kernel-fxtec-pro1x/kernel/exit.c

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/*
* linux/kernel/exit.c
*
* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
*/
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/completion.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <linux/mnt_namespace.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/acct.h>
#include <linux/tsacct_kern.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/profile.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/mempolicy.h>
#include <linux/taskstats_kern.h>
#include <linux/delayacct.h>
#include <linux/freezer.h>
#include <linux/cpuset.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
#include <linux/cn_proc.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/futex.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
#include <linux/audit.h> /* for audit_free() */
#include <linux/resource.h>
#include <linux/blkdev.h>
#include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h>
Freezer: avoid freezing kernel threads prematurely Kernel threads should not have TIF_FREEZE set when user space processes are being frozen, since otherwise some of them might be frozen prematurely. To prevent this from happening we can (1) make exit_mm() unset TIF_FREEZE unconditionally just after clearing tsk->mm and (2) make try_to_freeze_tasks() check if p->mm is different from zero and PF_BORROWED_MM is unset in p->flags when user space processes are to be frozen. Namely, when user space processes are being frozen, we only should set TIF_FREEZE for tasks that have p->mm different from NULL and don't have PF_BORROWED_MM set in p->flags. For this reason task_lock() must be used to prevent try_to_freeze_tasks() from racing with use_mm()/unuse_mm(), in which p->mm and p->flags.PF_BORROWED_MM are changed under task_lock(p). Also, we need to prevent the following scenario from happening: * daemonize() is called by a task spawned from a user space code path * freezer checks if the task has p->mm set and the result is positive * task enters exit_mm() and clears its TIF_FREEZE * freezer sets TIF_FREEZE for the task * task calls try_to_freeze() and goes to the refrigerator, which is wrong at that point This requires us to acquire task_lock(p) before p->flags.PF_BORROWED_MM and p->mm are examined and release it after TIF_FREEZE is set for p (or it turns out that TIF_FREEZE should not be set). Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: Gautham R Shenoy <ego@in.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Nigel Cunningham <nigel@nigel.suspend2.net> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-19 02:47:33 -06:00
#include <linux/freezer.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
extern void sem_exit (void);
static void exit_mm(struct task_struct * tsk);
static void __unhash_process(struct task_struct *p)
{
nr_threads--;
detach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID);
if (thread_group_leader(p)) {
detach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID);
detach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_SID);
list_del_rcu(&p->tasks);
__get_cpu_var(process_counts)--;
}
list_del_rcu(&p->thread_group);
remove_parent(p);
}
/*
* This function expects the tasklist_lock write-locked.
*/
static void __exit_signal(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal;
struct sighand_struct *sighand;
BUG_ON(!sig);
BUG_ON(!atomic_read(&sig->count));
rcu_read_lock();
sighand = rcu_dereference(tsk->sighand);
spin_lock(&sighand->siglock);
posix_cpu_timers_exit(tsk);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&sig->count))
posix_cpu_timers_exit_group(tsk);
else {
/*
* If there is any task waiting for the group exit
* then notify it:
*/
if (sig->group_exit_task && atomic_read(&sig->count) == sig->notify_count) {
wake_up_process(sig->group_exit_task);
sig->group_exit_task = NULL;
}
if (tsk == sig->curr_target)
sig->curr_target = next_thread(tsk);
/*
* Accumulate here the counters for all threads but the
* group leader as they die, so they can be added into
* the process-wide totals when those are taken.
* The group leader stays around as a zombie as long
* as there are other threads. When it gets reaped,
* the exit.c code will add its counts into these totals.
* We won't ever get here for the group leader, since it
* will have been the last reference on the signal_struct.
*/
sig->utime = cputime_add(sig->utime, tsk->utime);
sig->stime = cputime_add(sig->stime, tsk->stime);
sig->gtime = cputime_add(sig->gtime, tsk->gtime);
sig->min_flt += tsk->min_flt;
sig->maj_flt += tsk->maj_flt;
sig->nvcsw += tsk->nvcsw;
sig->nivcsw += tsk->nivcsw;
sig->inblock += task_io_get_inblock(tsk);
sig->oublock += task_io_get_oublock(tsk);
sig->sum_sched_runtime += tsk->se.sum_exec_runtime;
sig = NULL; /* Marker for below. */
}
__unhash_process(tsk);
tsk->signal = NULL;
tsk->sighand = NULL;
spin_unlock(&sighand->siglock);
rcu_read_unlock();
__cleanup_sighand(sighand);
clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk,TIF_SIGPENDING);
flush_sigqueue(&tsk->pending);
if (sig) {
flush_sigqueue(&sig->shared_pending);
taskstats_tgid_free(sig);
__cleanup_signal(sig);
}
}
[PATCH] task: RCU protect task->usage A big problem with rcu protected data structures that are also reference counted is that you must jump through several hoops to increase the reference count. I think someone finally implemented atomic_inc_not_zero(&count) to automate the common case. Unfortunately this means you must special case the rcu access case. When data structures are only visible via rcu in a manner that is not determined by the reference count on the object (i.e. tasks are visible until their zombies are reaped) there is a much simpler technique we can employ. Simply delaying the decrement of the reference count until the rcu interval is over. What that means is that the proc code that looks up a task and later wants to sleep can now do: rcu_read_lock(); task = find_task_by_pid(some_pid); if (task) { get_task_struct(task); } rcu_read_unlock(); The effect on the rest of the kernel is that put_task_struct becomes cheaper and immediate, and in the case where the task has been reaped it frees the task immediate instead of unnecessarily waiting an until the rcu interval is over. Cleanup of task_struct does not happen when its reference count drops to zero, instead cleanup happens when release_task is called. Tasks can only be looked up via rcu before release_task is called. All rcu protected members of task_struct are freed by release_task. Therefore we can move call_rcu from put_task_struct into release_task. And we can modify release_task to not immediately release the reference count but instead have it call put_task_struct from the function it gives to call_rcu. The end result: - get_task_struct is safe in an rcu context where we have just looked up the task. - put_task_struct() simplifies into its old pre rcu self. This reorganization also makes put_task_struct uncallable from modules as it is not exported but it does not appear to be called from any modules so this should not be an issue, and is trivially fixed. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 03:31:37 -07:00
static void delayed_put_task_struct(struct rcu_head *rhp)
{
put_task_struct(container_of(rhp, struct task_struct, rcu));
}
void release_task(struct task_struct * p)
{
struct task_struct *leader;
int zap_leader;
repeat:
atomic_dec(&p->user->processes);
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
ptrace_unlink(p);
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&p->ptrace_list) || !list_empty(&p->ptrace_children));
__exit_signal(p);
/*
* If we are the last non-leader member of the thread
* group, and the leader is zombie, then notify the
* group leader's parent process. (if it wants notification.)
*/
zap_leader = 0;
leader = p->group_leader;
if (leader != p && thread_group_empty(leader) && leader->exit_state == EXIT_ZOMBIE) {
BUG_ON(leader->exit_signal == -1);
do_notify_parent(leader, leader->exit_signal);
/*
* If we were the last child thread and the leader has
* exited already, and the leader's parent ignores SIGCHLD,
* then we are the one who should release the leader.
*
* do_notify_parent() will have marked it self-reaping in
* that case.
*/
zap_leader = (leader->exit_signal == -1);
}
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
proc_flush_task(p);
release_thread(p);
[PATCH] task: RCU protect task->usage A big problem with rcu protected data structures that are also reference counted is that you must jump through several hoops to increase the reference count. I think someone finally implemented atomic_inc_not_zero(&count) to automate the common case. Unfortunately this means you must special case the rcu access case. When data structures are only visible via rcu in a manner that is not determined by the reference count on the object (i.e. tasks are visible until their zombies are reaped) there is a much simpler technique we can employ. Simply delaying the decrement of the reference count until the rcu interval is over. What that means is that the proc code that looks up a task and later wants to sleep can now do: rcu_read_lock(); task = find_task_by_pid(some_pid); if (task) { get_task_struct(task); } rcu_read_unlock(); The effect on the rest of the kernel is that put_task_struct becomes cheaper and immediate, and in the case where the task has been reaped it frees the task immediate instead of unnecessarily waiting an until the rcu interval is over. Cleanup of task_struct does not happen when its reference count drops to zero, instead cleanup happens when release_task is called. Tasks can only be looked up via rcu before release_task is called. All rcu protected members of task_struct are freed by release_task. Therefore we can move call_rcu from put_task_struct into release_task. And we can modify release_task to not immediately release the reference count but instead have it call put_task_struct from the function it gives to call_rcu. The end result: - get_task_struct is safe in an rcu context where we have just looked up the task. - put_task_struct() simplifies into its old pre rcu self. This reorganization also makes put_task_struct uncallable from modules as it is not exported but it does not appear to be called from any modules so this should not be an issue, and is trivially fixed. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 03:31:37 -07:00
call_rcu(&p->rcu, delayed_put_task_struct);
p = leader;
if (unlikely(zap_leader))
goto repeat;
}
/*
* This checks not only the pgrp, but falls back on the pid if no
* satisfactory pgrp is found. I dunno - gdb doesn't work correctly
* without this...
*
* The caller must hold rcu lock or the tasklist lock.
*/
struct pid *session_of_pgrp(struct pid *pgrp)
{
struct task_struct *p;
struct pid *sid = NULL;
p = pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID);
if (p == NULL)
p = pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PID);
if (p != NULL)
sid = task_session(p);
return sid;
}
/*
* Determine if a process group is "orphaned", according to the POSIX
* definition in 2.2.2.52. Orphaned process groups are not to be affected
* by terminal-generated stop signals. Newly orphaned process groups are
* to receive a SIGHUP and a SIGCONT.
*
* "I ask you, have you ever known what it is to be an orphan?"
*/
static int will_become_orphaned_pgrp(struct pid *pgrp, struct task_struct *ignored_task)
{
struct task_struct *p;
int ret = 1;
do_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
if (p == ignored_task
|| p->exit_state
|| is_init(p->real_parent))
continue;
if (task_pgrp(p->real_parent) != pgrp &&
task_session(p->real_parent) == task_session(p)) {
ret = 0;
break;
}
} while_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
return ret; /* (sighing) "Often!" */
}
int is_current_pgrp_orphaned(void)
{
int retval;
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
retval = will_become_orphaned_pgrp(task_pgrp(current), NULL);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
return retval;
}
static int has_stopped_jobs(struct pid *pgrp)
{
int retval = 0;
struct task_struct *p;
do_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
if (p->state != TASK_STOPPED)
continue;
retval = 1;
break;
} while_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
return retval;
}
/**
* reparent_to_kthreadd - Reparent the calling kernel thread to kthreadd
*
* If a kernel thread is launched as a result of a system call, or if
* it ever exits, it should generally reparent itself to kthreadd so it
* isn't in the way of other processes and is correctly cleaned up on exit.
*
* The various task state such as scheduling policy and priority may have
* been inherited from a user process, so we reset them to sane values here.
*
* NOTE that reparent_to_kthreadd() gives the caller full capabilities.
*/
static void reparent_to_kthreadd(void)
{
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
ptrace_unlink(current);
/* Reparent to init */
remove_parent(current);
current->real_parent = current->parent = kthreadd_task;
add_parent(current);
/* Set the exit signal to SIGCHLD so we signal init on exit */
current->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
if (task_nice(current) < 0)
set_user_nice(current, 0);
/* cpus_allowed? */
/* rt_priority? */
/* signals? */
security_task_reparent_to_init(current);
memcpy(current->signal->rlim, init_task.signal->rlim,
sizeof(current->signal->rlim));
atomic_inc(&(INIT_USER->__count));
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
switch_uid(INIT_USER);
}
void __set_special_pids(pid_t session, pid_t pgrp)
{
struct task_struct *curr = current->group_leader;
if (process_session(curr) != session) {
detach_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_SID);
set_signal_session(curr->signal, session);
attach_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_SID, find_pid(session));
}
if (process_group(curr) != pgrp) {
detach_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_PGID);
curr->signal->pgrp = pgrp;
attach_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_PGID, find_pid(pgrp));
}
}
static void set_special_pids(pid_t session, pid_t pgrp)
{
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
__set_special_pids(session, pgrp);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
}
/*
* Let kernel threads use this to say that they
* allow a certain signal (since daemonize() will
* have disabled all of them by default).
*/
int allow_signal(int sig)
{
if (!valid_signal(sig) || sig < 1)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
sigdelset(&current->blocked, sig);
if (!current->mm) {
/* Kernel threads handle their own signals.
Let the signal code know it'll be handled, so
that they don't get converted to SIGKILL or
just silently dropped */
current->sighand->action[(sig)-1].sa.sa_handler = (void __user *)2;
}
recalc_sigpending();
spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(allow_signal);
int disallow_signal(int sig)
{
if (!valid_signal(sig) || sig < 1)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
current->sighand->action[(sig)-1].sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
recalc_sigpending();
spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(disallow_signal);
/*
* Put all the gunge required to become a kernel thread without
* attached user resources in one place where it belongs.
*/
void daemonize(const char *name, ...)
{
va_list args;
struct fs_struct *fs;
sigset_t blocked;
va_start(args, name);
vsnprintf(current->comm, sizeof(current->comm), name, args);
va_end(args);
/*
* If we were started as result of loading a module, close all of the
* user space pages. We don't need them, and if we didn't close them
* they would be locked into memory.
*/
exit_mm(current);
/*
* We don't want to have TIF_FREEZE set if the system-wide hibernation
* or suspend transition begins right now.
*/
current->flags |= PF_NOFREEZE;
set_special_pids(1, 1);
[PATCH] tty: ->signal->tty locking Fix the locking of signal->tty. Use ->sighand->siglock to protect ->signal->tty; this lock is already used by most other members of ->signal/->sighand. And unless we are 'current' or the tasklist_lock is held we need ->siglock to access ->signal anyway. (NOTE: sys_unshare() is broken wrt ->sighand locking rules) Note that tty_mutex is held over tty destruction, so while holding tty_mutex any tty pointer remains valid. Otherwise the lifetime of ttys are governed by their open file handles. This leaves some holes for tty access from signal->tty (or any other non file related tty access). It solves the tty SLAB scribbles we were seeing. (NOTE: the change from group_send_sig_info to __group_send_sig_info needs to be examined by someone familiar with the security framework, I think it is safe given the SEND_SIG_PRIV from other __group_send_sig_info invocations) [schwidefsky@de.ibm.com: 3270 fix] [akpm@osdl.org: various post-viro fixes] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08 03:36:04 -07:00
proc_clear_tty(current);
/* Block and flush all signals */
sigfillset(&blocked);
sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &blocked, NULL);
flush_signals(current);
/* Become as one with the init task */
exit_fs(current); /* current->fs->count--; */
fs = init_task.fs;
current->fs = fs;
atomic_inc(&fs->count);
exit_task_namespaces(current);
current->nsproxy = init_task.nsproxy;
get_task_namespaces(current);
exit_files(current);
current->files = init_task.files;
atomic_inc(&current->files->count);
reparent_to_kthreadd();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(daemonize);
static void close_files(struct files_struct * files)
{
int i, j;
struct fdtable *fdt;
j = 0;
/*
* It is safe to dereference the fd table without RCU or
* ->file_lock because this is the last reference to the
* files structure.
*/
fdt = files_fdtable(files);
for (;;) {
unsigned long set;
i = j * __NFDBITS;
if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
break;
set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j++];
while (set) {
if (set & 1) {
struct file * file = xchg(&fdt->fd[i], NULL);
if (file) {
filp_close(file, files);
cond_resched();
}
}
i++;
set >>= 1;
}
}
}
struct files_struct *get_files_struct(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct files_struct *files;
task_lock(task);
files = task->files;
if (files)
atomic_inc(&files->count);
task_unlock(task);
return files;
}
void fastcall put_files_struct(struct files_struct *files)
{
struct fdtable *fdt;
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&files->count)) {
close_files(files);
/*
* Free the fd and fdset arrays if we expanded them.
* If the fdtable was embedded, pass files for freeing
* at the end of the RCU grace period. Otherwise,
* you can free files immediately.
*/
fdt = files_fdtable(files);
if (fdt != &files->fdtab)
kmem_cache_free(files_cachep, files);
free_fdtable(fdt);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(put_files_struct);
void reset_files_struct(struct task_struct *tsk, struct files_struct *files)
{
struct files_struct *old;
old = tsk->files;
task_lock(tsk);
tsk->files = files;
task_unlock(tsk);
put_files_struct(old);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(reset_files_struct);
static inline void __exit_files(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct files_struct * files = tsk->files;
if (files) {
task_lock(tsk);
tsk->files = NULL;
task_unlock(tsk);
put_files_struct(files);
}
}
void exit_files(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
__exit_files(tsk);
}
static inline void __put_fs_struct(struct fs_struct *fs)
{
/* No need to hold fs->lock if we are killing it */
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&fs->count)) {
dput(fs->root);
mntput(fs->rootmnt);
dput(fs->pwd);
mntput(fs->pwdmnt);
if (fs->altroot) {
dput(fs->altroot);
mntput(fs->altrootmnt);
}
kmem_cache_free(fs_cachep, fs);
}
}
void put_fs_struct(struct fs_struct *fs)
{
__put_fs_struct(fs);
}
static inline void __exit_fs(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct fs_struct * fs = tsk->fs;
if (fs) {
task_lock(tsk);
tsk->fs = NULL;
task_unlock(tsk);
__put_fs_struct(fs);
}
}
void exit_fs(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
__exit_fs(tsk);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(exit_fs);
/*
* Turn us into a lazy TLB process if we
* aren't already..
*/
static void exit_mm(struct task_struct * tsk)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
mm_release(tsk, mm);
if (!mm)
return;
/*
* Serialize with any possible pending coredump.
* We must hold mmap_sem around checking core_waiters
* and clearing tsk->mm. The core-inducing thread
* will increment core_waiters for each thread in the
* group with ->mm != NULL.
*/
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (mm->core_waiters) {
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (!--mm->core_waiters)
complete(mm->core_startup_done);
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
wait_for_completion(&mm->core_done);
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
}
atomic_inc(&mm->mm_count);
BUG_ON(mm != tsk->active_mm);
/* more a memory barrier than a real lock */
task_lock(tsk);
tsk->mm = NULL;
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
enter_lazy_tlb(mm, current);
Freezer: avoid freezing kernel threads prematurely Kernel threads should not have TIF_FREEZE set when user space processes are being frozen, since otherwise some of them might be frozen prematurely. To prevent this from happening we can (1) make exit_mm() unset TIF_FREEZE unconditionally just after clearing tsk->mm and (2) make try_to_freeze_tasks() check if p->mm is different from zero and PF_BORROWED_MM is unset in p->flags when user space processes are to be frozen. Namely, when user space processes are being frozen, we only should set TIF_FREEZE for tasks that have p->mm different from NULL and don't have PF_BORROWED_MM set in p->flags. For this reason task_lock() must be used to prevent try_to_freeze_tasks() from racing with use_mm()/unuse_mm(), in which p->mm and p->flags.PF_BORROWED_MM are changed under task_lock(p). Also, we need to prevent the following scenario from happening: * daemonize() is called by a task spawned from a user space code path * freezer checks if the task has p->mm set and the result is positive * task enters exit_mm() and clears its TIF_FREEZE * freezer sets TIF_FREEZE for the task * task calls try_to_freeze() and goes to the refrigerator, which is wrong at that point This requires us to acquire task_lock(p) before p->flags.PF_BORROWED_MM and p->mm are examined and release it after TIF_FREEZE is set for p (or it turns out that TIF_FREEZE should not be set). Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: Gautham R Shenoy <ego@in.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Nigel Cunningham <nigel@nigel.suspend2.net> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-19 02:47:33 -06:00
/* We don't want this task to be frozen prematurely */
clear_freeze_flag(tsk);
task_unlock(tsk);
mmput(mm);
}
static inline void
choose_new_parent(struct task_struct *p, struct task_struct *reaper)
{
/*
* Make sure we're not reparenting to ourselves and that
* the parent is not a zombie.
*/
BUG_ON(p == reaper || reaper->exit_state);
p->real_parent = reaper;
}
static void
reparent_thread(struct task_struct *p, struct task_struct *father, int traced)
{
if (p->pdeath_signal)
/* We already hold the tasklist_lock here. */
group_send_sig_info(p->pdeath_signal, SEND_SIG_NOINFO, p);
/* Move the child from its dying parent to the new one. */
if (unlikely(traced)) {
/* Preserve ptrace links if someone else is tracing this child. */
list_del_init(&p->ptrace_list);
if (p->parent != p->real_parent)
list_add(&p->ptrace_list, &p->real_parent->ptrace_children);
} else {
/* If this child is being traced, then we're the one tracing it
* anyway, so let go of it.
*/
p->ptrace = 0;
remove_parent(p);
p->parent = p->real_parent;
add_parent(p);
if (p->state == TASK_TRACED) {
/*
* If it was at a trace stop, turn it into
* a normal stop since it's no longer being
* traced.
*/
ptrace_untrace(p);
}
}
/* If this is a threaded reparent there is no need to
* notify anyone anything has happened.
*/
if (p->real_parent->group_leader == father->group_leader)
return;
/* We don't want people slaying init. */
if (p->exit_signal != -1)
p->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
/* If we'd notified the old parent about this child's death,
* also notify the new parent.
*/
if (!traced && p->exit_state == EXIT_ZOMBIE &&
p->exit_signal != -1 && thread_group_empty(p))
do_notify_parent(p, p->exit_signal);
/*
* process group orphan check
* Case ii: Our child is in a different pgrp
* than we are, and it was the only connection
* outside, so the child pgrp is now orphaned.
*/
if ((task_pgrp(p) != task_pgrp(father)) &&
(task_session(p) == task_session(father))) {
struct pid *pgrp = task_pgrp(p);
if (will_become_orphaned_pgrp(pgrp, NULL) &&
has_stopped_jobs(pgrp)) {
__kill_pgrp_info(SIGHUP, SEND_SIG_PRIV, pgrp);
__kill_pgrp_info(SIGCONT, SEND_SIG_PRIV, pgrp);
}
}
}
/*
* When we die, we re-parent all our children.
* Try to give them to another thread in our thread
* group, and if no such member exists, give it to
* the child reaper process (ie "init") in our pid
* space.
*/
static void
forget_original_parent(struct task_struct *father, struct list_head *to_release)
{
struct task_struct *p, *reaper = father;
struct list_head *_p, *_n;
do {
reaper = next_thread(reaper);
if (reaper == father) {
reaper = child_reaper(father);
break;
}
} while (reaper->exit_state);
/*
* There are only two places where our children can be:
*
* - in our child list
* - in our ptraced child list
*
* Search them and reparent children.
*/
list_for_each_safe(_p, _n, &father->children) {
int ptrace;
p = list_entry(_p, struct task_struct, sibling);
ptrace = p->ptrace;
/* if father isn't the real parent, then ptrace must be enabled */
BUG_ON(father != p->real_parent && !ptrace);
if (father == p->real_parent) {
/* reparent with a reaper, real father it's us */
choose_new_parent(p, reaper);
reparent_thread(p, father, 0);
} else {
/* reparent ptraced task to its real parent */
__ptrace_unlink (p);
if (p->exit_state == EXIT_ZOMBIE && p->exit_signal != -1 &&
thread_group_empty(p))
do_notify_parent(p, p->exit_signal);
}
/*
* if the ptraced child is a zombie with exit_signal == -1
* we must collect it before we exit, or it will remain
* zombie forever since we prevented it from self-reap itself
* while it was being traced by us, to be able to see it in wait4.
*/
if (unlikely(ptrace && p->exit_state == EXIT_ZOMBIE && p->exit_signal == -1))
list_add(&p->ptrace_list, to_release);
}
list_for_each_safe(_p, _n, &father->ptrace_children) {
p = list_entry(_p, struct task_struct, ptrace_list);
choose_new_parent(p, reaper);
reparent_thread(p, father, 1);
}
}
/*
* Send signals to all our closest relatives so that they know
* to properly mourn us..
*/
static void exit_notify(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
int state;
struct task_struct *t;
struct list_head ptrace_dead, *_p, *_n;
struct pid *pgrp;
if (signal_pending(tsk) && !(tsk->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)
&& !thread_group_empty(tsk)) {
/*
* This occurs when there was a race between our exit
* syscall and a group signal choosing us as the one to
* wake up. It could be that we are the only thread
* alerted to check for pending signals, but another thread
* should be woken now to take the signal since we will not.
* Now we'll wake all the threads in the group just to make
* sure someone gets all the pending signals.
*/
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
for (t = next_thread(tsk); t != tsk; t = next_thread(t))
if (!signal_pending(t) && !(t->flags & PF_EXITING))
recalc_sigpending_and_wake(t);
spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
}
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
/*
* This does two things:
*
* A. Make init inherit all the child processes
* B. Check to see if any process groups have become orphaned
* as a result of our exiting, and if they have any stopped
* jobs, send them a SIGHUP and then a SIGCONT. (POSIX 3.2.2.2)
*/
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ptrace_dead);
forget_original_parent(tsk, &ptrace_dead);
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&tsk->children));
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&tsk->ptrace_children));
/*
* Check to see if any process groups have become orphaned
* as a result of our exiting, and if they have any stopped
* jobs, send them a SIGHUP and then a SIGCONT. (POSIX 3.2.2.2)
*
* Case i: Our father is in a different pgrp than we are
* and we were the only connection outside, so our pgrp
* is about to become orphaned.
*/
t = tsk->real_parent;
pgrp = task_pgrp(tsk);
if ((task_pgrp(t) != pgrp) &&
(task_session(t) == task_session(tsk)) &&
will_become_orphaned_pgrp(pgrp, tsk) &&
has_stopped_jobs(pgrp)) {
__kill_pgrp_info(SIGHUP, SEND_SIG_PRIV, pgrp);
__kill_pgrp_info(SIGCONT, SEND_SIG_PRIV, pgrp);
}
/* Let father know we died
*
* Thread signals are configurable, but you aren't going to use
* that to send signals to arbitary processes.
* That stops right now.
*
* If the parent exec id doesn't match the exec id we saved
* when we started then we know the parent has changed security
* domain.
*
* If our self_exec id doesn't match our parent_exec_id then
* we have changed execution domain as these two values started
* the same after a fork.
*/
if (tsk->exit_signal != SIGCHLD && tsk->exit_signal != -1 &&
( tsk->parent_exec_id != t->self_exec_id ||
tsk->self_exec_id != tsk->parent_exec_id)
&& !capable(CAP_KILL))
tsk->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
/* If something other than our normal parent is ptracing us, then
* send it a SIGCHLD instead of honoring exit_signal. exit_signal
* only has special meaning to our real parent.
*/
if (tsk->exit_signal != -1 && thread_group_empty(tsk)) {
int signal = tsk->parent == tsk->real_parent ? tsk->exit_signal : SIGCHLD;
do_notify_parent(tsk, signal);
} else if (tsk->ptrace) {
do_notify_parent(tsk, SIGCHLD);
}
state = EXIT_ZOMBIE;
if (tsk->exit_signal == -1 && likely(!tsk->ptrace))
state = EXIT_DEAD;
tsk->exit_state = state;
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
list_for_each_safe(_p, _n, &ptrace_dead) {
list_del_init(_p);
t = list_entry(_p, struct task_struct, ptrace_list);
release_task(t);
}
/* If the process is dead, release it - nobody will wait for it */
if (state == EXIT_DEAD)
release_task(tsk);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE
static void check_stack_usage(void)
{
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(low_water_lock);
static int lowest_to_date = THREAD_SIZE;
unsigned long *n = end_of_stack(current);
unsigned long free;
while (*n == 0)
n++;
free = (unsigned long)n - (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current);
if (free >= lowest_to_date)
return;
spin_lock(&low_water_lock);
if (free < lowest_to_date) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s used greatest stack depth: %lu bytes "
"left\n",
current->comm, free);
lowest_to_date = free;
}
spin_unlock(&low_water_lock);
}
#else
static inline void check_stack_usage(void) {}
#endif
fastcall NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
int group_dead;
profile_task_exit(tsk);
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&tsk->fs_excl));
if (unlikely(in_interrupt()))
panic("Aiee, killing interrupt handler!");
if (unlikely(!tsk->pid))
panic("Attempted to kill the idle task!");
if (unlikely(tsk == child_reaper(tsk))) {
if (tsk->nsproxy->pid_ns != &init_pid_ns)
tsk->nsproxy->pid_ns->child_reaper = init_pid_ns.child_reaper;
else
panic("Attempted to kill init!");
}
if (unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_TRACE_EXIT)) {
current->ptrace_message = code;
ptrace_notify((PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT << 8) | SIGTRAP);
}
/*
* We're taking recursive faults here in do_exit. Safest is to just
* leave this task alone and wait for reboot.
*/
if (unlikely(tsk->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
printk(KERN_ALERT
"Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed!\n");
pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems 1. New entries can be added to tsk->pi_state_list after task completed exit_pi_state_list(). The result is memory leakage and deadlocks. 2. handle_mm_fault() is called under spinlock. The result is obvious. 3. results in self-inflicted deadlock inside glibc. Sometimes futex_lock_pi returns -ESRCH, when it is not expected and glibc enters to for(;;) sleep() to simulate deadlock. This problem is quite obvious and I think the patch is right. Though it looks like each "if" in futex_lock_pi() got some stupid special case "else if". :-) 4. sometimes futex_lock_pi() returns -EDEADLK, when nobody has the lock. The reason is also obvious (see comment in the patch), but correct fix is far beyond my comprehension. I guess someone already saw this, the chunk: if (rt_mutex_trylock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex)) ret = 0; is obviously from the same opera. But it does not work, because the rtmutex is really taken at this point: wake_futex_pi() of previous owner reassigned it to us. My fix works. But it looks very stupid. I would think about removal of shift of ownership in wake_futex_pi() and making all the work in context of process taking lock. From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fix 1) Avoid the tasklist lock variant of the exit race fix by adding an additional state transition to the exit code. This fixes also the issue, when a task with recursive segfaults is not able to release the futexes. Fix 2) Cleanup the lookup_pi_state() failure path and solve the -ESRCH problem finally. Fix 3) Solve the fixup_pi_state_owner() problem which needs to do the fixup in the lock protected section by using the in_atomic userspace access functions. This removes also the ugly lock drop / unqueue inside of fixup_pi_state() Fix 4) Fix a stale lock in the error path of futex_wake_pi() Added some error checks for verification. The -EDEADLK problem is solved by the rtmutex fixups. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-06-08 14:47:00 -06:00
/*
* We can do this unlocked here. The futex code uses
* this flag just to verify whether the pi state
* cleanup has been done or not. In the worst case it
* loops once more. We pretend that the cleanup was
* done as there is no way to return. Either the
* OWNER_DIED bit is set by now or we push the blocked
* task into the wait for ever nirwana as well.
*/
tsk->flags |= PF_EXITPIDONE;
if (tsk->io_context)
exit_io_context();
set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
schedule();
}
pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems 1. New entries can be added to tsk->pi_state_list after task completed exit_pi_state_list(). The result is memory leakage and deadlocks. 2. handle_mm_fault() is called under spinlock. The result is obvious. 3. results in self-inflicted deadlock inside glibc. Sometimes futex_lock_pi returns -ESRCH, when it is not expected and glibc enters to for(;;) sleep() to simulate deadlock. This problem is quite obvious and I think the patch is right. Though it looks like each "if" in futex_lock_pi() got some stupid special case "else if". :-) 4. sometimes futex_lock_pi() returns -EDEADLK, when nobody has the lock. The reason is also obvious (see comment in the patch), but correct fix is far beyond my comprehension. I guess someone already saw this, the chunk: if (rt_mutex_trylock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex)) ret = 0; is obviously from the same opera. But it does not work, because the rtmutex is really taken at this point: wake_futex_pi() of previous owner reassigned it to us. My fix works. But it looks very stupid. I would think about removal of shift of ownership in wake_futex_pi() and making all the work in context of process taking lock. From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fix 1) Avoid the tasklist lock variant of the exit race fix by adding an additional state transition to the exit code. This fixes also the issue, when a task with recursive segfaults is not able to release the futexes. Fix 2) Cleanup the lookup_pi_state() failure path and solve the -ESRCH problem finally. Fix 3) Solve the fixup_pi_state_owner() problem which needs to do the fixup in the lock protected section by using the in_atomic userspace access functions. This removes also the ugly lock drop / unqueue inside of fixup_pi_state() Fix 4) Fix a stale lock in the error path of futex_wake_pi() Added some error checks for verification. The -EDEADLK problem is solved by the rtmutex fixups. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-06-08 14:47:00 -06:00
/*
* tsk->flags are checked in the futex code to protect against
* an exiting task cleaning up the robust pi futexes.
*/
spin_lock_irq(&tsk->pi_lock);
tsk->flags |= PF_EXITING;
pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems 1. New entries can be added to tsk->pi_state_list after task completed exit_pi_state_list(). The result is memory leakage and deadlocks. 2. handle_mm_fault() is called under spinlock. The result is obvious. 3. results in self-inflicted deadlock inside glibc. Sometimes futex_lock_pi returns -ESRCH, when it is not expected and glibc enters to for(;;) sleep() to simulate deadlock. This problem is quite obvious and I think the patch is right. Though it looks like each "if" in futex_lock_pi() got some stupid special case "else if". :-) 4. sometimes futex_lock_pi() returns -EDEADLK, when nobody has the lock. The reason is also obvious (see comment in the patch), but correct fix is far beyond my comprehension. I guess someone already saw this, the chunk: if (rt_mutex_trylock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex)) ret = 0; is obviously from the same opera. But it does not work, because the rtmutex is really taken at this point: wake_futex_pi() of previous owner reassigned it to us. My fix works. But it looks very stupid. I would think about removal of shift of ownership in wake_futex_pi() and making all the work in context of process taking lock. From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fix 1) Avoid the tasklist lock variant of the exit race fix by adding an additional state transition to the exit code. This fixes also the issue, when a task with recursive segfaults is not able to release the futexes. Fix 2) Cleanup the lookup_pi_state() failure path and solve the -ESRCH problem finally. Fix 3) Solve the fixup_pi_state_owner() problem which needs to do the fixup in the lock protected section by using the in_atomic userspace access functions. This removes also the ugly lock drop / unqueue inside of fixup_pi_state() Fix 4) Fix a stale lock in the error path of futex_wake_pi() Added some error checks for verification. The -EDEADLK problem is solved by the rtmutex fixups. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-06-08 14:47:00 -06:00
spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->pi_lock);
if (unlikely(in_atomic()))
printk(KERN_INFO "note: %s[%d] exited with preempt_count %d\n",
current->comm, current->pid,
preempt_count());
acct_update_integrals(tsk);
[PATCH] mm: update_hiwaters just in time update_mem_hiwater has attracted various criticisms, in particular from those concerned with mm scalability. Originally it was called whenever rss or total_vm got raised. Then many of those callsites were replaced by a timer tick call from account_system_time. Now Frank van Maarseveen reports that to be found inadequate. How about this? Works for Frank. Replace update_mem_hiwater, a poor combination of two unrelated ops, by macros update_hiwater_rss and update_hiwater_vm. Don't attempt to keep mm->hiwater_rss up to date at timer tick, nor every time we raise rss (usually by 1): those are hot paths. Do the opposite, update only when about to lower rss (usually by many), or just before final accounting in do_exit. Handle mm->hiwater_vm in the same way, though it's much less of an issue. Demand that whoever collects these hiwater statistics do the work of taking the maximum with rss or total_vm. And there has been no collector of these hiwater statistics in the tree. The new convention needs an example, so match Frank's usage by adding a VmPeak line above VmSize to /proc/<pid>/status, and also a VmHWM line above VmRSS (High-Water-Mark or High-Water-Memory). There was a particular anomaly during mremap move, that hiwater_vm might be captured too high. A fleeting such anomaly remains, but it's quickly corrected now, whereas before it would stick. What locking? None: if the app is racy then these statistics will be racy, it's not worth any overhead to make them exact. But whenever it suits, hiwater_vm is updated under exclusive mmap_sem, and hiwater_rss under page_table_lock (for now) or with preemption disabled (later on): without going to any trouble, minimize the time between reading current values and updating, to minimize those occasions when a racing thread bumps a count up and back down in between. Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-10-29 19:16:18 -06:00
if (tsk->mm) {
update_hiwater_rss(tsk->mm);
update_hiwater_vm(tsk->mm);
}
group_dead = atomic_dec_and_test(&tsk->signal->live);
if (group_dead) {
pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems 1. New entries can be added to tsk->pi_state_list after task completed exit_pi_state_list(). The result is memory leakage and deadlocks. 2. handle_mm_fault() is called under spinlock. The result is obvious. 3. results in self-inflicted deadlock inside glibc. Sometimes futex_lock_pi returns -ESRCH, when it is not expected and glibc enters to for(;;) sleep() to simulate deadlock. This problem is quite obvious and I think the patch is right. Though it looks like each "if" in futex_lock_pi() got some stupid special case "else if". :-) 4. sometimes futex_lock_pi() returns -EDEADLK, when nobody has the lock. The reason is also obvious (see comment in the patch), but correct fix is far beyond my comprehension. I guess someone already saw this, the chunk: if (rt_mutex_trylock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex)) ret = 0; is obviously from the same opera. But it does not work, because the rtmutex is really taken at this point: wake_futex_pi() of previous owner reassigned it to us. My fix works. But it looks very stupid. I would think about removal of shift of ownership in wake_futex_pi() and making all the work in context of process taking lock. From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fix 1) Avoid the tasklist lock variant of the exit race fix by adding an additional state transition to the exit code. This fixes also the issue, when a task with recursive segfaults is not able to release the futexes. Fix 2) Cleanup the lookup_pi_state() failure path and solve the -ESRCH problem finally. Fix 3) Solve the fixup_pi_state_owner() problem which needs to do the fixup in the lock protected section by using the in_atomic userspace access functions. This removes also the ugly lock drop / unqueue inside of fixup_pi_state() Fix 4) Fix a stale lock in the error path of futex_wake_pi() Added some error checks for verification. The -EDEADLK problem is solved by the rtmutex fixups. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-06-08 14:47:00 -06:00
hrtimer_cancel(&tsk->signal->real_timer);
exit_itimers(tsk->signal);
}
acct_collect(code, group_dead);
if (unlikely(tsk->robust_list))
exit_robust_list(tsk);
#if defined(CONFIG_FUTEX) && defined(CONFIG_COMPAT)
if (unlikely(tsk->compat_robust_list))
compat_exit_robust_list(tsk);
#endif
Audit: add TTY input auditing Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it necessary to audit TTY output as well. Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still work). TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly useless audit events. Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel. The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone). Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY. See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix] Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-16 00:40:56 -06:00
if (group_dead)
tty_audit_exit();
if (unlikely(tsk->audit_context))
audit_free(tsk);
tsk->exit_code = code;
taskstats_exit(tsk, group_dead);
exit_mm(tsk);
if (group_dead)
acct_process();
exit_sem(tsk);
__exit_files(tsk);
__exit_fs(tsk);
check_stack_usage();
exit_thread();
cpuset_exit(tsk);
exit_keys(tsk);
if (group_dead && tsk->signal->leader)
disassociate_ctty(1);
module_put(task_thread_info(tsk)->exec_domain->module);
if (tsk->binfmt)
module_put(tsk->binfmt->module);
proc_exit_connector(tsk);
exit_task_namespaces(tsk);
exit_notify(tsk);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
mpol_free(tsk->mempolicy);
tsk->mempolicy = NULL;
#endif
/*
* This must happen late, after the PID is not
* hashed anymore:
*/
if (unlikely(!list_empty(&tsk->pi_state_list)))
exit_pi_state_list(tsk);
if (unlikely(current->pi_state_cache))
kfree(current->pi_state_cache);
/*
* Make sure we are holding no locks:
*/
debug_check_no_locks_held(tsk);
pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems 1. New entries can be added to tsk->pi_state_list after task completed exit_pi_state_list(). The result is memory leakage and deadlocks. 2. handle_mm_fault() is called under spinlock. The result is obvious. 3. results in self-inflicted deadlock inside glibc. Sometimes futex_lock_pi returns -ESRCH, when it is not expected and glibc enters to for(;;) sleep() to simulate deadlock. This problem is quite obvious and I think the patch is right. Though it looks like each "if" in futex_lock_pi() got some stupid special case "else if". :-) 4. sometimes futex_lock_pi() returns -EDEADLK, when nobody has the lock. The reason is also obvious (see comment in the patch), but correct fix is far beyond my comprehension. I guess someone already saw this, the chunk: if (rt_mutex_trylock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex)) ret = 0; is obviously from the same opera. But it does not work, because the rtmutex is really taken at this point: wake_futex_pi() of previous owner reassigned it to us. My fix works. But it looks very stupid. I would think about removal of shift of ownership in wake_futex_pi() and making all the work in context of process taking lock. From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fix 1) Avoid the tasklist lock variant of the exit race fix by adding an additional state transition to the exit code. This fixes also the issue, when a task with recursive segfaults is not able to release the futexes. Fix 2) Cleanup the lookup_pi_state() failure path and solve the -ESRCH problem finally. Fix 3) Solve the fixup_pi_state_owner() problem which needs to do the fixup in the lock protected section by using the in_atomic userspace access functions. This removes also the ugly lock drop / unqueue inside of fixup_pi_state() Fix 4) Fix a stale lock in the error path of futex_wake_pi() Added some error checks for verification. The -EDEADLK problem is solved by the rtmutex fixups. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-06-08 14:47:00 -06:00
/*
* We can do this unlocked here. The futex code uses this flag
* just to verify whether the pi state cleanup has been done
* or not. In the worst case it loops once more.
*/
tsk->flags |= PF_EXITPIDONE;
if (tsk->io_context)
exit_io_context();
if (tsk->splice_pipe)
__free_pipe_info(tsk->splice_pipe);
preempt_disable();
/* causes final put_task_struct in finish_task_switch(). */
tsk->state = TASK_DEAD;
schedule();
BUG();
/* Avoid "noreturn function does return". */
for (;;)
cpu_relax(); /* For when BUG is null */
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(do_exit);
NORET_TYPE void complete_and_exit(struct completion *comp, long code)
{
if (comp)
complete(comp);
do_exit(code);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(complete_and_exit);
asmlinkage long sys_exit(int error_code)
{
do_exit((error_code&0xff)<<8);
}
/*
* Take down every thread in the group. This is called by fatal signals
* as well as by sys_exit_group (below).
*/
NORET_TYPE void
do_group_exit(int exit_code)
{
BUG_ON(exit_code & 0x80); /* core dumps don't get here */
if (current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)
exit_code = current->signal->group_exit_code;
else if (!thread_group_empty(current)) {
struct signal_struct *const sig = current->signal;
struct sighand_struct *const sighand = current->sighand;
spin_lock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
if (sig->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)
/* Another thread got here before we took the lock. */
exit_code = sig->group_exit_code;
else {
sig->group_exit_code = exit_code;
zap_other_threads(current);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
}
do_exit(exit_code);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
/*
* this kills every thread in the thread group. Note that any externally
* wait4()-ing process will get the correct exit code - even if this
* thread is not the thread group leader.
*/
asmlinkage void sys_exit_group(int error_code)
{
do_group_exit((error_code & 0xff) << 8);
}
static int eligible_child(pid_t pid, int options, struct task_struct *p)
{
int err;
if (pid > 0) {
if (p->pid != pid)
return 0;
} else if (!pid) {
if (process_group(p) != process_group(current))
return 0;
} else if (pid != -1) {
if (process_group(p) != -pid)
return 0;
}
/*
* Do not consider detached threads that are
* not ptraced:
*/
if (p->exit_signal == -1 && !p->ptrace)
return 0;
/* Wait for all children (clone and not) if __WALL is set;
* otherwise, wait for clone children *only* if __WCLONE is
* set; otherwise, wait for non-clone children *only*. (Note:
* A "clone" child here is one that reports to its parent
* using a signal other than SIGCHLD.) */
if (((p->exit_signal != SIGCHLD) ^ ((options & __WCLONE) != 0))
&& !(options & __WALL))
return 0;
/*
* Do not consider thread group leaders that are
* in a non-empty thread group:
*/
if (delay_group_leader(p))
return 2;
err = security_task_wait(p);
if (err)
return err;
return 1;
}
static int wait_noreap_copyout(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pid, uid_t uid,
int why, int status,
struct siginfo __user *infop,
struct rusage __user *rusagep)
{
int retval = rusagep ? getrusage(p, RUSAGE_BOTH, rusagep) : 0;
put_task_struct(p);
if (!retval)
retval = put_user(SIGCHLD, &infop->si_signo);
if (!retval)
retval = put_user(0, &infop->si_errno);
if (!retval)
retval = put_user((short)why, &infop->si_code);
if (!retval)
retval = put_user(pid, &infop->si_pid);
if (!retval)
retval = put_user(uid, &infop->si_uid);
if (!retval)
retval = put_user(status, &infop->si_status);
if (!retval)
retval = pid;
return retval;
}
/*
* Handle sys_wait4 work for one task in state EXIT_ZOMBIE. We hold
* read_lock(&tasklist_lock) on entry. If we return zero, we still hold
* the lock and this task is uninteresting. If we return nonzero, we have
* released the lock and the system call should return.
*/
static int wait_task_zombie(struct task_struct *p, int noreap,
struct siginfo __user *infop,
int __user *stat_addr, struct rusage __user *ru)
{
unsigned long state;
int retval;
int status;
if (unlikely(noreap)) {
pid_t pid = p->pid;
uid_t uid = p->uid;
int exit_code = p->exit_code;
int why, status;
if (unlikely(p->exit_state != EXIT_ZOMBIE))
return 0;
if (unlikely(p->exit_signal == -1 && p->ptrace == 0))
return 0;
get_task_struct(p);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
if ((exit_code & 0x7f) == 0) {
why = CLD_EXITED;
status = exit_code >> 8;
} else {
why = (exit_code & 0x80) ? CLD_DUMPED : CLD_KILLED;
status = exit_code & 0x7f;
}
return wait_noreap_copyout(p, pid, uid, why,
status, infop, ru);
}
/*
* Try to move the task's state to DEAD
* only one thread is allowed to do this:
*/
state = xchg(&p->exit_state, EXIT_DEAD);
if (state != EXIT_ZOMBIE) {
BUG_ON(state != EXIT_DEAD);
return 0;
}
if (unlikely(p->exit_signal == -1 && p->ptrace == 0)) {
/*
* This can only happen in a race with a ptraced thread
* dying on another processor.
*/
return 0;
}
if (likely(p->real_parent == p->parent) && likely(p->signal)) {
struct signal_struct *psig;
struct signal_struct *sig;
/*
* The resource counters for the group leader are in its
* own task_struct. Those for dead threads in the group
* are in its signal_struct, as are those for the child
* processes it has previously reaped. All these
* accumulate in the parent's signal_struct c* fields.
*
* We don't bother to take a lock here to protect these
* p->signal fields, because they are only touched by
* __exit_signal, which runs with tasklist_lock
* write-locked anyway, and so is excluded here. We do
* need to protect the access to p->parent->signal fields,
* as other threads in the parent group can be right
* here reaping other children at the same time.
*/
spin_lock_irq(&p->parent->sighand->siglock);
psig = p->parent->signal;
sig = p->signal;
psig->cutime =
cputime_add(psig->cutime,
cputime_add(p->utime,
cputime_add(sig->utime,
sig->cutime)));
psig->cstime =
cputime_add(psig->cstime,
cputime_add(p->stime,
cputime_add(sig->stime,
sig->cstime)));
psig->cgtime =
cputime_add(psig->cgtime,
cputime_add(p->gtime,
cputime_add(sig->gtime,
sig->cgtime)));
psig->cmin_flt +=
p->min_flt + sig->min_flt + sig->cmin_flt;
psig->cmaj_flt +=
p->maj_flt + sig->maj_flt + sig->cmaj_flt;
psig->cnvcsw +=
p->nvcsw + sig->nvcsw + sig->cnvcsw;
psig->cnivcsw +=
p->nivcsw + sig->nivcsw + sig->cnivcsw;
psig->cinblock +=
task_io_get_inblock(p) +
sig->inblock + sig->cinblock;
psig->coublock +=
task_io_get_oublock(p) +
sig->oublock + sig->coublock;
spin_unlock_irq(&p->parent->sighand->siglock);
}
/*
* Now we are sure this task is interesting, and no other
* thread can reap it because we set its state to EXIT_DEAD.
*/
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
retval = ru ? getrusage(p, RUSAGE_BOTH, ru) : 0;
status = (p->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)
? p->signal->group_exit_code : p->exit_code;
if (!retval && stat_addr)
retval = put_user(status, stat_addr);
if (!retval && infop)
retval = put_user(SIGCHLD, &infop->si_signo);
if (!retval && infop)
retval = put_user(0, &infop->si_errno);
if (!retval && infop) {
int why;
if ((status & 0x7f) == 0) {
why = CLD_EXITED;
status >>= 8;
} else {
why = (status & 0x80) ? CLD_DUMPED : CLD_KILLED;
status &= 0x7f;
}
retval = put_user((short)why, &infop->si_code);
if (!retval)
retval = put_user(status, &infop->si_status);
}
if (!retval && infop)
retval = put_user(p->pid, &infop->si_pid);
if (!retval && infop)
retval = put_user(p->uid, &infop->si_uid);
if (retval) {
// TODO: is this safe?
p->exit_state = EXIT_ZOMBIE;
return retval;
}
retval = p->pid;
if (p->real_parent != p->parent) {
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
/* Double-check with lock held. */
if (p->real_parent != p->parent) {
__ptrace_unlink(p);
// TODO: is this safe?
p->exit_state = EXIT_ZOMBIE;
/*
* If this is not a detached task, notify the parent.
* If it's still not detached after that, don't release
* it now.
*/
if (p->exit_signal != -1) {
do_notify_parent(p, p->exit_signal);
if (p->exit_signal != -1)
p = NULL;
}
}
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
}
if (p != NULL)
release_task(p);
BUG_ON(!retval);
return retval;
}
/*
* Handle sys_wait4 work for one task in state TASK_STOPPED. We hold
* read_lock(&tasklist_lock) on entry. If we return zero, we still hold
* the lock and this task is uninteresting. If we return nonzero, we have
* released the lock and the system call should return.
*/
static int wait_task_stopped(struct task_struct *p, int delayed_group_leader,
int noreap, struct siginfo __user *infop,
int __user *stat_addr, struct rusage __user *ru)
{
int retval, exit_code;
if (!p->exit_code)
return 0;
if (delayed_group_leader && !(p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) &&
p->signal && p->signal->group_stop_count > 0)
/*
* A group stop is in progress and this is the group leader.
* We won't report until all threads have stopped.
*/
return 0;
/*
* Now we are pretty sure this task is interesting.
* Make sure it doesn't get reaped out from under us while we
* give up the lock and then examine it below. We don't want to
* keep holding onto the tasklist_lock while we call getrusage and
* possibly take page faults for user memory.
*/
get_task_struct(p);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
if (unlikely(noreap)) {
pid_t pid = p->pid;
uid_t uid = p->uid;
int why = (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) ? CLD_TRAPPED : CLD_STOPPED;
exit_code = p->exit_code;
if (unlikely(!exit_code) ||
unlikely(p->state & TASK_TRACED))
goto bail_ref;
return wait_noreap_copyout(p, pid, uid,
why, (exit_code << 8) | 0x7f,
infop, ru);
}
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
/*
* This uses xchg to be atomic with the thread resuming and setting
* it. It must also be done with the write lock held to prevent a
* race with the EXIT_ZOMBIE case.
*/
exit_code = xchg(&p->exit_code, 0);
if (unlikely(p->exit_state)) {
/*
* The task resumed and then died. Let the next iteration
* catch it in EXIT_ZOMBIE. Note that exit_code might
* already be zero here if it resumed and did _exit(0).
* The task itself is dead and won't touch exit_code again;
* other processors in this function are locked out.
*/
p->exit_code = exit_code;
exit_code = 0;
}
if (unlikely(exit_code == 0)) {
/*
* Another thread in this function got to it first, or it
* resumed, or it resumed and then died.
*/
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
bail_ref:
put_task_struct(p);
/*
* We are returning to the wait loop without having successfully
* removed the process and having released the lock. We cannot
* continue, since the "p" task pointer is potentially stale.
*
* Return -EAGAIN, and do_wait() will restart the loop from the
* beginning. Do _not_ re-acquire the lock.
*/
return -EAGAIN;
}
/* move to end of parent's list to avoid starvation */
remove_parent(p);
add_parent(p);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
retval = ru ? getrusage(p, RUSAGE_BOTH, ru) : 0;
if (!retval && stat_addr)
retval = put_user((exit_code << 8) | 0x7f, stat_addr);
if (!retval && infop)
retval = put_user(SIGCHLD, &infop->si_signo);
if (!retval && infop)
retval = put_user(0, &infop->si_errno);
if (!retval && infop)
retval = put_user((short)((p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
? CLD_TRAPPED : CLD_STOPPED),
&infop->si_code);
if (!retval && infop)
retval = put_user(exit_code, &infop->si_status);
if (!retval && infop)
retval = put_user(p->pid, &infop->si_pid);
if (!retval && infop)
retval = put_user(p->uid, &infop->si_uid);
if (!retval)
retval = p->pid;
put_task_struct(p);
BUG_ON(!retval);
return retval;
}
/*
* Handle do_wait work for one task in a live, non-stopped state.
* read_lock(&tasklist_lock) on entry. If we return zero, we still hold
* the lock and this task is uninteresting. If we return nonzero, we have
* released the lock and the system call should return.
*/
static int wait_task_continued(struct task_struct *p, int noreap,
struct siginfo __user *infop,
int __user *stat_addr, struct rusage __user *ru)
{
int retval;
pid_t pid;
uid_t uid;
if (unlikely(!p->signal))
return 0;
if (!(p->signal->flags & SIGNAL_STOP_CONTINUED))
return 0;
spin_lock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock);
/* Re-check with the lock held. */
if (!(p->signal->flags & SIGNAL_STOP_CONTINUED)) {
spin_unlock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock);
return 0;
}
if (!noreap)
p->signal->flags &= ~SIGNAL_STOP_CONTINUED;
spin_unlock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock);
pid = p->pid;
uid = p->uid;
get_task_struct(p);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
if (!infop) {
retval = ru ? getrusage(p, RUSAGE_BOTH, ru) : 0;
put_task_struct(p);
if (!retval && stat_addr)
retval = put_user(0xffff, stat_addr);
if (!retval)
retval = p->pid;
} else {
retval = wait_noreap_copyout(p, pid, uid,
CLD_CONTINUED, SIGCONT,
infop, ru);
BUG_ON(retval == 0);
}
return retval;
}
static inline int my_ptrace_child(struct task_struct *p)
{
if (!(p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED))
return 0;
if (!(p->ptrace & PT_ATTACHED))
return 1;
/*
* This child was PTRACE_ATTACH'd. We should be seeing it only if
* we are the attacher. If we are the real parent, this is a race
* inside ptrace_attach. It is waiting for the tasklist_lock,
* which we have to switch the parent links, but has already set
* the flags in p->ptrace.
*/
return (p->parent != p->real_parent);
}
static long do_wait(pid_t pid, int options, struct siginfo __user *infop,
int __user *stat_addr, struct rusage __user *ru)
{
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
struct task_struct *tsk;
int flag, retval;
int allowed, denied;
add_wait_queue(&current->signal->wait_chldexit,&wait);
repeat:
/*
* We will set this flag if we see any child that might later
* match our criteria, even if we are not able to reap it yet.
*/
flag = 0;
allowed = denied = 0;
current->state = TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE;
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
tsk = current;
do {
struct task_struct *p;
struct list_head *_p;
int ret;
list_for_each(_p,&tsk->children) {
p = list_entry(_p, struct task_struct, sibling);
ret = eligible_child(pid, options, p);
if (!ret)
continue;
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
denied = ret;
continue;
}
allowed = 1;
switch (p->state) {
case TASK_TRACED:
/*
* When we hit the race with PTRACE_ATTACH,
* we will not report this child. But the
* race means it has not yet been moved to
* our ptrace_children list, so we need to
* set the flag here to avoid a spurious ECHILD
* when the race happens with the only child.
*/
flag = 1;
if (!my_ptrace_child(p))
continue;
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case TASK_STOPPED:
/*
* It's stopped now, so it might later
* continue, exit, or stop again.
*/
flag = 1;
if (!(options & WUNTRACED) &&
!my_ptrace_child(p))
continue;
retval = wait_task_stopped(p, ret == 2,
(options & WNOWAIT),
infop,
stat_addr, ru);
if (retval == -EAGAIN)
goto repeat;
if (retval != 0) /* He released the lock. */
goto end;
break;
default:
// case EXIT_DEAD:
if (p->exit_state == EXIT_DEAD)
continue;
// case EXIT_ZOMBIE:
if (p->exit_state == EXIT_ZOMBIE) {
/*
* Eligible but we cannot release
* it yet:
*/
if (ret == 2)
goto check_continued;
if (!likely(options & WEXITED))
continue;
retval = wait_task_zombie(
p, (options & WNOWAIT),
infop, stat_addr, ru);
/* He released the lock. */
if (retval != 0)
goto end;
break;
}
check_continued:
/*
* It's running now, so it might later
* exit, stop, or stop and then continue.
*/
flag = 1;
if (!unlikely(options & WCONTINUED))
continue;
retval = wait_task_continued(
p, (options & WNOWAIT),
infop, stat_addr, ru);
if (retval != 0) /* He released the lock. */
goto end;
break;
}
}
if (!flag) {
list_for_each(_p, &tsk->ptrace_children) {
p = list_entry(_p, struct task_struct,
ptrace_list);
if (!eligible_child(pid, options, p))
continue;
flag = 1;
break;
}
}
if (options & __WNOTHREAD)
break;
tsk = next_thread(tsk);
BUG_ON(tsk->signal != current->signal);
} while (tsk != current);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
if (flag) {
retval = 0;
if (options & WNOHANG)
goto end;
retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
if (signal_pending(current))
goto end;
schedule();
goto repeat;
}
retval = -ECHILD;
if (unlikely(denied) && !allowed)
retval = denied;
end:
current->state = TASK_RUNNING;
remove_wait_queue(&current->signal->wait_chldexit,&wait);
if (infop) {
if (retval > 0)
retval = 0;
else {
/*
* For a WNOHANG return, clear out all the fields
* we would set so the user can easily tell the
* difference.
*/
if (!retval)
retval = put_user(0, &infop->si_signo);
if (!retval)
retval = put_user(0, &infop->si_errno);
if (!retval)
retval = put_user(0, &infop->si_code);
if (!retval)
retval = put_user(0, &infop->si_pid);
if (!retval)
retval = put_user(0, &infop->si_uid);
if (!retval)
retval = put_user(0, &infop->si_status);
}
}
return retval;
}
asmlinkage long sys_waitid(int which, pid_t pid,
struct siginfo __user *infop, int options,
struct rusage __user *ru)
{
long ret;
if (options & ~(WNOHANG|WNOWAIT|WEXITED|WSTOPPED|WCONTINUED))
return -EINVAL;
if (!(options & (WEXITED|WSTOPPED|WCONTINUED)))
return -EINVAL;
switch (which) {
case P_ALL:
pid = -1;
break;
case P_PID:
if (pid <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case P_PGID:
if (pid <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
pid = -pid;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = do_wait(pid, options, infop, NULL, ru);
/* avoid REGPARM breakage on x86: */
prevent_tail_call(ret);
return ret;
}
asmlinkage long sys_wait4(pid_t pid, int __user *stat_addr,
int options, struct rusage __user *ru)
{
long ret;
if (options & ~(WNOHANG|WUNTRACED|WCONTINUED|
__WNOTHREAD|__WCLONE|__WALL))
return -EINVAL;
ret = do_wait(pid, options | WEXITED, NULL, stat_addr, ru);
/* avoid REGPARM breakage on x86: */
prevent_tail_call(ret);
return ret;
}
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_WAITPID
/*
* sys_waitpid() remains for compatibility. waitpid() should be
* implemented by calling sys_wait4() from libc.a.
*/
asmlinkage long sys_waitpid(pid_t pid, int __user *stat_addr, int options)
{
return sys_wait4(pid, stat_addr, options, NULL);
}
#endif