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Merge branch 'next-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next

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This commit is contained in:
James Morris 2014-03-12 16:33:48 +11:00
commit 33b2533518
20 changed files with 169 additions and 145 deletions
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17
MAINTAINERS
View file

@ -3325,7 +3325,9 @@ F: Documentation/filesystems/ext4.txt
F: fs/ext4/
Extended Verification Module (EVM)
M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
L: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
F: security/integrity/evm/
@ -4339,8 +4341,11 @@ S: Maintained
F: drivers/ipack/
INTEGRITY MEASUREMENT ARCHITECTURE (IMA)
M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
M: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
L: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
L: linux-ima-user@lists.sourceforge.net
L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
F: security/integrity/ima/
@ -5003,8 +5008,8 @@ F: include/keys/
F: security/keys/
KEYS-TRUSTED
M: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
M: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
L: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
S: Supported
@ -5014,8 +5019,8 @@ F: security/keys/trusted.c
F: security/keys/trusted.h
KEYS-ENCRYPTED
M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
M: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
M: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
L: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
S: Supported

6
include/linux/fs.h
View file

@ -586,6 +586,9 @@ struct inode {
atomic_t i_count;
atomic_t i_dio_count;
atomic_t i_writecount;
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
atomic_t i_readcount; /* struct files open RO */
#endif
const struct file_operations *i_fop; /* former ->i_op->default_file_ops */
struct file_lock *i_flock;
struct address_space i_data;
@ -606,9 +609,6 @@ struct inode {
struct hlist_head i_fsnotify_marks;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
atomic_t i_readcount; /* struct files open RO */
#endif
void *i_private; /* fs or device private pointer */
};

8
security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
View file

@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
config EVM
boolean "EVM support"
depends on SECURITY && KEYS && (TRUSTED_KEYS=y || TRUSTED_KEYS=n)
select CRYPTO_HMAC
select CRYPTO_MD5
select CRYPTO_SHA1
depends on SECURITY
select KEYS
select ENCRYPTED_KEYS
select CRYPTO_HMAC
select CRYPTO_SHA1
default n
help
EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against

28
security/integrity/evm/evm.h
View file

@ -32,19 +32,19 @@ extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[];
extern int evm_init_key(void);
extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *req_xattr_name,
const char *req_xattr_value,
size_t req_xattr_value_len);
extern int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
const char *req_xattr_value,
size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
extern int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
const char *req_xattr_value,
size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
extern int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
char *hmac_val);
extern int evm_init_secfs(void);
int evm_init_key(void);
int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *req_xattr_name,
const char *req_xattr_value,
size_t req_xattr_value_len);
int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
const char *req_xattr_value,
size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
const char *req_xattr_value,
size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
char *hmac_val);
int evm_init_secfs(void);
#endif

8
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
View file

@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
* Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
@ -103,13 +105,13 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
umode_t mode;
} hmac_misc;
memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc);
memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc));
hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid);
hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc);
crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
if (evm_hmac_version > 1)
crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid,
sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid));
@ -221,7 +223,7 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC);
if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "init_desc failed\n");
pr_info("init_desc failed\n");
return PTR_ERR(desc);
}

6
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
View file

@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
* evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
@ -432,7 +434,7 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
error = evm_init_secfs();
if (error < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: Error registering secfs\n");
pr_info("Error registering secfs\n");
goto err;
}
@ -449,7 +451,7 @@ static int __init evm_display_config(void)
char **xattrname;
for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++)
printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: %s\n", *xattrname);
pr_info("%s\n", *xattrname);
return 0;
}

6
security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
View file

@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
* - Get the key and enable EVM
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include "evm.h"
@ -79,9 +81,9 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
error = evm_init_key();
if (!error) {
evm_initialized = 1;
pr_info("EVM: initialized\n");
pr_info("initialized\n");
} else
pr_err("EVM: initialization failed\n");
pr_err("initialization failed\n");
return count;
}

2
security/integrity/iint.c
View file

@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
{
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo;
memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint);
memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
iint->version = 0;
iint->flags = 0UL;
iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;

2
security/integrity/ima/ima.h
View file

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
#include "../integrity.h"
enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN,
IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT, IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
/* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */

20
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
View file

@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
int violation, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *filename)
{
const char *op = "add_template_measure";
const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error";
static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error";
char *template_name = entry->template_desc->name;
int result;
struct {
@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
const char *op, const char *cause)
{
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
int violation = 1;
int result;
@ -160,10 +160,10 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MMAP_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK)
*
* The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
* subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
* func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
* mask: contains the permission mask
* func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
* mask: contains the permission mask
* fsmagic: hex value
*
* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
*
* We only get here if the inode has not already been measured,
* but the measurement could already exist:
* - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
* - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
* different filesystems.
* - the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info,
* containing the hashing info.
@ -260,8 +260,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len)
{
const char *op = "add_template_measure";
const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
static const char audit_cause[] = "ENOMEM";
int result = -ENOMEM;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
@ -332,5 +332,5 @@ const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf)
pathname = NULL;
}
}
return pathname;
return pathname ?: (const char *)path->dentry->d_name.name;
}

4
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
View file

@ -177,11 +177,11 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len)
{
static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
char *cause = "unknown";
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
const char *op = "appraise_data";
char *cause = "unknown";
int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
if (!ima_appraise)

37
security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
View file

@ -10,9 +10,11 @@
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*
* File: ima_crypto.c
* Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
* Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
@ -85,16 +87,20 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rbuf) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
if (i_size == 0)
goto out;
}
rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
read = 1;
}
i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
while (offset < i_size) {
int rbuf_len;
@ -111,12 +117,12 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
if (rc)
break;
}
kfree(rbuf);
if (!rc)
rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest);
if (read)
file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
kfree(rbuf);
out:
if (!rc)
rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest);
return rc;
}
@ -161,15 +167,22 @@ static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
return rc;
for (i = 0; i < num_fields; i++) {
u8 buffer[IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1] = { 0 };
u8 *data_to_hash = field_data[i].data;
u32 datalen = field_data[i].len;
if (strcmp(td->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) {
rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash,
(const u8 *) &field_data[i].len,
sizeof(field_data[i].len));
if (rc)
break;
} else if (strcmp(td->fields[i]->field_id, "n") == 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data_to_hash, datalen);
data_to_hash = buffer;
datalen = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1;
}
rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, field_data[i].data,
field_data[i].len);
rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, data_to_hash, datalen);
if (rc)
break;
}
@ -205,7 +218,7 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
return;
if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0)
pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
}
/*

8
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
View file

@ -133,14 +133,14 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
* PCR used is always the same (config option) in
* little-endian format
*/
ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof pcr);
ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof(pcr));
/* 2nd: template digest */
ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* 3rd: template name size */
namelen = strlen(e->template_desc->name);
ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen);
ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof(namelen));
/* 4th: template name */
ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen);
@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "d") == 0)
show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN;
if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "n") == 0)
show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT;
field->field_show(m, show, &e->template_data[i]);
}
return 0;
@ -290,7 +292,7 @@ static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
/*
* ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file
*/
static int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
/* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */
if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY))

9
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
View file

@ -14,6 +14,9 @@
* File: ima_init.c
* initialization and cleanup functions
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
@ -42,10 +45,10 @@ int ima_used_chip;
*/
static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
{
static const char op[] = "add_boot_aggregate";
const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
const char *op = "add_boot_aggregate";
const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
int result = -ENOMEM;
int violation = 0;
struct {
@ -93,7 +96,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
ima_used_chip = 1;
if (!ima_used_chip)
pr_info("IMA: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
rc = ima_init_crypto();
if (rc)

11
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
View file

@ -71,15 +71,14 @@ __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
* ima_rdwr_violation_check
*
* Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
* - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
* - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
* results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
* - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
* could result in a file measurement error.
* could result in a file measurement error.
*
*/
static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
{
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
int must_measure;
@ -111,8 +110,6 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
return;
pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
if (!pathname || strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
pathname = dentry->d_name.name;
if (send_tomtou)
ima_add_violation(file, pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
@ -220,9 +217,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
if (rc != 0)
goto out_digsig;
pathname = !filename ? ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf) : filename;
if (!pathname)
pathname = (const char *)file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
pathname = filename ?: ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,

75
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*
* ima_policy.c
* - initialize default measure policy rules
* - initialize default measure policy rules
*
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
@ -21,8 +21,8 @@
#include "ima.h"
/* flags definitions */
#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
#define IMA_MASK 0x0002
#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
#define IMA_MASK 0x0002
#define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
#define IMA_UID 0x0008
#define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
@ -69,35 +69,35 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
* and running executables.
*/
static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = MEASURE,.func = MMAP_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
{.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
{.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
{.action = MEASURE,.func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
};
static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,.flags = IMA_FOWNER},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
};
static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
@ -122,12 +122,12 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
/*
/*
* Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be
* reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old,
* stale LSM policy.
*
* Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.
* Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.
* We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't.
*/
static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
@ -167,9 +167,11 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int i;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func)
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
(rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
return false;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && rule->mask != mask)
if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
(rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
return false;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
&& rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
@ -216,7 +218,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
retried = 1;
ima_lsm_update_rules();
goto retry;
}
}
if (!rc)
return false;
}
@ -232,7 +234,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func)
if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
switch(func) {
switch (func) {
case MMAP_CHECK:
return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
case BPRM_CHECK:
@ -304,7 +306,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) {
if (i < measure_entries)
list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list,
@ -329,7 +331,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
*/
void ima_update_policy(void)
{
const char *op = "policy_update";
static const char op[] = "policy_update";
const char *cause = "already exists";
int result = 1;
int audit_info = 0;
@ -520,8 +522,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
break;
}
result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16,
&entry->fsmagic);
result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic);
if (!result)
entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
break;
@ -645,7 +646,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
*/
ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
{
const char *op = "update_policy";
static const char op[] = "update_policy";
char *p;
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
ssize_t result, len;

12
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
View file

@ -18,6 +18,9 @@
* The measurement list is append-only. No entry is
* ever removed or changed during the boot-cycle.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
@ -72,7 +75,7 @@ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
qe = kmalloc(sizeof(*qe), GFP_KERNEL);
if (qe == NULL) {
pr_err("IMA: OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry.\n");
pr_err("OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
qe->entry = entry;
@ -95,8 +98,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash)
result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, hash);
if (result != 0)
pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n",
result);
pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result);
return result;
}
@ -115,7 +117,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
if (!violation) {
memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof digest);
memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof(digest));
if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest)) {
audit_cause = "hash_exists";
result = -EEXIST;
@ -131,7 +133,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
}
if (violation) /* invalidate pcr */
memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof digest);
memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof(digest));
tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digest);
if (tpmresult != 0) {

19
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
View file

@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
* File: ima_template.c
* Helpers to manage template descriptors.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include "ima.h"
@ -19,20 +22,20 @@
static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
{.name = "ima-ng",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
{.name = "ima-sig",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
{.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
{.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
};
static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
{.field_id = "d",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
{.field_id = "d", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_digest},
{.field_id = "n",.field_init = ima_eventname_init,
{.field_id = "n", .field_init = ima_eventname_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_string},
{.field_id = "d-ng",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
{.field_id = "d-ng", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
{.field_id = "n-ng",.field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
{.field_id = "n-ng", .field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_string},
{.field_id = "sig",.field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
{.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
};
@ -58,7 +61,7 @@ static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
*/
if (template_len == 3 && strcmp(str, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0 &&
ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_SHA1 && ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_MD5) {
pr_err("IMA: template does not support hash alg\n");
pr_err("template does not support hash alg\n");
return 1;
}

31
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
View file

@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ static bool ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(u8 algo)
enum data_formats {
DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0,
DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO,
DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME,
DATA_FMT_STRING,
DATA_FMT_HEX
};
@ -37,18 +36,10 @@ static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
u8 *buf, *buf_ptr;
u32 buflen;
u32 buflen = datalen;
switch (datafmt) {
case DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME:
buflen = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1;
break;
case DATA_FMT_STRING:
if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING)
buflen = datalen + 1;
break;
default:
buflen = datalen;
}
buf = kzalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
@ -63,7 +54,7 @@ static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen,
* split into multiple template fields (the space is the delimitator
* character for measurements lists in ASCII format).
*/
if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME || datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) {
if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) {
for (buf_ptr = buf; buf_ptr - buf < datalen; buf_ptr++)
if (*buf_ptr == ' ')
*buf_ptr = '_';
@ -109,13 +100,16 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_binary(struct seq_file *m,
enum data_formats datafmt,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
if (show != IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN)
ima_putc(m, &field_data->len, sizeof(u32));
u32 len = (show == IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT) ?
strlen(field_data->data) : field_data->len;
if (!field_data->len)
if (show != IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN)
ima_putc(m, &len, sizeof(len));
if (!len)
return;
ima_putc(m, field_data->data, field_data->len);
ima_putc(m, field_data->data, len);
}
static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m,
@ -129,6 +123,7 @@ static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m,
break;
case IMA_SHOW_BINARY:
case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN:
case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT:
ima_show_template_data_binary(m, show, datafmt, field_data);
break;
default:
@ -277,8 +272,6 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
{
const char *cur_filename = NULL;
u32 cur_filename_len = 0;
enum data_formats fmt = size_limit ?
DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME : DATA_FMT_STRING;
BUG_ON(filename == NULL && file == NULL);
@ -301,7 +294,7 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX;
out:
return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len,
fmt, field_data);
DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data);
}
/*

5
security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
*
* File: integrity_audit.c
* Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
* Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
*/
#include <linux/fs.h>
@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const char *cause, int result, int audit_info)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char name[TASK_COMM_LEN];
if (!integrity_audit_info && audit_info == 1) /* Skip info messages */
return;
@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
audit_log_format(ab, " cause=");
audit_log_string(ab, cause);
audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(name, current));
if (fname) {
audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, fname);