kernel-fxtec-pro1x/fs/eventpoll.c

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/*
* fs/eventpoll.c ( Efficent event polling implementation )
* Copyright (C) 2001,...,2006 Davide Libenzi
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
*
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/poll.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/hash.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/rwsem.h>
#include <linux/rbtree.h>
#include <linux/wait.h>
#include <linux/eventpoll.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/system.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/mman.h>
#include <asm/atomic.h>
#include <asm/semaphore.h>
/*
* LOCKING:
* There are three level of locking required by epoll :
*
* 1) epmutex (mutex)
* 2) ep->sem (rw_semaphore)
* 3) ep->lock (rw_lock)
*
* The acquire order is the one listed above, from 1 to 3.
* We need a spinlock (ep->lock) because we manipulate objects
* from inside the poll callback, that might be triggered from
* a wake_up() that in turn might be called from IRQ context.
* So we can't sleep inside the poll callback and hence we need
* a spinlock. During the event transfer loop (from kernel to
* user space) we could end up sleeping due a copy_to_user(), so
* we need a lock that will allow us to sleep. This lock is a
* read-write semaphore (ep->sem). It is acquired on read during
* the event transfer loop and in write during epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL)
* and during eventpoll_release_file(). Then we also need a global
* semaphore to serialize eventpoll_release_file() and ep_free().
* This semaphore is acquired by ep_free() during the epoll file
* cleanup path and it is also acquired by eventpoll_release_file()
* if a file has been pushed inside an epoll set and it is then
* close()d without a previous call toepoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL).
* It is possible to drop the "ep->sem" and to use the global
* semaphore "epmutex" (together with "ep->lock") to have it working,
* but having "ep->sem" will make the interface more scalable.
* Events that require holding "epmutex" are very rare, while for
* normal operations the epoll private "ep->sem" will guarantee
* a greater scalability.
*/
#define EVENTPOLLFS_MAGIC 0x03111965 /* My birthday should work for this :) */
#define DEBUG_EPOLL 0
#if DEBUG_EPOLL > 0
#define DPRINTK(x) printk x
#define DNPRINTK(n, x) do { if ((n) <= DEBUG_EPOLL) printk x; } while (0)
#else /* #if DEBUG_EPOLL > 0 */
#define DPRINTK(x) (void) 0
#define DNPRINTK(n, x) (void) 0
#endif /* #if DEBUG_EPOLL > 0 */
#define DEBUG_EPI 0
#if DEBUG_EPI != 0
#define EPI_SLAB_DEBUG (SLAB_DEBUG_FREE | SLAB_RED_ZONE /* | SLAB_POISON */)
#else /* #if DEBUG_EPI != 0 */
#define EPI_SLAB_DEBUG 0
#endif /* #if DEBUG_EPI != 0 */
/* Epoll private bits inside the event mask */
#define EP_PRIVATE_BITS (EPOLLONESHOT | EPOLLET)
/* Maximum number of poll wake up nests we are allowing */
#define EP_MAX_POLLWAKE_NESTS 4
/* Maximum msec timeout value storeable in a long int */
#define EP_MAX_MSTIMEO min(1000ULL * MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT / HZ, (LONG_MAX - 999ULL) / HZ)
#define EP_MAX_EVENTS (INT_MAX / sizeof(struct epoll_event))
struct epoll_filefd {
struct file *file;
int fd;
};
/*
* Node that is linked into the "wake_task_list" member of the "struct poll_safewake".
* It is used to keep track on all tasks that are currently inside the wake_up() code
* to 1) short-circuit the one coming from the same task and same wait queue head
* ( loop ) 2) allow a maximum number of epoll descriptors inclusion nesting
* 3) let go the ones coming from other tasks.
*/
struct wake_task_node {
struct list_head llink;
struct task_struct *task;
wait_queue_head_t *wq;
};
/*
* This is used to implement the safe poll wake up avoiding to reenter
* the poll callback from inside wake_up().
*/
struct poll_safewake {
struct list_head wake_task_list;
spinlock_t lock;
};
/*
* This structure is stored inside the "private_data" member of the file
* structure and rapresent the main data sructure for the eventpoll
* interface.
*/
struct eventpoll {
/* Protect the this structure access */
rwlock_t lock;
/*
* This semaphore is used to ensure that files are not removed
* while epoll is using them. This is read-held during the event
* collection loop and it is write-held during the file cleanup
* path, the epoll file exit code and the ctl operations.
*/
struct rw_semaphore sem;
/* Wait queue used by sys_epoll_wait() */
wait_queue_head_t wq;
/* Wait queue used by file->poll() */
wait_queue_head_t poll_wait;
/* List of ready file descriptors */
struct list_head rdllist;
/* RB-Tree root used to store monitored fd structs */
struct rb_root rbr;
};
/* Wait structure used by the poll hooks */
struct eppoll_entry {
/* List header used to link this structure to the "struct epitem" */
struct list_head llink;
/* The "base" pointer is set to the container "struct epitem" */
void *base;
/*
* Wait queue item that will be linked to the target file wait
* queue head.
*/
wait_queue_t wait;
/* The wait queue head that linked the "wait" wait queue item */
wait_queue_head_t *whead;
};
/*
* Each file descriptor added to the eventpoll interface will
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
* have an entry of this type linked to the "rbr" RB tree.
*/
struct epitem {
/* RB-Tree node used to link this structure to the eventpoll rb-tree */
struct rb_node rbn;
/* List header used to link this structure to the eventpoll ready list */
struct list_head rdllink;
/* The file descriptor information this item refers to */
struct epoll_filefd ffd;
/* Number of active wait queue attached to poll operations */
int nwait;
/* List containing poll wait queues */
struct list_head pwqlist;
/* The "container" of this item */
struct eventpoll *ep;
/* The structure that describe the interested events and the source fd */
struct epoll_event event;
/*
* Used to keep track of the usage count of the structure. This avoids
* that the structure will desappear from underneath our processing.
*/
atomic_t usecnt;
/* List header used to link this item to the "struct file" items list */
struct list_head fllink;
};
/* Wrapper struct used by poll queueing */
struct ep_pqueue {
poll_table pt;
struct epitem *epi;
};
static void ep_poll_safewake_init(struct poll_safewake *psw);
static void ep_poll_safewake(struct poll_safewake *psw, wait_queue_head_t *wq);
static int ep_getfd(int *efd, struct inode **einode, struct file **efile,
struct eventpoll *ep);
static int ep_alloc(struct eventpoll **pep);
static void ep_free(struct eventpoll *ep);
static struct epitem *ep_find(struct eventpoll *ep, struct file *file, int fd);
static void ep_use_epitem(struct epitem *epi);
static void ep_release_epitem(struct epitem *epi);
static void ep_ptable_queue_proc(struct file *file, wait_queue_head_t *whead,
poll_table *pt);
static void ep_rbtree_insert(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi);
static int ep_insert(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epoll_event *event,
struct file *tfile, int fd);
static int ep_modify(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi,
struct epoll_event *event);
static void ep_unregister_pollwait(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi);
static int ep_unlink(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi);
static int ep_remove(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi);
static int ep_poll_callback(wait_queue_t *wait, unsigned mode, int sync, void *key);
static int ep_eventpoll_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);
static unsigned int ep_eventpoll_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
static int ep_send_events(struct eventpoll *ep, struct list_head *txlist,
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
struct epoll_event __user *events, int maxevents);
static int ep_events_transfer(struct eventpoll *ep,
struct epoll_event __user *events,
int maxevents);
static int ep_poll(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epoll_event __user *events,
int maxevents, long timeout);
static int eventpollfs_delete_dentry(struct dentry *dentry);
static struct inode *ep_eventpoll_inode(void);
[PATCH] VFS: Permit filesystem to override root dentry on mount Extend the get_sb() filesystem operation to take an extra argument that permits the VFS to pass in the target vfsmount that defines the mountpoint. The filesystem is then required to manually set the superblock and root dentry pointers. For most filesystems, this should be done with simple_set_mnt() which will set the superblock pointer and then set the root dentry to the superblock's s_root (as per the old default behaviour). The get_sb() op now returns an integer as there's now no need to return the superblock pointer. This patch permits a superblock to be implicitly shared amongst several mount points, such as can be done with NFS to avoid potential inode aliasing. In such a case, simple_set_mnt() would not be called, and instead the mnt_root and mnt_sb would be set directly. The patch also makes the following changes: (*) the get_sb_*() convenience functions in the core kernel now take a vfsmount pointer argument and return an integer, so most filesystems have to change very little. (*) If one of the convenience function is not used, then get_sb() should normally call simple_set_mnt() to instantiate the vfsmount. This will always return 0, and so can be tail-called from get_sb(). (*) generic_shutdown_super() now calls shrink_dcache_sb() to clean up the dcache upon superblock destruction rather than shrink_dcache_anon(). This is required because the superblock may now have multiple trees that aren't actually bound to s_root, but that still need to be cleaned up. The currently called functions assume that the whole tree is rooted at s_root, and that anonymous dentries are not the roots of trees which results in dentries being left unculled. However, with the way NFS superblock sharing are currently set to be implemented, these assumptions are violated: the root of the filesystem is simply a dummy dentry and inode (the real inode for '/' may well be inaccessible), and all the vfsmounts are rooted on anonymous[*] dentries with child trees. [*] Anonymous until discovered from another tree. (*) The documentation has been adjusted, including the additional bit of changing ext2_* into foo_* in the documentation. [akpm@osdl.org: convert ipath_fs, do other stuff] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Nathan Scott <nathans@sgi.com> Cc: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-23 03:02:57 -06:00
static int eventpollfs_get_sb(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
int flags, const char *dev_name,
void *data, struct vfsmount *mnt);
/*
* This semaphore is used to serialize ep_free() and eventpoll_release_file().
*/
static struct mutex epmutex;
/* Safe wake up implementation */
static struct poll_safewake psw;
/* Slab cache used to allocate "struct epitem" */
static struct kmem_cache *epi_cache __read_mostly;
/* Slab cache used to allocate "struct eppoll_entry" */
static struct kmem_cache *pwq_cache __read_mostly;
/* Virtual fs used to allocate inodes for eventpoll files */
static struct vfsmount *eventpoll_mnt __read_mostly;
/* File callbacks that implement the eventpoll file behaviour */
static const struct file_operations eventpoll_fops = {
.release = ep_eventpoll_close,
.poll = ep_eventpoll_poll
};
/*
* This is used to register the virtual file system from where
* eventpoll inodes are allocated.
*/
static struct file_system_type eventpoll_fs_type = {
.name = "eventpollfs",
.get_sb = eventpollfs_get_sb,
.kill_sb = kill_anon_super,
};
/* Very basic directory entry operations for the eventpoll virtual file system */
static struct dentry_operations eventpollfs_dentry_operations = {
.d_delete = eventpollfs_delete_dentry,
};
/* Fast test to see if the file is an evenpoll file */
static inline int is_file_epoll(struct file *f)
{
return f->f_op == &eventpoll_fops;
}
/* Setup the structure that is used as key for the rb-tree */
static inline void ep_set_ffd(struct epoll_filefd *ffd,
struct file *file, int fd)
{
ffd->file = file;
ffd->fd = fd;
}
/* Compare rb-tree keys */
static inline int ep_cmp_ffd(struct epoll_filefd *p1,
struct epoll_filefd *p2)
{
return (p1->file > p2->file ? +1:
(p1->file < p2->file ? -1 : p1->fd - p2->fd));
}
/* Special initialization for the rb-tree node to detect linkage */
static inline void ep_rb_initnode(struct rb_node *n)
{
rb_set_parent(n, n);
}
/* Removes a node from the rb-tree and marks it for a fast is-linked check */
static inline void ep_rb_erase(struct rb_node *n, struct rb_root *r)
{
rb_erase(n, r);
rb_set_parent(n, n);
}
/* Fast check to verify that the item is linked to the main rb-tree */
static inline int ep_rb_linked(struct rb_node *n)
{
return rb_parent(n) != n;
}
/* Tells us if the item is currently linked */
static inline int ep_is_linked(struct list_head *p)
{
return !list_empty(p);
}
/* Get the "struct epitem" from a wait queue pointer */
static inline struct epitem * ep_item_from_wait(wait_queue_t *p)
{
return container_of(p, struct eppoll_entry, wait)->base;
}
/* Get the "struct epitem" from an epoll queue wrapper */
static inline struct epitem * ep_item_from_epqueue(poll_table *p)
{
return container_of(p, struct ep_pqueue, pt)->epi;
}
/* Tells if the epoll_ctl(2) operation needs an event copy from userspace */
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
static inline int ep_op_has_event(int op)
{
return op != EPOLL_CTL_DEL;
}
/* Initialize the poll safe wake up structure */
static void ep_poll_safewake_init(struct poll_safewake *psw)
{
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&psw->wake_task_list);
spin_lock_init(&psw->lock);
}
/*
* Perform a safe wake up of the poll wait list. The problem is that
* with the new callback'd wake up system, it is possible that the
* poll callback is reentered from inside the call to wake_up() done
* on the poll wait queue head. The rule is that we cannot reenter the
* wake up code from the same task more than EP_MAX_POLLWAKE_NESTS times,
* and we cannot reenter the same wait queue head at all. This will
* enable to have a hierarchy of epoll file descriptor of no more than
* EP_MAX_POLLWAKE_NESTS deep. We need the irq version of the spin lock
* because this one gets called by the poll callback, that in turn is called
* from inside a wake_up(), that might be called from irq context.
*/
static void ep_poll_safewake(struct poll_safewake *psw, wait_queue_head_t *wq)
{
int wake_nests = 0;
unsigned long flags;
struct task_struct *this_task = current;
struct list_head *lsthead = &psw->wake_task_list, *lnk;
struct wake_task_node *tncur;
struct wake_task_node tnode;
spin_lock_irqsave(&psw->lock, flags);
/* Try to see if the current task is already inside this wakeup call */
list_for_each(lnk, lsthead) {
tncur = list_entry(lnk, struct wake_task_node, llink);
if (tncur->wq == wq ||
(tncur->task == this_task && ++wake_nests > EP_MAX_POLLWAKE_NESTS)) {
/*
* Ops ... loop detected or maximum nest level reached.
* We abort this wake by breaking the cycle itself.
*/
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psw->lock, flags);
return;
}
}
/* Add the current task to the list */
tnode.task = this_task;
tnode.wq = wq;
list_add(&tnode.llink, lsthead);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psw->lock, flags);
/* Do really wake up now */
wake_up(wq);
/* Remove the current task from the list */
spin_lock_irqsave(&psw->lock, flags);
list_del(&tnode.llink);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psw->lock, flags);
}
/*
* This is called from eventpoll_release() to unlink files from the eventpoll
* interface. We need to have this facility to cleanup correctly files that are
* closed without being removed from the eventpoll interface.
*/
void eventpoll_release_file(struct file *file)
{
struct list_head *lsthead = &file->f_ep_links;
struct eventpoll *ep;
struct epitem *epi;
/*
* We don't want to get "file->f_ep_lock" because it is not
* necessary. It is not necessary because we're in the "struct file"
* cleanup path, and this means that noone is using this file anymore.
* The only hit might come from ep_free() but by holding the semaphore
* will correctly serialize the operation. We do need to acquire
* "ep->sem" after "epmutex" because ep_remove() requires it when called
* from anywhere but ep_free().
*/
mutex_lock(&epmutex);
while (!list_empty(lsthead)) {
epi = list_first_entry(lsthead, struct epitem, fllink);
ep = epi->ep;
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
list_del_init(&epi->fllink);
down_write(&ep->sem);
ep_remove(ep, epi);
up_write(&ep->sem);
}
mutex_unlock(&epmutex);
}
/*
* It opens an eventpoll file descriptor by suggesting a storage of "size"
* file descriptors. The size parameter is just an hint about how to size
* data structures. It won't prevent the user to store more than "size"
* file descriptors inside the epoll interface. It is the kernel part of
* the userspace epoll_create(2).
*/
asmlinkage long sys_epoll_create(int size)
{
int error, fd = -1;
struct eventpoll *ep;
struct inode *inode;
struct file *file;
DNPRINTK(3, (KERN_INFO "[%p] eventpoll: sys_epoll_create(%d)\n",
current, size));
/*
* Sanity check on the size parameter, and create the internal data
* structure ( "struct eventpoll" ).
*/
error = -EINVAL;
if (size <= 0 || (error = ep_alloc(&ep)) != 0)
goto eexit_1;
/*
* Creates all the items needed to setup an eventpoll file. That is,
* a file structure, and inode and a free file descriptor.
*/
error = ep_getfd(&fd, &inode, &file, ep);
if (error)
goto eexit_2;
DNPRINTK(3, (KERN_INFO "[%p] eventpoll: sys_epoll_create(%d) = %d\n",
current, size, fd));
return fd;
eexit_2:
ep_free(ep);
kfree(ep);
eexit_1:
DNPRINTK(3, (KERN_INFO "[%p] eventpoll: sys_epoll_create(%d) = %d\n",
current, size, error));
return error;
}
/*
* The following function implements the controller interface for
* the eventpoll file that enables the insertion/removal/change of
* file descriptors inside the interest set. It represents
* the kernel part of the user space epoll_ctl(2).
*/
asmlinkage long
sys_epoll_ctl(int epfd, int op, int fd, struct epoll_event __user *event)
{
int error;
struct file *file, *tfile;
struct eventpoll *ep;
struct epitem *epi;
struct epoll_event epds;
DNPRINTK(3, (KERN_INFO "[%p] eventpoll: sys_epoll_ctl(%d, %d, %d, %p)\n",
current, epfd, op, fd, event));
error = -EFAULT;
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
if (ep_op_has_event(op) &&
copy_from_user(&epds, event, sizeof(struct epoll_event)))
goto eexit_1;
/* Get the "struct file *" for the eventpoll file */
error = -EBADF;
file = fget(epfd);
if (!file)
goto eexit_1;
/* Get the "struct file *" for the target file */
tfile = fget(fd);
if (!tfile)
goto eexit_2;
/* The target file descriptor must support poll */
error = -EPERM;
if (!tfile->f_op || !tfile->f_op->poll)
goto eexit_3;
/*
* We have to check that the file structure underneath the file descriptor
* the user passed to us _is_ an eventpoll file. And also we do not permit
* adding an epoll file descriptor inside itself.
*/
error = -EINVAL;
if (file == tfile || !is_file_epoll(file))
goto eexit_3;
/*
* At this point it is safe to assume that the "private_data" contains
* our own data structure.
*/
ep = file->private_data;
down_write(&ep->sem);
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
/* Try to lookup the file inside our RB tree */
epi = ep_find(ep, tfile, fd);
error = -EINVAL;
switch (op) {
case EPOLL_CTL_ADD:
if (!epi) {
epds.events |= POLLERR | POLLHUP;
error = ep_insert(ep, &epds, tfile, fd);
} else
error = -EEXIST;
break;
case EPOLL_CTL_DEL:
if (epi)
error = ep_remove(ep, epi);
else
error = -ENOENT;
break;
case EPOLL_CTL_MOD:
if (epi) {
epds.events |= POLLERR | POLLHUP;
error = ep_modify(ep, epi, &epds);
} else
error = -ENOENT;
break;
}
/*
* The function ep_find() increments the usage count of the structure
* so, if this is not NULL, we need to release it.
*/
if (epi)
ep_release_epitem(epi);
up_write(&ep->sem);
eexit_3:
fput(tfile);
eexit_2:
fput(file);
eexit_1:
DNPRINTK(3, (KERN_INFO "[%p] eventpoll: sys_epoll_ctl(%d, %d, %d, %p) = %d\n",
current, epfd, op, fd, event, error));
return error;
}
/*
* Implement the event wait interface for the eventpoll file. It is the kernel
* part of the user space epoll_wait(2).
*/
asmlinkage long sys_epoll_wait(int epfd, struct epoll_event __user *events,
int maxevents, int timeout)
{
int error;
struct file *file;
struct eventpoll *ep;
DNPRINTK(3, (KERN_INFO "[%p] eventpoll: sys_epoll_wait(%d, %p, %d, %d)\n",
current, epfd, events, maxevents, timeout));
/* The maximum number of event must be greater than zero */
if (maxevents <= 0 || maxevents > EP_MAX_EVENTS)
return -EINVAL;
/* Verify that the area passed by the user is writeable */
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, events, maxevents * sizeof(struct epoll_event))) {
error = -EFAULT;
goto eexit_1;
}
/* Get the "struct file *" for the eventpoll file */
error = -EBADF;
file = fget(epfd);
if (!file)
goto eexit_1;
/*
* We have to check that the file structure underneath the fd
* the user passed to us _is_ an eventpoll file.
*/
error = -EINVAL;
if (!is_file_epoll(file))
goto eexit_2;
/*
* At this point it is safe to assume that the "private_data" contains
* our own data structure.
*/
ep = file->private_data;
/* Time to fish for events ... */
error = ep_poll(ep, events, maxevents, timeout);
eexit_2:
fput(file);
eexit_1:
DNPRINTK(3, (KERN_INFO "[%p] eventpoll: sys_epoll_wait(%d, %p, %d, %d) = %d\n",
current, epfd, events, maxevents, timeout, error));
return error;
}
#ifdef TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK
/*
* Implement the event wait interface for the eventpoll file. It is the kernel
* part of the user space epoll_pwait(2).
*/
asmlinkage long sys_epoll_pwait(int epfd, struct epoll_event __user *events,
int maxevents, int timeout, const sigset_t __user *sigmask,
size_t sigsetsize)
{
int error;
sigset_t ksigmask, sigsaved;
/*
* If the caller wants a certain signal mask to be set during the wait,
* we apply it here.
*/
if (sigmask) {
if (sigsetsize != sizeof(sigset_t))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&ksigmask, sigmask, sizeof(ksigmask)))
return -EFAULT;
sigdelsetmask(&ksigmask, sigmask(SIGKILL) | sigmask(SIGSTOP));
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &ksigmask, &sigsaved);
}
error = sys_epoll_wait(epfd, events, maxevents, timeout);
/*
* If we changed the signal mask, we need to restore the original one.
* In case we've got a signal while waiting, we do not restore the
* signal mask yet, and we allow do_signal() to deliver the signal on
* the way back to userspace, before the signal mask is restored.
*/
if (sigmask) {
if (error == -EINTR) {
memcpy(&current->saved_sigmask, &sigsaved,
sizeof(sigsaved));
set_thread_flag(TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK);
} else
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigsaved, NULL);
}
return error;
}
#endif /* #ifdef TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK */
/*
* Creates the file descriptor to be used by the epoll interface.
*/
static int ep_getfd(int *efd, struct inode **einode, struct file **efile,
struct eventpoll *ep)
{
struct qstr this;
char name[32];
struct dentry *dentry;
struct inode *inode;
struct file *file;
int error, fd;
/* Get an ready to use file */
error = -ENFILE;
file = get_empty_filp();
if (!file)
goto eexit_1;
/* Allocates an inode from the eventpoll file system */
inode = ep_eventpoll_inode();
if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
error = PTR_ERR(inode);
goto eexit_2;
}
/* Allocates a free descriptor to plug the file onto */
error = get_unused_fd();
if (error < 0)
goto eexit_3;
fd = error;
/*
* Link the inode to a directory entry by creating a unique name
* using the inode number.
*/
error = -ENOMEM;
sprintf(name, "[%lu]", inode->i_ino);
this.name = name;
this.len = strlen(name);
this.hash = inode->i_ino;
dentry = d_alloc(eventpoll_mnt->mnt_sb->s_root, &this);
if (!dentry)
goto eexit_4;
dentry->d_op = &eventpollfs_dentry_operations;
d_add(dentry, inode);
file->f_path.mnt = mntget(eventpoll_mnt);
file->f_path.dentry = dentry;
file->f_mapping = inode->i_mapping;
file->f_pos = 0;
file->f_flags = O_RDONLY;
file->f_op = &eventpoll_fops;
file->f_mode = FMODE_READ;
file->f_version = 0;
file->private_data = ep;
/* Install the new setup file into the allocated fd. */
fd_install(fd, file);
*efd = fd;
*einode = inode;
*efile = file;
return 0;
eexit_4:
put_unused_fd(fd);
eexit_3:
iput(inode);
eexit_2:
put_filp(file);
eexit_1:
return error;
}
static int ep_alloc(struct eventpoll **pep)
{
struct eventpoll *ep = kzalloc(sizeof(*ep), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ep)
return -ENOMEM;
rwlock_init(&ep->lock);
init_rwsem(&ep->sem);
init_waitqueue_head(&ep->wq);
init_waitqueue_head(&ep->poll_wait);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ep->rdllist);
ep->rbr = RB_ROOT;
*pep = ep;
DNPRINTK(3, (KERN_INFO "[%p] eventpoll: ep_alloc() ep=%p\n",
current, ep));
return 0;
}
static void ep_free(struct eventpoll *ep)
{
struct rb_node *rbp;
struct epitem *epi;
/* We need to release all tasks waiting for these file */
if (waitqueue_active(&ep->poll_wait))
ep_poll_safewake(&psw, &ep->poll_wait);
/*
* We need to lock this because we could be hit by
* eventpoll_release_file() while we're freeing the "struct eventpoll".
* We do not need to hold "ep->sem" here because the epoll file
* is on the way to be removed and no one has references to it
* anymore. The only hit might come from eventpoll_release_file() but
* holding "epmutex" is sufficent here.
*/
mutex_lock(&epmutex);
/*
* Walks through the whole tree by unregistering poll callbacks.
*/
for (rbp = rb_first(&ep->rbr); rbp; rbp = rb_next(rbp)) {
epi = rb_entry(rbp, struct epitem, rbn);
ep_unregister_pollwait(ep, epi);
}
/*
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
* Walks through the whole tree by freeing each "struct epitem". At this
* point we are sure no poll callbacks will be lingering around, and also by
* write-holding "sem" we can be sure that no file cleanup code will hit
* us during this operation. So we can avoid the lock on "ep->lock".
*/
while ((rbp = rb_first(&ep->rbr)) != 0) {
epi = rb_entry(rbp, struct epitem, rbn);
ep_remove(ep, epi);
}
mutex_unlock(&epmutex);
}
/*
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
* Search the file inside the eventpoll tree. It add usage count to
* the returned item, so the caller must call ep_release_epitem()
* after finished using the "struct epitem".
*/
static struct epitem *ep_find(struct eventpoll *ep, struct file *file, int fd)
{
int kcmp;
unsigned long flags;
struct rb_node *rbp;
struct epitem *epi, *epir = NULL;
struct epoll_filefd ffd;
ep_set_ffd(&ffd, file, fd);
read_lock_irqsave(&ep->lock, flags);
for (rbp = ep->rbr.rb_node; rbp; ) {
epi = rb_entry(rbp, struct epitem, rbn);
kcmp = ep_cmp_ffd(&ffd, &epi->ffd);
if (kcmp > 0)
rbp = rbp->rb_right;
else if (kcmp < 0)
rbp = rbp->rb_left;
else {
ep_use_epitem(epi);
epir = epi;
break;
}
}
read_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->lock, flags);
DNPRINTK(3, (KERN_INFO "[%p] eventpoll: ep_find(%p) -> %p\n",
current, file, epir));
return epir;
}
/*
* Increment the usage count of the "struct epitem" making it sure
* that the user will have a valid pointer to reference.
*/
static void ep_use_epitem(struct epitem *epi)
{
atomic_inc(&epi->usecnt);
}
/*
* Decrement ( release ) the usage count by signaling that the user
* has finished using the structure. It might lead to freeing the
* structure itself if the count goes to zero.
*/
static void ep_release_epitem(struct epitem *epi)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&epi->usecnt))
kmem_cache_free(epi_cache, epi);
}
/*
* This is the callback that is used to add our wait queue to the
* target file wakeup lists.
*/
static void ep_ptable_queue_proc(struct file *file, wait_queue_head_t *whead,
poll_table *pt)
{
struct epitem *epi = ep_item_from_epqueue(pt);
struct eppoll_entry *pwq;
if (epi->nwait >= 0 && (pwq = kmem_cache_alloc(pwq_cache, GFP_KERNEL))) {
init_waitqueue_func_entry(&pwq->wait, ep_poll_callback);
pwq->whead = whead;
pwq->base = epi;
add_wait_queue(whead, &pwq->wait);
list_add_tail(&pwq->llink, &epi->pwqlist);
epi->nwait++;
} else {
/* We have to signal that an error occurred */
epi->nwait = -1;
}
}
static void ep_rbtree_insert(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
{
int kcmp;
struct rb_node **p = &ep->rbr.rb_node, *parent = NULL;
struct epitem *epic;
while (*p) {
parent = *p;
epic = rb_entry(parent, struct epitem, rbn);
kcmp = ep_cmp_ffd(&epi->ffd, &epic->ffd);
if (kcmp > 0)
p = &parent->rb_right;
else
p = &parent->rb_left;
}
rb_link_node(&epi->rbn, parent, p);
rb_insert_color(&epi->rbn, &ep->rbr);
}
static int ep_insert(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epoll_event *event,
struct file *tfile, int fd)
{
int error, revents, pwake = 0;
unsigned long flags;
struct epitem *epi;
struct ep_pqueue epq;
error = -ENOMEM;
if (!(epi = kmem_cache_alloc(epi_cache, GFP_KERNEL)))
goto eexit_1;
/* Item initialization follow here ... */
ep_rb_initnode(&epi->rbn);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->fllink);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->pwqlist);
epi->ep = ep;
ep_set_ffd(&epi->ffd, tfile, fd);
epi->event = *event;
atomic_set(&epi->usecnt, 1);
epi->nwait = 0;
/* Initialize the poll table using the queue callback */
epq.epi = epi;
init_poll_funcptr(&epq.pt, ep_ptable_queue_proc);
/*
* Attach the item to the poll hooks and get current event bits.
* We can safely use the file* here because its usage count has
* been increased by the caller of this function.
*/
revents = tfile->f_op->poll(tfile, &epq.pt);
/*
* We have to check if something went wrong during the poll wait queue
* install process. Namely an allocation for a wait queue failed due
* high memory pressure.
*/
if (epi->nwait < 0)
goto eexit_2;
/* Add the current item to the list of active epoll hook for this file */
spin_lock(&tfile->f_ep_lock);
list_add_tail(&epi->fllink, &tfile->f_ep_links);
spin_unlock(&tfile->f_ep_lock);
/* We have to drop the new item inside our item list to keep track of it */
write_lock_irqsave(&ep->lock, flags);
/* Add the current item to the rb-tree */
ep_rbtree_insert(ep, epi);
/* If the file is already "ready" we drop it inside the ready list */
if ((revents & event->events) && !ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) {
list_add_tail(&epi->rdllink, &ep->rdllist);
/* Notify waiting tasks that events are available */
if (waitqueue_active(&ep->wq))
__wake_up_locked(&ep->wq, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE | TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (waitqueue_active(&ep->poll_wait))
pwake++;
}
write_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->lock, flags);
/* We have to call this outside the lock */
if (pwake)
ep_poll_safewake(&psw, &ep->poll_wait);
DNPRINTK(3, (KERN_INFO "[%p] eventpoll: ep_insert(%p, %p, %d)\n",
current, ep, tfile, fd));
return 0;
eexit_2:
ep_unregister_pollwait(ep, epi);
/*
* We need to do this because an event could have been arrived on some
* allocated wait queue.
*/
write_lock_irqsave(&ep->lock, flags);
if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink))
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
list_del_init(&epi->rdllink);
write_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->lock, flags);
kmem_cache_free(epi_cache, epi);
eexit_1:
return error;
}
/*
* Modify the interest event mask by dropping an event if the new mask
* has a match in the current file status.
*/
static int ep_modify(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi, struct epoll_event *event)
{
int pwake = 0;
unsigned int revents;
unsigned long flags;
/*
* Set the new event interest mask before calling f_op->poll(), otherwise
* a potential race might occur. In fact if we do this operation inside
* the lock, an event might happen between the f_op->poll() call and the
* new event set registering.
*/
epi->event.events = event->events;
/*
* Get current event bits. We can safely use the file* here because
* its usage count has been increased by the caller of this function.
*/
revents = epi->ffd.file->f_op->poll(epi->ffd.file, NULL);
write_lock_irqsave(&ep->lock, flags);
/* Copy the data member from inside the lock */
epi->event.data = event->data;
/*
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
* If the item is not linked to the RB tree it means that it's on its
* way toward the removal. Do nothing in this case.
*/
if (ep_rb_linked(&epi->rbn)) {
/*
* If the item is "hot" and it is not registered inside the ready
* list, push it inside. If the item is not "hot" and it is currently
* registered inside the ready list, unlink it.
*/
if (revents & event->events) {
if (!ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) {
list_add_tail(&epi->rdllink, &ep->rdllist);
/* Notify waiting tasks that events are available */
if (waitqueue_active(&ep->wq))
__wake_up_locked(&ep->wq, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE |
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (waitqueue_active(&ep->poll_wait))
pwake++;
}
}
}
write_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->lock, flags);
/* We have to call this outside the lock */
if (pwake)
ep_poll_safewake(&psw, &ep->poll_wait);
return 0;
}
/*
* This function unregister poll callbacks from the associated file descriptor.
* Since this must be called without holding "ep->lock" the atomic exchange trick
* will protect us from multiple unregister.
*/
static void ep_unregister_pollwait(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
{
int nwait;
struct list_head *lsthead = &epi->pwqlist;
struct eppoll_entry *pwq;
/* This is called without locks, so we need the atomic exchange */
nwait = xchg(&epi->nwait, 0);
if (nwait) {
while (!list_empty(lsthead)) {
pwq = list_first_entry(lsthead, struct eppoll_entry, llink);
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
list_del_init(&pwq->llink);
remove_wait_queue(pwq->whead, &pwq->wait);
kmem_cache_free(pwq_cache, pwq);
}
}
}
/*
* Unlink the "struct epitem" from all places it might have been hooked up.
* This function must be called with write IRQ lock on "ep->lock".
*/
static int ep_unlink(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
{
int error;
/*
* It can happen that this one is called for an item already unlinked.
* The check protect us from doing a double unlink ( crash ).
*/
error = -ENOENT;
if (!ep_rb_linked(&epi->rbn))
goto eexit_1;
/*
* Clear the event mask for the unlinked item. This will avoid item
* notifications to be sent after the unlink operation from inside
* the kernel->userspace event transfer loop.
*/
epi->event.events = 0;
/*
* At this point is safe to do the job, unlink the item from our rb-tree.
* This operation togheter with the above check closes the door to
* double unlinks.
*/
ep_rb_erase(&epi->rbn, &ep->rbr);
/*
* If the item we are going to remove is inside the ready file descriptors
* we want to remove it from this list to avoid stale events.
*/
if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink))
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
list_del_init(&epi->rdllink);
error = 0;
eexit_1:
DNPRINTK(3, (KERN_INFO "[%p] eventpoll: ep_unlink(%p, %p) = %d\n",
current, ep, epi->ffd.file, error));
return error;
}
/*
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
* Removes a "struct epitem" from the eventpoll RB tree and deallocates
* all the associated resources.
*/
static int ep_remove(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epitem *epi)
{
int error;
unsigned long flags;
struct file *file = epi->ffd.file;
/*
* Removes poll wait queue hooks. We _have_ to do this without holding
* the "ep->lock" otherwise a deadlock might occur. This because of the
* sequence of the lock acquisition. Here we do "ep->lock" then the wait
* queue head lock when unregistering the wait queue. The wakeup callback
* will run by holding the wait queue head lock and will call our callback
* that will try to get "ep->lock".
*/
ep_unregister_pollwait(ep, epi);
/* Remove the current item from the list of epoll hooks */
spin_lock(&file->f_ep_lock);
if (ep_is_linked(&epi->fllink))
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
list_del_init(&epi->fllink);
spin_unlock(&file->f_ep_lock);
/* We need to acquire the write IRQ lock before calling ep_unlink() */
write_lock_irqsave(&ep->lock, flags);
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
/* Really unlink the item from the RB tree */
error = ep_unlink(ep, epi);
write_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->lock, flags);
if (error)
goto eexit_1;
/* At this point it is safe to free the eventpoll item */
ep_release_epitem(epi);
error = 0;
eexit_1:
DNPRINTK(3, (KERN_INFO "[%p] eventpoll: ep_remove(%p, %p) = %d\n",
current, ep, file, error));
return error;
}
/*
* This is the callback that is passed to the wait queue wakeup
* machanism. It is called by the stored file descriptors when they
* have events to report.
*/
static int ep_poll_callback(wait_queue_t *wait, unsigned mode, int sync, void *key)
{
int pwake = 0;
unsigned long flags;
struct epitem *epi = ep_item_from_wait(wait);
struct eventpoll *ep = epi->ep;
DNPRINTK(3, (KERN_INFO "[%p] eventpoll: poll_callback(%p) epi=%p ep=%p\n",
current, epi->ffd.file, epi, ep));
write_lock_irqsave(&ep->lock, flags);
/*
* If the event mask does not contain any poll(2) event, we consider the
* descriptor to be disabled. This condition is likely the effect of the
* EPOLLONESHOT bit that disables the descriptor when an event is received,
* until the next EPOLL_CTL_MOD will be issued.
*/
if (!(epi->event.events & ~EP_PRIVATE_BITS))
goto is_disabled;
/* If this file is already in the ready list we exit soon */
if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink))
goto is_linked;
list_add_tail(&epi->rdllink, &ep->rdllist);
is_linked:
/*
* Wake up ( if active ) both the eventpoll wait list and the ->poll()
* wait list.
*/
if (waitqueue_active(&ep->wq))
__wake_up_locked(&ep->wq, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE |
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (waitqueue_active(&ep->poll_wait))
pwake++;
is_disabled:
write_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->lock, flags);
/* We have to call this outside the lock */
if (pwake)
ep_poll_safewake(&psw, &ep->poll_wait);
return 1;
}
static int ep_eventpoll_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct eventpoll *ep = file->private_data;
if (ep) {
ep_free(ep);
kfree(ep);
}
DNPRINTK(3, (KERN_INFO "[%p] eventpoll: close() ep=%p\n", current, ep));
return 0;
}
static unsigned int ep_eventpoll_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
unsigned int pollflags = 0;
unsigned long flags;
struct eventpoll *ep = file->private_data;
/* Insert inside our poll wait queue */
poll_wait(file, &ep->poll_wait, wait);
/* Check our condition */
read_lock_irqsave(&ep->lock, flags);
if (!list_empty(&ep->rdllist))
pollflags = POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
read_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->lock, flags);
return pollflags;
}
/*
* This function is called without holding the "ep->lock" since the call to
* __copy_to_user() might sleep, and also f_op->poll() might reenable the IRQ
* because of the way poll() is traditionally implemented in Linux.
*/
static int ep_send_events(struct eventpoll *ep, struct list_head *txlist,
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
struct epoll_event __user *events, int maxevents)
{
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
int eventcnt, error = -EFAULT, pwake = 0;
unsigned int revents;
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
unsigned long flags;
struct epitem *epi;
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
struct list_head injlist;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&injlist);
/*
* We can loop without lock because this is a task private list.
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
* We just splice'd out the ep->rdllist in ep_collect_ready_items().
* Items cannot vanish during the loop because we are holding "sem" in
* read.
*/
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
for (eventcnt = 0; !list_empty(txlist) && eventcnt < maxevents;) {
epi = list_first_entry(txlist, struct epitem, rdllink);
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
prefetch(epi->rdllink.next);
/*
* Get the ready file event set. We can safely use the file
* because we are holding the "sem" in read and this will
* guarantee that both the file and the item will not vanish.
*/
revents = epi->ffd.file->f_op->poll(epi->ffd.file, NULL);
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
revents &= epi->event.events;
/*
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
* Is the event mask intersect the caller-requested one,
* deliver the event to userspace. Again, we are holding
* "sem" in read, so no operations coming from userspace
* can change the item.
*/
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
if (revents) {
if (__put_user(revents,
&events[eventcnt].events) ||
__put_user(epi->event.data,
&events[eventcnt].data))
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
goto errxit;
if (epi->event.events & EPOLLONESHOT)
epi->event.events &= EP_PRIVATE_BITS;
eventcnt++;
}
/*
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
* This is tricky. We are holding the "sem" in read, and this
* means that the operations that can change the "linked" status
* of the epoll item (epi->rbn and epi->rdllink), cannot touch
* them. Also, since we are "linked" from a epi->rdllink POV
* (the item is linked to our transmission list we just
* spliced), the ep_poll_callback() cannot touch us either,
* because of the check present in there. Another parallel
* epoll_wait() will not get the same result set, since we
* spliced the ready list before. Note that list_del() still
* shows the item as linked to the test in ep_poll_callback().
*/
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
list_del(&epi->rdllink);
if (!(epi->event.events & EPOLLET) &&
(revents & epi->event.events))
list_add_tail(&epi->rdllink, &injlist);
else {
/*
* Be sure the item is totally detached before re-init
* the list_head. After INIT_LIST_HEAD() is committed,
* the ep_poll_callback() can requeue the item again,
* but we don't care since we are already past it.
*/
smp_mb();
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink);
}
}
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
error = 0;
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
errxit:
/*
* If the re-injection list or the txlist are not empty, re-splice
* them to the ready list and do proper wakeups.
*/
if (!list_empty(&injlist) || !list_empty(txlist)) {
write_lock_irqsave(&ep->lock, flags);
list_splice(txlist, &ep->rdllist);
list_splice(&injlist, &ep->rdllist);
/*
* Wake up ( if active ) both the eventpoll wait list and the ->poll()
* wait list.
*/
if (waitqueue_active(&ep->wq))
__wake_up_locked(&ep->wq, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE |
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (waitqueue_active(&ep->poll_wait))
pwake++;
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
write_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->lock, flags);
}
/* We have to call this outside the lock */
if (pwake)
ep_poll_safewake(&psw, &ep->poll_wait);
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
return eventcnt == 0 ? error: eventcnt;
}
/*
* Perform the transfer of events to user space.
*/
static int ep_events_transfer(struct eventpoll *ep,
struct epoll_event __user *events, int maxevents)
{
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
int eventcnt;
unsigned long flags;
struct list_head txlist;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&txlist);
/*
* We need to lock this because we could be hit by
* eventpoll_release_file() and epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL).
*/
down_read(&ep->sem);
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
/*
* Steal the ready list, and re-init the original one to the
* empty list.
*/
write_lock_irqsave(&ep->lock, flags);
list_splice(&ep->rdllist, &txlist);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ep->rdllist);
write_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->lock, flags);
epoll: optimizations and cleanups Epoll is doing multiple passes over the ready set at the moment, because of the constraints over the f_op->poll() call. Looking at the code again, I noticed that we already hold the epoll semaphore in read, and this (together with other locking conditions that hold while doing an epoll_wait()) can lead to a smarter way [1] to "ship" events to userspace (in a single pass). This is a stress application that can be used to test the new code. It spwans multiple thread and call epoll_wait() and epoll_ctl() from many threads. Stress tested on my dual Opteron 254 w/out any problems. http://www.xmailserver.org/totalmess.c This is not a benchmark, just something that tries to stress and exploit possible problems with the new code. Also, I made a stupid micro-benchmark: http://www.xmailserver.org/epwbench.c [1] Considering that epoll must be thread-safe, there are five ways we can be hit during an epoll_wait() transfer loop (ep_send_events()): 1) The epoll fd going away and calling ep_free This just can't happen, since we did an fget() in sys_epoll_wait 2) An epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) This can't happen because epoll_ctl() gets ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 3) An fd stored inside the epoll fd going away This can't happen because in eventpoll_release_file() we get ep->sem in write, and we're holding it in read during ep_send_events() 4) Another epoll_wait() happening on another thread They both can be inside ep_send_events() at the same time, we get (splice) the ready-list under the spinlock, so each one will get its own ready list. Note that an fd cannot be at the same time inside more than one ready list, because ep_poll_callback() will not re-queue it if it sees it already linked: if (ep_is_linked(&epi->rdllink)) goto is_linked; Another case that can happen, is two concurrent epoll_wait(), coming in with a userspace event buffer of size, say, ten. Suppose there are 50 event ready in the list. The first epoll_wait() will "steal" the whole list, while the second, seeing no events, will go to sleep. But at the end of ep_send_events() in the first epoll_wait(), we will re-inject surplus ready fds, and we will trigger the proper wake_up to the second epoll_wait(). 5) ep_poll_callback() hitting us asyncronously This is the tricky part. As I said above, the ep_is_linked() test done inside ep_poll_callback(), will guarantee us that until the item will result linked to a list, ep_poll_callback() will not try to re-queue it again (read, write data on any of its members). When we do a list_del() in ep_send_events(), the item will still satisfy the ep_is_linked() test (whatever data is written in prev/next, it'll never be its own pointer), so ep_poll_callback() will still leave us alone. It's only after the eventual smp_mb()+INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epi->rdllink) that it'll become visible to ep_poll_callback(), but at the point we're already past it. [akpm@osdl.org: 80 cols] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 01:25:41 -06:00
/* Build result set in userspace */
eventcnt = ep_send_events(ep, &txlist, events, maxevents);
up_read(&ep->sem);
return eventcnt;
}
static int ep_poll(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epoll_event __user *events,
int maxevents, long timeout)
{
int res, eavail;
unsigned long flags;
long jtimeout;
wait_queue_t wait;
/*
* Calculate the timeout by checking for the "infinite" value ( -1 )
* and the overflow condition. The passed timeout is in milliseconds,
* that why (t * HZ) / 1000.
*/
jtimeout = (timeout < 0 || timeout >= EP_MAX_MSTIMEO) ?
MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT : (timeout * HZ + 999) / 1000;
retry:
write_lock_irqsave(&ep->lock, flags);
res = 0;
if (list_empty(&ep->rdllist)) {
/*
* We don't have any available event to return to the caller.
* We need to sleep here, and we will be wake up by
* ep_poll_callback() when events will become available.
*/
init_waitqueue_entry(&wait, current);
__add_wait_queue(&ep->wq, &wait);
for (;;) {
/*
* We don't want to sleep if the ep_poll_callback() sends us
* a wakeup in between. That's why we set the task state
* to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE before doing the checks.
*/
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (!list_empty(&ep->rdllist) || !jtimeout)
break;
if (signal_pending(current)) {
res = -EINTR;
break;
}
write_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->lock, flags);
jtimeout = schedule_timeout(jtimeout);
write_lock_irqsave(&ep->lock, flags);
}
__remove_wait_queue(&ep->wq, &wait);
set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
}
/* Is it worth to try to dig for events ? */
eavail = !list_empty(&ep->rdllist);
write_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->lock, flags);
/*
* Try to transfer events to user space. In case we get 0 events and
* there's still timeout left over, we go trying again in search of
* more luck.
*/
if (!res && eavail &&
!(res = ep_events_transfer(ep, events, maxevents)) && jtimeout)
goto retry;
return res;
}
static int eventpollfs_delete_dentry(struct dentry *dentry)
{
return 1;
}
static struct inode *ep_eventpoll_inode(void)
{
int error = -ENOMEM;
struct inode *inode = new_inode(eventpoll_mnt->mnt_sb);
if (!inode)
goto eexit_1;
inode->i_fop = &eventpoll_fops;
/*
* Mark the inode dirty from the very beginning,
* that way it will never be moved to the dirty
* list because mark_inode_dirty() will think
* that it already _is_ on the dirty list.
*/
inode->i_state = I_DIRTY;
inode->i_mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR;
inode->i_uid = current->fsuid;
inode->i_gid = current->fsgid;
inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
return inode;
eexit_1:
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
[PATCH] VFS: Permit filesystem to override root dentry on mount Extend the get_sb() filesystem operation to take an extra argument that permits the VFS to pass in the target vfsmount that defines the mountpoint. The filesystem is then required to manually set the superblock and root dentry pointers. For most filesystems, this should be done with simple_set_mnt() which will set the superblock pointer and then set the root dentry to the superblock's s_root (as per the old default behaviour). The get_sb() op now returns an integer as there's now no need to return the superblock pointer. This patch permits a superblock to be implicitly shared amongst several mount points, such as can be done with NFS to avoid potential inode aliasing. In such a case, simple_set_mnt() would not be called, and instead the mnt_root and mnt_sb would be set directly. The patch also makes the following changes: (*) the get_sb_*() convenience functions in the core kernel now take a vfsmount pointer argument and return an integer, so most filesystems have to change very little. (*) If one of the convenience function is not used, then get_sb() should normally call simple_set_mnt() to instantiate the vfsmount. This will always return 0, and so can be tail-called from get_sb(). (*) generic_shutdown_super() now calls shrink_dcache_sb() to clean up the dcache upon superblock destruction rather than shrink_dcache_anon(). This is required because the superblock may now have multiple trees that aren't actually bound to s_root, but that still need to be cleaned up. The currently called functions assume that the whole tree is rooted at s_root, and that anonymous dentries are not the roots of trees which results in dentries being left unculled. However, with the way NFS superblock sharing are currently set to be implemented, these assumptions are violated: the root of the filesystem is simply a dummy dentry and inode (the real inode for '/' may well be inaccessible), and all the vfsmounts are rooted on anonymous[*] dentries with child trees. [*] Anonymous until discovered from another tree. (*) The documentation has been adjusted, including the additional bit of changing ext2_* into foo_* in the documentation. [akpm@osdl.org: convert ipath_fs, do other stuff] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Nathan Scott <nathans@sgi.com> Cc: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-23 03:02:57 -06:00
static int
eventpollfs_get_sb(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
[PATCH] VFS: Permit filesystem to override root dentry on mount Extend the get_sb() filesystem operation to take an extra argument that permits the VFS to pass in the target vfsmount that defines the mountpoint. The filesystem is then required to manually set the superblock and root dentry pointers. For most filesystems, this should be done with simple_set_mnt() which will set the superblock pointer and then set the root dentry to the superblock's s_root (as per the old default behaviour). The get_sb() op now returns an integer as there's now no need to return the superblock pointer. This patch permits a superblock to be implicitly shared amongst several mount points, such as can be done with NFS to avoid potential inode aliasing. In such a case, simple_set_mnt() would not be called, and instead the mnt_root and mnt_sb would be set directly. The patch also makes the following changes: (*) the get_sb_*() convenience functions in the core kernel now take a vfsmount pointer argument and return an integer, so most filesystems have to change very little. (*) If one of the convenience function is not used, then get_sb() should normally call simple_set_mnt() to instantiate the vfsmount. This will always return 0, and so can be tail-called from get_sb(). (*) generic_shutdown_super() now calls shrink_dcache_sb() to clean up the dcache upon superblock destruction rather than shrink_dcache_anon(). This is required because the superblock may now have multiple trees that aren't actually bound to s_root, but that still need to be cleaned up. The currently called functions assume that the whole tree is rooted at s_root, and that anonymous dentries are not the roots of trees which results in dentries being left unculled. However, with the way NFS superblock sharing are currently set to be implemented, these assumptions are violated: the root of the filesystem is simply a dummy dentry and inode (the real inode for '/' may well be inaccessible), and all the vfsmounts are rooted on anonymous[*] dentries with child trees. [*] Anonymous until discovered from another tree. (*) The documentation has been adjusted, including the additional bit of changing ext2_* into foo_* in the documentation. [akpm@osdl.org: convert ipath_fs, do other stuff] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Nathan Scott <nathans@sgi.com> Cc: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-23 03:02:57 -06:00
const char *dev_name, void *data, struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
[PATCH] VFS: Permit filesystem to override root dentry on mount Extend the get_sb() filesystem operation to take an extra argument that permits the VFS to pass in the target vfsmount that defines the mountpoint. The filesystem is then required to manually set the superblock and root dentry pointers. For most filesystems, this should be done with simple_set_mnt() which will set the superblock pointer and then set the root dentry to the superblock's s_root (as per the old default behaviour). The get_sb() op now returns an integer as there's now no need to return the superblock pointer. This patch permits a superblock to be implicitly shared amongst several mount points, such as can be done with NFS to avoid potential inode aliasing. In such a case, simple_set_mnt() would not be called, and instead the mnt_root and mnt_sb would be set directly. The patch also makes the following changes: (*) the get_sb_*() convenience functions in the core kernel now take a vfsmount pointer argument and return an integer, so most filesystems have to change very little. (*) If one of the convenience function is not used, then get_sb() should normally call simple_set_mnt() to instantiate the vfsmount. This will always return 0, and so can be tail-called from get_sb(). (*) generic_shutdown_super() now calls shrink_dcache_sb() to clean up the dcache upon superblock destruction rather than shrink_dcache_anon(). This is required because the superblock may now have multiple trees that aren't actually bound to s_root, but that still need to be cleaned up. The currently called functions assume that the whole tree is rooted at s_root, and that anonymous dentries are not the roots of trees which results in dentries being left unculled. However, with the way NFS superblock sharing are currently set to be implemented, these assumptions are violated: the root of the filesystem is simply a dummy dentry and inode (the real inode for '/' may well be inaccessible), and all the vfsmounts are rooted on anonymous[*] dentries with child trees. [*] Anonymous until discovered from another tree. (*) The documentation has been adjusted, including the additional bit of changing ext2_* into foo_* in the documentation. [akpm@osdl.org: convert ipath_fs, do other stuff] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Nathan Scott <nathans@sgi.com> Cc: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-23 03:02:57 -06:00
return get_sb_pseudo(fs_type, "eventpoll:", NULL, EVENTPOLLFS_MAGIC,
mnt);
}
static int __init eventpoll_init(void)
{
int error;
mutex_init(&epmutex);
/* Initialize the structure used to perform safe poll wait head wake ups */
ep_poll_safewake_init(&psw);
/* Allocates slab cache used to allocate "struct epitem" items */
epi_cache = kmem_cache_create("eventpoll_epi", sizeof(struct epitem),
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|EPI_SLAB_DEBUG|SLAB_PANIC,
NULL, NULL);
/* Allocates slab cache used to allocate "struct eppoll_entry" */
pwq_cache = kmem_cache_create("eventpoll_pwq",
sizeof(struct eppoll_entry), 0,
EPI_SLAB_DEBUG|SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
/*
* Register the virtual file system that will be the source of inodes
* for the eventpoll files
*/
error = register_filesystem(&eventpoll_fs_type);
if (error)
goto epanic;
/* Mount the above commented virtual file system */
eventpoll_mnt = kern_mount(&eventpoll_fs_type);
error = PTR_ERR(eventpoll_mnt);
if (IS_ERR(eventpoll_mnt))
goto epanic;
DNPRINTK(3, (KERN_INFO "[%p] eventpoll: successfully initialized.\n",
current));
return 0;
epanic:
panic("eventpoll_init() failed\n");
}
static void __exit eventpoll_exit(void)
{
/* Undo all operations done inside eventpoll_init() */
unregister_filesystem(&eventpoll_fs_type);
mntput(eventpoll_mnt);
kmem_cache_destroy(pwq_cache);
kmem_cache_destroy(epi_cache);
}
module_init(eventpoll_init);
module_exit(eventpoll_exit);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");