kernel-fxtec-pro1x/drivers/xen/Kconfig

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menu "Xen driver support"
depends on XEN
config XEN_BALLOON
bool "Xen memory balloon driver"
default y
help
The balloon driver allows the Xen domain to request more memory from
the system to expand the domain's memory allocation, or alternatively
return unneeded memory to the system.
xen: tmem: self-ballooning and frontswap-selfshrinking This patch introduces two in-kernel drivers for Xen transcendent memory ("tmem") functionality that complement cleancache and frontswap. Both use control theory to dynamically adjust and optimize memory utilization. Selfballooning controls the in-kernel Xen balloon driver, targeting a goal value (vm_committed_as), thus pushing less frequently used clean page cache pages (through the cleancache code) into Xen tmem where Xen can balance needs across all VMs residing on the physical machine. Frontswap-selfshrinking controls the number of pages in frontswap, driving it towards zero (effectively doing a partial swapoff) when in-kernel memory pressure subsides, freeing up RAM for other VMs. More detail is provided in the header comment of xen-selfballooning.c. Signed-off-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com> [v8: konrad.wilk@oracle.com: set default enablement depending on frontswap] [v7: konrad.wilk@oracle.com: fix capitalization and punctuation in comments] [v6: fix frontswap-selfshrinking initialization] [v6: konrad.wilk@oracle.com: fix init pr_infos; add comments about swap] [v5: konrad.wilk@oracle.com: add NULL to attr list; move inits up to decls] [v4: dkiper@net-space.pl: use strict_strtoul plus a few syntactic nits] [v3: konrad.wilk@oracle.com: fix potential divides-by-zero] [v3: konrad.wilk@oracle.com: add many more comments, fix nits] [v2: rebased to linux-3.0-rc1] [v2: Ian.Campbell@citrix.com: reorganize as new file (xen-selfballoon.c)] [v2: dkiper@net-space.pl: proper access to vm_committed_as] [v2: dkiper@net-space.pl: accounting fixes] Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@novell.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Cc: <xen-devel@lists.xensource.com>
2011-07-08 12:26:21 -06:00
config XEN_SELFBALLOONING
bool "Dynamically self-balloon kernel memory to target"
depends on XEN && XEN_BALLOON && CLEANCACHE && SWAP && XEN_TMEM
xen: tmem: self-ballooning and frontswap-selfshrinking This patch introduces two in-kernel drivers for Xen transcendent memory ("tmem") functionality that complement cleancache and frontswap. Both use control theory to dynamically adjust and optimize memory utilization. Selfballooning controls the in-kernel Xen balloon driver, targeting a goal value (vm_committed_as), thus pushing less frequently used clean page cache pages (through the cleancache code) into Xen tmem where Xen can balance needs across all VMs residing on the physical machine. Frontswap-selfshrinking controls the number of pages in frontswap, driving it towards zero (effectively doing a partial swapoff) when in-kernel memory pressure subsides, freeing up RAM for other VMs. More detail is provided in the header comment of xen-selfballooning.c. Signed-off-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com> [v8: konrad.wilk@oracle.com: set default enablement depending on frontswap] [v7: konrad.wilk@oracle.com: fix capitalization and punctuation in comments] [v6: fix frontswap-selfshrinking initialization] [v6: konrad.wilk@oracle.com: fix init pr_infos; add comments about swap] [v5: konrad.wilk@oracle.com: add NULL to attr list; move inits up to decls] [v4: dkiper@net-space.pl: use strict_strtoul plus a few syntactic nits] [v3: konrad.wilk@oracle.com: fix potential divides-by-zero] [v3: konrad.wilk@oracle.com: add many more comments, fix nits] [v2: rebased to linux-3.0-rc1] [v2: Ian.Campbell@citrix.com: reorganize as new file (xen-selfballoon.c)] [v2: dkiper@net-space.pl: proper access to vm_committed_as] [v2: dkiper@net-space.pl: accounting fixes] Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@novell.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Cc: <xen-devel@lists.xensource.com>
2011-07-08 12:26:21 -06:00
default n
help
Self-ballooning dynamically balloons available kernel memory driven
by the current usage of anonymous memory ("committed AS") and
controlled by various sysfs-settable parameters. Configuring
FRONTSWAP is highly recommended; if it is not configured, self-
ballooning is disabled by default but can be enabled with the
'selfballooning' kernel boot parameter. If FRONTSWAP is configured,
frontswap-selfshrinking is enabled by default but can be disabled
with the 'noselfshrink' kernel boot parameter; and self-ballooning
is enabled by default but can be disabled with the 'noselfballooning'
kernel boot parameter. Note that systems without a sufficiently
large swap device should not enable self-ballooning.
config XEN_BALLOON_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
bool "Memory hotplug support for Xen balloon driver"
default n
depends on XEN_BALLOON && MEMORY_HOTPLUG
help
Memory hotplug support for Xen balloon driver allows expanding memory
available for the system above limit declared at system startup.
It is very useful on critical systems which require long
run without rebooting.
Memory could be hotplugged in following steps:
1) dom0: xl mem-max <domU> <maxmem>
where <maxmem> is >= requested memory size,
2) dom0: xl mem-set <domU> <memory>
where <memory> is requested memory size; alternatively memory
could be added by writing proper value to
/sys/devices/system/xen_memory/xen_memory0/target or
/sys/devices/system/xen_memory/xen_memory0/target_kb on dumU,
3) domU: for i in /sys/devices/system/memory/memory*/state; do \
[ "`cat "$i"`" = offline ] && echo online > "$i"; done
Memory could be onlined automatically on domU by adding following line to udev rules:
SUBSYSTEM=="memory", ACTION=="add", RUN+="/bin/sh -c '[ -f /sys$devpath/state ] && echo online > /sys$devpath/state'"
In that case step 3 should be omitted.
config XEN_SCRUB_PAGES
bool "Scrub pages before returning them to system"
depends on XEN_BALLOON
default y
help
Scrub pages before returning them to the system for reuse by
other domains. This makes sure that any confidential data
is not accidentally visible to other domains. Is it more
secure, but slightly less efficient.
If in doubt, say yes.
config XEN_DEV_EVTCHN
tristate "Xen /dev/xen/evtchn device"
default y
help
The evtchn driver allows a userspace process to triger event
channels and to receive notification of an event channel
firing.
If in doubt, say yes.
config XEN_BACKEND
bool "Backend driver support"
depends on XEN_DOM0
default y
help
Support for backend device drivers that provide I/O services
to other virtual machines.
config XENFS
tristate "Xen filesystem"
select XEN_PRIVCMD
default y
help
The xen filesystem provides a way for domains to share
information with each other and with the hypervisor.
For example, by reading and writing the "xenbus" file, guests
may pass arbitrary information to the initial domain.
If in doubt, say yes.
config XEN_COMPAT_XENFS
bool "Create compatibility mount point /proc/xen"
depends on XENFS
default y
help
The old xenstore userspace tools expect to find "xenbus"
under /proc/xen, but "xenbus" is now found at the root of the
xenfs filesystem. Selecting this causes the kernel to create
the compatibility mount point /proc/xen if it is running on
a xen platform.
If in doubt, say yes.
config XEN_SYS_HYPERVISOR
bool "Create xen entries under /sys/hypervisor"
depends on SYSFS
select SYS_HYPERVISOR
default y
help
Create entries under /sys/hypervisor describing the Xen
hypervisor environment. When running native or in another
virtual environment, /sys/hypervisor will still be present,
but will have no xen contents.
config XEN_XENBUS_FRONTEND
tristate
config XEN_GNTDEV
tristate "userspace grant access device driver"
depends on XEN
default m
select MMU_NOTIFIER
help
Allows userspace processes to use grants.
config XEN_GRANT_DEV_ALLOC
tristate "User-space grant reference allocator driver"
depends on XEN
default m
help
Allows userspace processes to create pages with access granted
to other domains. This can be used to implement frontend drivers
or as part of an inter-domain shared memory channel.
config SWIOTLB_XEN
def_bool y
depends on PCI
select SWIOTLB
config XEN_TMEM
bool
default y if (CLEANCACHE || FRONTSWAP)
help
Shim to interface in-kernel Transcendent Memory hooks
(e.g. cleancache and frontswap) to Xen tmem hypercalls.
xen/pciback: xen pci backend driver. This is the host side counterpart to the frontend driver in drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c. The PV protocol is also implemented by frontend drivers in other OSes too, such as the BSDs. The PV protocol is rather simple. There is page shared with the guest, which has the 'struct xen_pci_sharedinfo' embossed in it. The backend has a thread that is kicked every-time the structure is changed and based on the operation field it performs specific tasks: XEN_PCI_OP_conf_[read|write]: Read/Write 0xCF8/0xCFC filtered data. (conf_space*.c) Based on which field is probed, we either enable/disable the PCI device, change power state, read VPD, etc. The major goal of this call is to provide a Physical IRQ (PIRQ) to the guest. The PIRQ is Xen hypervisor global IRQ value irrespective of the IRQ is tied in to the IO-APIC, or is a vector. For GSI type interrupts, the PIRQ==GSI holds. For MSI/MSI-X the PIRQ value != Linux IRQ number (thought PIRQ==vector). Please note, that with Xen, all interrupts (except those level shared ones) are injected directly to the guest - there is no host interaction. XEN_PCI_OP_[enable|disable]_msi[|x] (pciback_ops.c) Enables/disables the MSI/MSI-X capability of the device. These operations setup the MSI/MSI-X vectors for the guest and pass them to the frontend. When the device is activated, the interrupts are directly injected in the guest without involving the host. XEN_PCI_OP_aer_[detected|resume|mmio|slotreset]: In case of failure, perform the appropriate AER commands on the guest. Right now that is a cop-out - we just kill the guest. Besides implementing those commands, it can also - hide a PCI device from the host. When booting up, the user can specify xen-pciback.hide=(1:0:0)(BDF..) so that host does not try to use the device. The driver was lifted from linux-2.6.18.hg tree and fixed up so that it could compile under v3.0. Per suggestion from Jesse Barnes moved the driver to drivers/xen/xen-pciback. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-10-13 15:22:20 -06:00
config XEN_PCIDEV_BACKEND
tristate "Xen PCI-device backend driver"
depends on PCI && X86 && XEN
depends on XEN_BACKEND
default m
xen/pciback: xen pci backend driver. This is the host side counterpart to the frontend driver in drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c. The PV protocol is also implemented by frontend drivers in other OSes too, such as the BSDs. The PV protocol is rather simple. There is page shared with the guest, which has the 'struct xen_pci_sharedinfo' embossed in it. The backend has a thread that is kicked every-time the structure is changed and based on the operation field it performs specific tasks: XEN_PCI_OP_conf_[read|write]: Read/Write 0xCF8/0xCFC filtered data. (conf_space*.c) Based on which field is probed, we either enable/disable the PCI device, change power state, read VPD, etc. The major goal of this call is to provide a Physical IRQ (PIRQ) to the guest. The PIRQ is Xen hypervisor global IRQ value irrespective of the IRQ is tied in to the IO-APIC, or is a vector. For GSI type interrupts, the PIRQ==GSI holds. For MSI/MSI-X the PIRQ value != Linux IRQ number (thought PIRQ==vector). Please note, that with Xen, all interrupts (except those level shared ones) are injected directly to the guest - there is no host interaction. XEN_PCI_OP_[enable|disable]_msi[|x] (pciback_ops.c) Enables/disables the MSI/MSI-X capability of the device. These operations setup the MSI/MSI-X vectors for the guest and pass them to the frontend. When the device is activated, the interrupts are directly injected in the guest without involving the host. XEN_PCI_OP_aer_[detected|resume|mmio|slotreset]: In case of failure, perform the appropriate AER commands on the guest. Right now that is a cop-out - we just kill the guest. Besides implementing those commands, it can also - hide a PCI device from the host. When booting up, the user can specify xen-pciback.hide=(1:0:0)(BDF..) so that host does not try to use the device. The driver was lifted from linux-2.6.18.hg tree and fixed up so that it could compile under v3.0. Per suggestion from Jesse Barnes moved the driver to drivers/xen/xen-pciback. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-10-13 15:22:20 -06:00
help
The PCI device backend driver allows the kernel to export arbitrary
PCI devices to other guests. If you select this to be a module, you
will need to make sure no other driver has bound to the device(s)
you want to make visible to other guests.
The parameter "passthrough" allows you specify how you want the PCI
devices to appear in the guest. You can choose the default (0) where
PCI topology starts at 00.00.0, or (1) for passthrough if you want
the PCI devices topology appear the same as in the host.
xen/pciback: xen pci backend driver. This is the host side counterpart to the frontend driver in drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c. The PV protocol is also implemented by frontend drivers in other OSes too, such as the BSDs. The PV protocol is rather simple. There is page shared with the guest, which has the 'struct xen_pci_sharedinfo' embossed in it. The backend has a thread that is kicked every-time the structure is changed and based on the operation field it performs specific tasks: XEN_PCI_OP_conf_[read|write]: Read/Write 0xCF8/0xCFC filtered data. (conf_space*.c) Based on which field is probed, we either enable/disable the PCI device, change power state, read VPD, etc. The major goal of this call is to provide a Physical IRQ (PIRQ) to the guest. The PIRQ is Xen hypervisor global IRQ value irrespective of the IRQ is tied in to the IO-APIC, or is a vector. For GSI type interrupts, the PIRQ==GSI holds. For MSI/MSI-X the PIRQ value != Linux IRQ number (thought PIRQ==vector). Please note, that with Xen, all interrupts (except those level shared ones) are injected directly to the guest - there is no host interaction. XEN_PCI_OP_[enable|disable]_msi[|x] (pciback_ops.c) Enables/disables the MSI/MSI-X capability of the device. These operations setup the MSI/MSI-X vectors for the guest and pass them to the frontend. When the device is activated, the interrupts are directly injected in the guest without involving the host. XEN_PCI_OP_aer_[detected|resume|mmio|slotreset]: In case of failure, perform the appropriate AER commands on the guest. Right now that is a cop-out - we just kill the guest. Besides implementing those commands, it can also - hide a PCI device from the host. When booting up, the user can specify xen-pciback.hide=(1:0:0)(BDF..) so that host does not try to use the device. The driver was lifted from linux-2.6.18.hg tree and fixed up so that it could compile under v3.0. Per suggestion from Jesse Barnes moved the driver to drivers/xen/xen-pciback. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-10-13 15:22:20 -06:00
The "hide" parameter (only applicable if backend driver is compiled
into the kernel) allows you to bind the PCI devices to this module
from the default device drivers. The argument is the list of PCI BDFs:
xen-pciback.hide=(03:00.0)(04:00.0)
xen/pciback: xen pci backend driver. This is the host side counterpart to the frontend driver in drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c. The PV protocol is also implemented by frontend drivers in other OSes too, such as the BSDs. The PV protocol is rather simple. There is page shared with the guest, which has the 'struct xen_pci_sharedinfo' embossed in it. The backend has a thread that is kicked every-time the structure is changed and based on the operation field it performs specific tasks: XEN_PCI_OP_conf_[read|write]: Read/Write 0xCF8/0xCFC filtered data. (conf_space*.c) Based on which field is probed, we either enable/disable the PCI device, change power state, read VPD, etc. The major goal of this call is to provide a Physical IRQ (PIRQ) to the guest. The PIRQ is Xen hypervisor global IRQ value irrespective of the IRQ is tied in to the IO-APIC, or is a vector. For GSI type interrupts, the PIRQ==GSI holds. For MSI/MSI-X the PIRQ value != Linux IRQ number (thought PIRQ==vector). Please note, that with Xen, all interrupts (except those level shared ones) are injected directly to the guest - there is no host interaction. XEN_PCI_OP_[enable|disable]_msi[|x] (pciback_ops.c) Enables/disables the MSI/MSI-X capability of the device. These operations setup the MSI/MSI-X vectors for the guest and pass them to the frontend. When the device is activated, the interrupts are directly injected in the guest without involving the host. XEN_PCI_OP_aer_[detected|resume|mmio|slotreset]: In case of failure, perform the appropriate AER commands on the guest. Right now that is a cop-out - we just kill the guest. Besides implementing those commands, it can also - hide a PCI device from the host. When booting up, the user can specify xen-pciback.hide=(1:0:0)(BDF..) so that host does not try to use the device. The driver was lifted from linux-2.6.18.hg tree and fixed up so that it could compile under v3.0. Per suggestion from Jesse Barnes moved the driver to drivers/xen/xen-pciback. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
2009-10-13 15:22:20 -06:00
If in doubt, say m.
config XEN_PRIVCMD
tristate
depends on XEN
default m
endmenu