Btrfs: fix checks in BTRFS_IOC_CLONE_RANGE
1. The BTRFS_IOC_CLONE and BTRFS_IOC_CLONE_RANGE ioctls should check whether the donor file is append-only before writing to it. 2. The BTRFS_IOC_CLONE_RANGE ioctl appears to have an integer overflow that allows a user to specify an out-of-bounds range to copy from the source file (if off + len wraps around). I haven't been able to successfully exploit this, but I'd imagine that a clever attacker could use this to read things he shouldn't. Even if it's not exploitable, it couldn't hurt to be safe. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com> cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@oracle.com>
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1 changed files with 2 additions and 2 deletions
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@ -1458,7 +1458,7 @@ static noinline long btrfs_ioctl_clone(struct file *file, unsigned long srcfd,
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*/
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/* the destination must be opened for writing */
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if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
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if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) || (file->f_flags & O_APPEND))
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return -EINVAL;
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ret = mnt_want_write(file->f_path.mnt);
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@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ static noinline long btrfs_ioctl_clone(struct file *file, unsigned long srcfd,
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/* determine range to clone */
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ret = -EINVAL;
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if (off >= src->i_size || off + len > src->i_size)
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if (off + len > src->i_size || off + len < off)
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goto out_unlock;
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if (len == 0)
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olen = len = src->i_size - off;
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