perf/x86/intel/pt: Do validate the size of a kernel address filter
Right now, the kernel address filters in PT are prone to integer overflow that may happen in adding filter's size to its offset to obtain the end of the range. Such an overflow would also throw a #GP in the PT event configuration path. Fix this by explicitly validating the result of this calculation. Reported-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@infradead.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org#v4.7 Cc: vince@deater.net Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160915151352.21306-4-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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1 changed files with 7 additions and 2 deletions
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@ -1089,8 +1089,13 @@ static int pt_event_addr_filters_validate(struct list_head *filters)
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if (!filter->range || !filter->size)
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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if (!filter->inode && !valid_kernel_ip(filter->offset))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (!filter->inode) {
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if (!valid_kernel_ip(filter->offset))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (!valid_kernel_ip(filter->offset + filter->size))
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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if (++range > pt_cap_get(PT_CAP_num_address_ranges))
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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