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.match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed,
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.match_data.raw_data = key,
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.match_data.raw_data = key,
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.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
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.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
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@ -207,11 +207,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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/* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key (assuming
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/* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key */
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* non-possession)
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* - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our
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* access to __current_cred() safe
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*/
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rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
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rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
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if (rc < 0)
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if (rc < 0)
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return 0;
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return 0;
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