2007-10-17 00:29:46 -06:00
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/* Basic authentication token and access key management
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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*
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2008-04-29 02:01:31 -06:00
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* Copyright (C) 2004-2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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2006-06-27 03:53:54 -06:00
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#include <linux/poison.h>
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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2005-10-30 16:02:44 -07:00
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#include <linux/security.h>
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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#include <linux/workqueue.h>
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2006-06-26 01:24:54 -06:00
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#include <linux/random.h>
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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#include <linux/err.h>
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2009-02-26 17:27:38 -07:00
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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#include "internal.h"
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2006-12-06 21:33:20 -07:00
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static struct kmem_cache *key_jar;
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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struct rb_root key_serial_tree; /* tree of keys indexed by serial */
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DEFINE_SPINLOCK(key_serial_lock);
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struct rb_root key_user_tree; /* tree of quota records indexed by UID */
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DEFINE_SPINLOCK(key_user_lock);
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2008-04-29 02:01:32 -06:00
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unsigned int key_quota_root_maxkeys = 200; /* root's key count quota */
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unsigned int key_quota_root_maxbytes = 20000; /* root's key space quota */
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unsigned int key_quota_maxkeys = 200; /* general key count quota */
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unsigned int key_quota_maxbytes = 20000; /* general key space quota */
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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static LIST_HEAD(key_types_list);
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static DECLARE_RWSEM(key_types_sem);
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2006-11-22 07:55:48 -07:00
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static void key_cleanup(struct work_struct *work);
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static DECLARE_WORK(key_cleanup_task, key_cleanup);
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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/* we serialise key instantiation and link */
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2007-10-17 00:29:46 -06:00
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DEFINE_MUTEX(key_construction_mutex);
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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/* any key who's type gets unegistered will be re-typed to this */
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2006-01-06 01:11:25 -07:00
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static struct key_type key_type_dead = {
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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.name = "dead",
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};
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#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
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void __key_check(const struct key *key)
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{
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printk("__key_check: key %p {%08x} should be {%08x}\n",
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key, key->magic, KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC);
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BUG();
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}
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#endif
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* get the key quota record for a user, allocating a new record if one doesn't
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* already exist
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*/
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2009-02-26 17:27:38 -07:00
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struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid, struct user_namespace *user_ns)
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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{
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struct key_user *candidate = NULL, *user;
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struct rb_node *parent = NULL;
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struct rb_node **p;
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try_again:
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p = &key_user_tree.rb_node;
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spin_lock(&key_user_lock);
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/* search the tree for a user record with a matching UID */
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while (*p) {
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parent = *p;
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user = rb_entry(parent, struct key_user, node);
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if (uid < user->uid)
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p = &(*p)->rb_left;
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else if (uid > user->uid)
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p = &(*p)->rb_right;
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2009-02-26 17:27:38 -07:00
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else if (user_ns < user->user_ns)
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p = &(*p)->rb_left;
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else if (user_ns > user->user_ns)
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p = &(*p)->rb_right;
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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else
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goto found;
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}
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/* if we get here, we failed to find a match in the tree */
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if (!candidate) {
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/* allocate a candidate user record if we don't already have
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* one */
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spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
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user = NULL;
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candidate = kmalloc(sizeof(struct key_user), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (unlikely(!candidate))
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goto out;
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/* the allocation may have scheduled, so we need to repeat the
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* search lest someone else added the record whilst we were
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* asleep */
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goto try_again;
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}
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/* if we get here, then the user record still hadn't appeared on the
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* second pass - so we use the candidate record */
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atomic_set(&candidate->usage, 1);
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atomic_set(&candidate->nkeys, 0);
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atomic_set(&candidate->nikeys, 0);
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candidate->uid = uid;
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2009-02-26 17:27:38 -07:00
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candidate->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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candidate->qnkeys = 0;
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candidate->qnbytes = 0;
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spin_lock_init(&candidate->lock);
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2007-10-17 00:29:46 -06:00
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mutex_init(&candidate->cons_lock);
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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rb_link_node(&candidate->node, parent, p);
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rb_insert_color(&candidate->node, &key_user_tree);
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spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
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user = candidate;
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goto out;
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/* okay - we found a user record for this UID */
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found:
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atomic_inc(&user->usage);
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spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
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2005-11-07 02:01:35 -07:00
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kfree(candidate);
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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out:
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return user;
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} /* end key_user_lookup() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* dispose of a user structure
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*/
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void key_user_put(struct key_user *user)
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{
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if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&user->usage, &key_user_lock)) {
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rb_erase(&user->node, &key_user_tree);
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spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
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2009-02-26 17:27:38 -07:00
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put_user_ns(user->user_ns);
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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kfree(user);
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}
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} /* end key_user_put() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* assign a key the next unique serial number
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2006-06-26 01:24:54 -06:00
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* - these are assigned randomly to avoid security issues through covert
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* channel problems
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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*/
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static inline void key_alloc_serial(struct key *key)
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{
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struct rb_node *parent, **p;
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struct key *xkey;
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2006-06-26 01:24:54 -06:00
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/* propose a random serial number and look for a hole for it in the
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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* serial number tree */
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2006-06-26 01:24:54 -06:00
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do {
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get_random_bytes(&key->serial, sizeof(key->serial));
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key->serial >>= 1; /* negative numbers are not permitted */
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} while (key->serial < 3);
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spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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2007-02-06 06:45:51 -07:00
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attempt_insertion:
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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parent = NULL;
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p = &key_serial_tree.rb_node;
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while (*p) {
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parent = *p;
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xkey = rb_entry(parent, struct key, serial_node);
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if (key->serial < xkey->serial)
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p = &(*p)->rb_left;
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else if (key->serial > xkey->serial)
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p = &(*p)->rb_right;
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else
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goto serial_exists;
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}
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2007-02-06 06:45:51 -07:00
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/* we've found a suitable hole - arrange for this key to occupy it */
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rb_link_node(&key->serial_node, parent, p);
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rb_insert_color(&key->serial_node, &key_serial_tree);
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spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
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return;
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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/* we found a key with the proposed serial number - walk the tree from
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* that point looking for the next unused serial number */
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2006-06-26 01:24:54 -06:00
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serial_exists:
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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for (;;) {
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2006-06-26 01:24:54 -06:00
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key->serial++;
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2007-02-06 06:45:51 -07:00
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if (key->serial < 3) {
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key->serial = 3;
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goto attempt_insertion;
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}
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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parent = rb_next(parent);
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if (!parent)
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2007-02-06 06:45:51 -07:00
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goto attempt_insertion;
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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xkey = rb_entry(parent, struct key, serial_node);
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if (key->serial < xkey->serial)
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2007-02-06 06:45:51 -07:00
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goto attempt_insertion;
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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}
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} /* end key_alloc_serial() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* allocate a key of the specified type
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* - update the user's quota to reflect the existence of the key
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2006-01-06 01:11:24 -07:00
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* - called from a key-type operation with key_types_sem read-locked by
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* key_create_or_update()
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* - this prevents unregistration of the key type
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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* - upon return the key is as yet uninstantiated; the caller needs to either
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* instantiate the key or discard it before returning
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*/
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struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
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CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 16:39:23 -07:00
|
|
|
uid_t uid, gid_t gid, const struct cred *cred,
|
2006-06-26 01:24:50 -06:00
|
|
|
key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct key_user *user = NULL;
|
|
|
|
struct key *key;
|
|
|
|
size_t desclen, quotalen;
|
2005-10-30 16:02:44 -07:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
if (!desc || !*desc)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
desclen = strlen(desc) + 1;
|
|
|
|
quotalen = desclen + type->def_datalen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get hold of the key tracking for this user */
|
2009-02-26 17:27:38 -07:00
|
|
|
user = key_user_lookup(uid, cred->user->user_ns);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
if (!user)
|
|
|
|
goto no_memory_1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* check that the user's quota permits allocation of another key and
|
|
|
|
* its description */
|
2006-06-26 01:24:50 -06:00
|
|
|
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
|
2008-04-29 02:01:32 -06:00
|
|
|
unsigned maxkeys = (uid == 0) ?
|
|
|
|
key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
|
|
|
|
unsigned maxbytes = (uid == 0) ?
|
|
|
|
key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(&user->lock);
|
2006-06-26 01:24:50 -06:00
|
|
|
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN)) {
|
2008-04-29 02:01:32 -06:00
|
|
|
if (user->qnkeys + 1 >= maxkeys ||
|
|
|
|
user->qnbytes + quotalen >= maxbytes ||
|
|
|
|
user->qnbytes + quotalen < user->qnbytes)
|
2006-06-26 01:24:50 -06:00
|
|
|
goto no_quota;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
user->qnkeys++;
|
|
|
|
user->qnbytes += quotalen;
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* allocate and initialise the key and its description */
|
2006-12-06 21:33:17 -07:00
|
|
|
key = kmem_cache_alloc(key_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
if (!key)
|
|
|
|
goto no_memory_2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (desc) {
|
2006-12-06 21:33:47 -07:00
|
|
|
key->description = kmemdup(desc, desclen, GFP_KERNEL);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
if (!key->description)
|
|
|
|
goto no_memory_3;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
atomic_set(&key->usage, 1);
|
|
|
|
init_rwsem(&key->sem);
|
|
|
|
key->type = type;
|
|
|
|
key->user = user;
|
|
|
|
key->quotalen = quotalen;
|
|
|
|
key->datalen = type->def_datalen;
|
|
|
|
key->uid = uid;
|
|
|
|
key->gid = gid;
|
|
|
|
key->perm = perm;
|
|
|
|
key->flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
key->expiry = 0;
|
|
|
|
key->payload.data = NULL;
|
2005-10-30 16:02:44 -07:00
|
|
|
key->security = NULL;
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-26 01:24:50 -06:00
|
|
|
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA))
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(&key->type_data, 0, sizeof(key->type_data));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
|
|
|
|
key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2005-10-30 16:02:44 -07:00
|
|
|
/* let the security module know about the key */
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 16:39:23 -07:00
|
|
|
ret = security_key_alloc(key, cred, flags);
|
2005-10-30 16:02:44 -07:00
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto security_error;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
/* publish the key by giving it a serial number */
|
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&user->nkeys);
|
|
|
|
key_alloc_serial(key);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-10-30 16:02:44 -07:00
|
|
|
error:
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
return key;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-10-30 16:02:44 -07:00
|
|
|
security_error:
|
|
|
|
kfree(key->description);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
|
2006-06-26 01:24:50 -06:00
|
|
|
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(&user->lock);
|
|
|
|
user->qnkeys--;
|
|
|
|
user->qnbytes -= quotalen;
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key_user_put(user);
|
2005-10-30 16:02:44 -07:00
|
|
|
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
no_memory_3:
|
|
|
|
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
|
|
|
|
no_memory_2:
|
2006-06-26 01:24:50 -06:00
|
|
|
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
|
2005-10-30 16:02:44 -07:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(&user->lock);
|
|
|
|
user->qnkeys--;
|
|
|
|
user->qnbytes -= quotalen;
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key_user_put(user);
|
|
|
|
no_memory_1:
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
key = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-10-30 16:02:44 -07:00
|
|
|
no_quota:
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
|
|
|
|
key_user_put(user);
|
|
|
|
key = ERR_PTR(-EDQUOT);
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_alloc() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_alloc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* reserve an amount of quota for the key's payload
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int delta = (int) datalen - key->datalen;
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_check(key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* contemplate the quota adjustment */
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
if (delta != 0 && test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
|
2008-04-29 02:01:32 -06:00
|
|
|
unsigned maxbytes = (key->user->uid == 0) ?
|
|
|
|
key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (delta > 0 &&
|
2008-04-29 02:01:32 -06:00
|
|
|
(key->user->qnbytes + delta >= maxbytes ||
|
|
|
|
key->user->qnbytes + delta < key->user->qnbytes)) {
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
ret = -EDQUOT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
key->user->qnbytes += delta;
|
|
|
|
key->quotalen += delta;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* change the recorded data length if that didn't generate an error */
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
|
|
|
key->datalen = datalen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_payload_reserve() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_payload_reserve);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* instantiate a key and link it into the target keyring atomically
|
|
|
|
* - called with the target keyring's semaphore writelocked
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
|
|
|
|
const void *data,
|
|
|
|
size_t datalen,
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 23:00:56 -06:00
|
|
|
struct key *keyring,
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 16:39:23 -07:00
|
|
|
struct key *authkey)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret, awaken;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_check(key);
|
|
|
|
key_check(keyring);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
awaken = 0;
|
|
|
|
ret = -EBUSY;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-17 00:29:46 -06:00
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* can't instantiate twice */
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
/* instantiate the key */
|
|
|
|
ret = key->type->instantiate(key, data, datalen);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* mark the key as being instantiated */
|
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
awaken = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* and link it into the destination keyring */
|
|
|
|
if (keyring)
|
|
|
|
ret = __key_link(keyring, key);
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 23:00:56 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* disable the authorisation key */
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 16:39:23 -07:00
|
|
|
if (authkey)
|
|
|
|
key_revoke(authkey);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-17 00:29:46 -06:00
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */
|
|
|
|
if (awaken)
|
2007-10-17 00:29:46 -06:00
|
|
|
wake_up_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end __key_instantiate_and_link() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* instantiate a key and link it into the target keyring atomically
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
|
|
|
|
const void *data,
|
|
|
|
size_t datalen,
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 23:00:56 -06:00
|
|
|
struct key *keyring,
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 16:39:23 -07:00
|
|
|
struct key *authkey)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (keyring)
|
|
|
|
down_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 16:39:23 -07:00
|
|
|
ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, data, datalen, keyring, authkey);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (keyring)
|
|
|
|
up_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 23:00:56 -06:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
} /* end key_instantiate_and_link() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_instantiate_and_link);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* negatively instantiate a key and link it into the target keyring atomically
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
|
|
|
|
unsigned timeout,
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 23:00:56 -06:00
|
|
|
struct key *keyring,
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 16:39:23 -07:00
|
|
|
struct key *authkey)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct timespec now;
|
|
|
|
int ret, awaken;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_check(key);
|
|
|
|
key_check(keyring);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
awaken = 0;
|
|
|
|
ret = -EBUSY;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (keyring)
|
|
|
|
down_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-17 00:29:46 -06:00
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* can't instantiate twice */
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
/* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */
|
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
|
|
|
|
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
now = current_kernel_time();
|
|
|
|
key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
|
2009-09-14 10:26:13 -06:00
|
|
|
key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
awaken = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* and link it into the destination keyring */
|
|
|
|
if (keyring)
|
|
|
|
ret = __key_link(keyring, key);
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 23:00:56 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* disable the authorisation key */
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 16:39:23 -07:00
|
|
|
if (authkey)
|
|
|
|
key_revoke(authkey);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-17 00:29:46 -06:00
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (keyring)
|
|
|
|
up_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */
|
|
|
|
if (awaken)
|
2007-10-17 00:29:46 -06:00
|
|
|
wake_up_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_negate_and_link() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_negate_and_link);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* do cleaning up in process context so that we don't have to disable
|
|
|
|
* interrupts all over the place
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-11-22 07:55:48 -07:00
|
|
|
static void key_cleanup(struct work_struct *work)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct rb_node *_n;
|
|
|
|
struct key *key;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
go_again:
|
|
|
|
/* look for a dead key in the tree */
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (_n = rb_first(&key_serial_tree); _n; _n = rb_next(_n)) {
|
|
|
|
key = rb_entry(_n, struct key, serial_node);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (atomic_read(&key->usage) == 0)
|
|
|
|
goto found_dead_key;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
found_dead_key:
|
|
|
|
/* we found a dead key - once we've removed it from the tree, we can
|
|
|
|
* drop the lock */
|
|
|
|
rb_erase(&key->serial_node, &key_serial_tree);
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
key_check(key);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-10-30 16:02:44 -07:00
|
|
|
security_key_free(key);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
/* deal with the user's key tracking and quota */
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
|
|
|
|
key->user->qnkeys--;
|
|
|
|
key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_user_put(key->user);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* now throw away the key memory */
|
|
|
|
if (key->type->destroy)
|
|
|
|
key->type->destroy(key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kfree(key->description);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
|
|
|
|
key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC_X;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* there may, of course, be more than one key to destroy */
|
|
|
|
goto go_again;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_cleanup() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* dispose of a reference to a key
|
|
|
|
* - when all the references are gone, we schedule the cleanup task to come and
|
|
|
|
* pull it out of the tree in definite process context
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void key_put(struct key *key)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (key) {
|
|
|
|
key_check(key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&key->usage))
|
|
|
|
schedule_work(&key_cleanup_task);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_put() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_put);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* find a key by its serial number
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct key *key_lookup(key_serial_t id)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct rb_node *n;
|
|
|
|
struct key *key;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* search the tree for the specified key */
|
|
|
|
n = key_serial_tree.rb_node;
|
|
|
|
while (n) {
|
|
|
|
key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (id < key->serial)
|
|
|
|
n = n->rb_left;
|
|
|
|
else if (id > key->serial)
|
|
|
|
n = n->rb_right;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
not_found:
|
|
|
|
key = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
found:
|
2009-09-02 02:13:45 -06:00
|
|
|
/* pretend it doesn't exist if it is awaiting deletion */
|
|
|
|
if (atomic_read(&key->usage) == 0)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
goto not_found;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* this races with key_put(), but that doesn't matter since key_put()
|
|
|
|
* doesn't actually change the key
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
|
|
|
|
return key;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_lookup() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* find and lock the specified key type against removal
|
|
|
|
* - we return with the sem readlocked
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct key_type *key_type_lookup(const char *type)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct key_type *ktype;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
down_read(&key_types_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel
|
|
|
|
* types */
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(ktype, &key_types_list, link) {
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(ktype->name, type) == 0)
|
|
|
|
goto found_kernel_type;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
up_read(&key_types_sem);
|
|
|
|
ktype = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
found_kernel_type:
|
|
|
|
return ktype;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_type_lookup() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* unlock a key type
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
up_read(&key_types_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_type_put() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* attempt to update an existing key
|
|
|
|
* - the key has an incremented refcount
|
|
|
|
* - we need to put the key if we get an error
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref,
|
|
|
|
const void *payload, size_t plen)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* need write permission on the key to update it */
|
2005-10-30 16:02:44 -07:00
|
|
|
ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_WRITE);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -EEXIST;
|
|
|
|
if (!key->type->update)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
down_write(&key->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = key->type->update(key, payload, plen);
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
/* updating a negative key instantiates it */
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
up_write(&key->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
return key_ref;
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
error:
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
key_put(key);
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end __key_update() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* search the specified keyring for a key of the same description; if one is
|
|
|
|
* found, update it, otherwise add a new one
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
|
|
|
|
const char *type,
|
|
|
|
const char *description,
|
|
|
|
const void *payload,
|
|
|
|
size_t plen,
|
2008-04-29 02:01:28 -06:00
|
|
|
key_perm_t perm,
|
2006-06-26 01:24:50 -06:00
|
|
|
unsigned long flags)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
{
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 16:39:23 -07:00
|
|
|
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
struct key_type *ktype;
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
struct key *keyring, *key = NULL;
|
|
|
|
key_ref_t key_ref;
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel
|
|
|
|
* types */
|
|
|
|
ktype = key_type_lookup(type);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(ktype)) {
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
if (!ktype->match || !ktype->instantiate)
|
|
|
|
goto error_2;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_check(keyring);
|
|
|
|
|
2006-04-10 08:15:21 -06:00
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
|
|
|
|
if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
|
|
|
|
goto error_2;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
down_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have
|
|
|
|
* to modify the keyring */
|
2005-10-30 16:02:44 -07:00
|
|
|
ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_WRITE);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
goto error_3;
|
2005-10-30 16:02:44 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
|
2006-03-25 04:06:52 -07:00
|
|
|
/* if it's possible to update this type of key, search for an existing
|
|
|
|
* key of the same type and description in the destination keyring and
|
|
|
|
* update that instead if possible
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-03-25 04:06:52 -07:00
|
|
|
if (ktype->update) {
|
|
|
|
key_ref = __keyring_search_one(keyring_ref, ktype, description,
|
|
|
|
0);
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
|
|
|
|
goto found_matching_key;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-29 02:01:28 -06:00
|
|
|
/* if the client doesn't provide, decide on the permissions we want */
|
|
|
|
if (perm == KEY_PERM_UNDEF) {
|
|
|
|
perm = KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR;
|
|
|
|
perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_LINK | KEY_USR_SETATTR;
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-29 02:01:28 -06:00
|
|
|
if (ktype->read)
|
|
|
|
perm |= KEY_POS_READ | KEY_USR_READ;
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-29 02:01:28 -06:00
|
|
|
if (ktype == &key_type_keyring || ktype->update)
|
|
|
|
perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* allocate a new key */
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 16:39:23 -07:00
|
|
|
key = key_alloc(ktype, description, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
|
|
|
|
perm, flags);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
|
2008-02-07 01:15:26 -07:00
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
goto error_3;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */
|
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.
(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.
This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.
This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.
(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.
(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 23:00:56 -06:00
|
|
|
ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, payload, plen, keyring, NULL);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
|
|
key_put(key);
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
|
|
|
goto error_3;
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
error_3:
|
|
|
|
up_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
error_2:
|
|
|
|
key_type_put(ktype);
|
|
|
|
error:
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
return key_ref;
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
found_matching_key:
|
|
|
|
/* we found a matching key, so we're going to try to update it
|
|
|
|
* - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
up_write(&keyring->sem);
|
|
|
|
key_type_put(ktype);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, payload, plen);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_create_or_update() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create_or_update);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* update a key
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-09-28 10:03:15 -06:00
|
|
|
struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_check(key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* the key must be writable */
|
2005-10-30 16:02:44 -07:00
|
|
|
ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_WRITE);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* attempt to update it if supported */
|
|
|
|
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
if (key->type->update) {
|
|
|
|
down_write(&key->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-10-30 16:02:44 -07:00
|
|
|
ret = key->type->update(key, payload, plen);
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
/* updating a negative key instantiates it */
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
up_write(&key->sem);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_update() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* revoke a key
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void key_revoke(struct key *key)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2009-09-02 02:14:00 -06:00
|
|
|
struct timespec now;
|
|
|
|
time_t time;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
key_check(key);
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-17 00:29:46 -06:00
|
|
|
/* make sure no one's trying to change or use the key when we mark it
|
|
|
|
* - we tell lockdep that we might nest because we might be revoking an
|
|
|
|
* authorisation key whilst holding the sem on a key we've just
|
|
|
|
* instantiated
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
down_write_nested(&key->sem, 1);
|
|
|
|
if (!test_and_set_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &key->flags) &&
|
|
|
|
key->type->revoke)
|
2006-06-22 15:47:18 -06:00
|
|
|
key->type->revoke(key);
|
|
|
|
|
2009-09-02 02:14:00 -06:00
|
|
|
/* set the death time to no more than the expiry time */
|
|
|
|
now = current_kernel_time();
|
|
|
|
time = now.tv_sec;
|
|
|
|
if (key->revoked_at == 0 || key->revoked_at > time) {
|
|
|
|
key->revoked_at = time;
|
2009-09-14 10:26:13 -06:00
|
|
|
key_schedule_gc(key->revoked_at + key_gc_delay);
|
2009-09-02 02:14:00 -06:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
up_write(&key->sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_revoke() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_revoke);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* register a type of key
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int register_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct key_type *p;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -EEXIST;
|
|
|
|
down_write(&key_types_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* disallow key types with the same name */
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(p, &key_types_list, link) {
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(p->name, ktype->name) == 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* store the type */
|
|
|
|
list_add(&ktype->link, &key_types_list);
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
up_write(&key_types_sem);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end register_key_type() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_key_type);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* unregister a type of key
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct rb_node *_n;
|
|
|
|
struct key *key;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
down_write(&key_types_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* withdraw the key type */
|
|
|
|
list_del_init(&ktype->link);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
/* mark all the keys of this type dead */
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (_n = rb_first(&key_serial_tree); _n; _n = rb_next(_n)) {
|
|
|
|
key = rb_entry(_n, struct key, serial_node);
|
|
|
|
|
2009-09-02 02:13:55 -06:00
|
|
|
if (key->type == ktype) {
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
key->type = &key_type_dead;
|
2009-09-02 02:13:55 -06:00
|
|
|
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* make sure everyone revalidates their keys */
|
2005-06-25 15:55:38 -06:00
|
|
|
synchronize_rcu();
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we should now be able to destroy the payloads of all the keys of
|
|
|
|
* this type with impunity */
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
for (_n = rb_first(&key_serial_tree); _n; _n = rb_next(_n)) {
|
|
|
|
key = rb_entry(_n, struct key, serial_node);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
if (key->type == ktype) {
|
|
|
|
if (ktype->destroy)
|
|
|
|
ktype->destroy(key);
|
2006-06-27 03:53:54 -06:00
|
|
|
memset(&key->payload, KEY_DESTROY, sizeof(key->payload));
|
2005-06-23 23:00:49 -06:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
|
|
|
|
up_write(&key_types_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
2009-09-02 02:14:00 -06:00
|
|
|
key_schedule_gc(0);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
} /* end unregister_key_type() */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_key_type);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* initialise the key management stuff
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void __init key_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* allocate a slab in which we can store keys */
|
|
|
|
key_jar = kmem_cache_create("key_jar", sizeof(struct key),
|
2007-07-19 19:11:58 -06:00
|
|
|
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* add the special key types */
|
|
|
|
list_add_tail(&key_type_keyring.link, &key_types_list);
|
|
|
|
list_add_tail(&key_type_dead.link, &key_types_list);
|
|
|
|
list_add_tail(&key_type_user.link, &key_types_list);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* record the root user tracking */
|
|
|
|
rb_link_node(&root_key_user.node,
|
|
|
|
NULL,
|
|
|
|
&key_user_tree.rb_node);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rb_insert_color(&root_key_user.node,
|
|
|
|
&key_user_tree);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} /* end key_init() */
|