kernel-fxtec-pro1x/fs/coda/inode.c

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/*
* Super block/filesystem wide operations
*
* Copyright (C) 1996 Peter J. Braam <braam@maths.ox.ac.uk> and
* Michael Callahan <callahan@maths.ox.ac.uk>
*
* Rewritten for Linux 2.1. Peter Braam <braam@cs.cmu.edu>
* Copyright (C) Carnegie Mellon University
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/stat.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/unistd.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/vfs.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/coda.h>
#include <linux/coda_psdev.h>
#include "coda_linux.h"
#include "coda_cache.h"
#include "coda_int.h"
/* VFS super_block ops */
static void coda_evict_inode(struct inode *);
static void coda_put_super(struct super_block *);
static int coda_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf);
static struct kmem_cache * coda_inode_cachep;
static struct inode *coda_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct coda_inode_info *ei;
ei = kmem_cache_alloc(coda_inode_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ei)
return NULL;
memset(&ei->c_fid, 0, sizeof(struct CodaFid));
ei->c_flags = 0;
ei->c_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
ei->c_cached_perm = 0;
spin_lock_init(&ei->c_lock);
return &ei->vfs_inode;
}
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static void coda_i_callback(struct rcu_head *head)
{
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struct inode *inode = container_of(head, struct inode, i_rcu);
kmem_cache_free(coda_inode_cachep, ITOC(inode));
}
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static void coda_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
call_rcu(&inode->i_rcu, coda_i_callback);
}
static void init_once(void *foo)
{
struct coda_inode_info *ei = (struct coda_inode_info *) foo;
inode_init_once(&ei->vfs_inode);
}
int __init coda_init_inodecache(void)
{
coda_inode_cachep = kmem_cache_create("coda_inode_cache",
sizeof(struct coda_inode_info),
[PATCH] cpuset memory spread: slab cache filesystems Mark file system inode and similar slab caches subject to SLAB_MEM_SPREAD memory spreading. If a slab cache is marked SLAB_MEM_SPREAD, then anytime that a task that's in a cpuset with the 'memory_spread_slab' option enabled goes to allocate from such a slab cache, the allocations are spread evenly over all the memory nodes (task->mems_allowed) allowed to that task, instead of favoring allocation on the node local to the current cpu. The following inode and similar caches are marked SLAB_MEM_SPREAD: file cache ==== ===== fs/adfs/super.c adfs_inode_cache fs/affs/super.c affs_inode_cache fs/befs/linuxvfs.c befs_inode_cache fs/bfs/inode.c bfs_inode_cache fs/block_dev.c bdev_cache fs/cifs/cifsfs.c cifs_inode_cache fs/coda/inode.c coda_inode_cache fs/dquot.c dquot fs/efs/super.c efs_inode_cache fs/ext2/super.c ext2_inode_cache fs/ext2/xattr.c (fs/mbcache.c) ext2_xattr fs/ext3/super.c ext3_inode_cache fs/ext3/xattr.c (fs/mbcache.c) ext3_xattr fs/fat/cache.c fat_cache fs/fat/inode.c fat_inode_cache fs/freevxfs/vxfs_super.c vxfs_inode fs/hpfs/super.c hpfs_inode_cache fs/isofs/inode.c isofs_inode_cache fs/jffs/inode-v23.c jffs_fm fs/jffs2/super.c jffs2_i fs/jfs/super.c jfs_ip fs/minix/inode.c minix_inode_cache fs/ncpfs/inode.c ncp_inode_cache fs/nfs/direct.c nfs_direct_cache fs/nfs/inode.c nfs_inode_cache fs/ntfs/super.c ntfs_big_inode_cache_name fs/ntfs/super.c ntfs_inode_cache fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmfs.c dlmfs_inode_cache fs/ocfs2/super.c ocfs2_inode_cache fs/proc/inode.c proc_inode_cache fs/qnx4/inode.c qnx4_inode_cache fs/reiserfs/super.c reiser_inode_cache fs/romfs/inode.c romfs_inode_cache fs/smbfs/inode.c smb_inode_cache fs/sysv/inode.c sysv_inode_cache fs/udf/super.c udf_inode_cache fs/ufs/super.c ufs_inode_cache net/socket.c sock_inode_cache net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c rpc_inode_cache The choice of which slab caches to so mark was quite simple. I marked those already marked SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT, except for fs/xfs, dentry_cache, inode_cache, and buffer_head, which were marked in a previous patch. Even though SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT is for a different purpose, it marks the same potentially large file system i/o related slab caches as we need for memory spreading. Given that the rule now becomes "wherever you would have used a SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT slab cache flag before (usually the inode cache), use the SLAB_MEM_SPREAD flag too", this should be easy enough to maintain. Future file system writers will just copy one of the existing file system slab cache setups and tend to get it right without thinking. Signed-off-by: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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0, SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|SLAB_MEM_SPREAD,
init_once);
if (coda_inode_cachep == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
void coda_destroy_inodecache(void)
{
/*
* Make sure all delayed rcu free inodes are flushed before we
* destroy cache.
*/
rcu_barrier();
kmem_cache_destroy(coda_inode_cachep);
}
static int coda_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
{
fs: push sync_filesystem() down to the file system's remount_fs() Previously, the no-op "mount -o mount /dev/xxx" operation when the file system is already mounted read-write causes an implied, unconditional syncfs(). This seems pretty stupid, and it's certainly documented or guaraunteed to do this, nor is it particularly useful, except in the case where the file system was mounted rw and is getting remounted read-only. However, it's possible that there might be some file systems that are actually depending on this behavior. In most file systems, it's probably fine to only call sync_filesystem() when transitioning from read-write to read-only, and there are some file systems where this is not needed at all (for example, for a pseudo-filesystem or something like romfs). Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Evgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp> Cc: Anders Larsen <al@alarsen.net> Cc: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mikulas@artax.karlin.mff.cuni.cz> Cc: Petr Vandrovec <petr@vandrovec.name> Cc: xfs@oss.sgi.com Cc: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org Cc: samba-technical@lists.samba.org Cc: codalist@coda.cs.cmu.edu Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: cluster-devel@redhat.com Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org Cc: jfs-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-nilfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ntfs-dev@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: ocfs2-devel@oss.oracle.com Cc: reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org
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sync_filesystem(sb);
*flags |= MS_NOATIME;
return 0;
}
/* exported operations */
static const struct super_operations coda_super_operations =
{
.alloc_inode = coda_alloc_inode,
.destroy_inode = coda_destroy_inode,
.evict_inode = coda_evict_inode,
.put_super = coda_put_super,
.statfs = coda_statfs,
.remount_fs = coda_remount,
};
static int get_device_index(struct coda_mount_data *data)
{
struct fd f;
struct inode *inode;
int idx;
if (data == NULL) {
pr_warn("%s: Bad mount data\n", __func__);
return -1;
}
if (data->version != CODA_MOUNT_VERSION) {
pr_warn("%s: Bad mount version\n", __func__);
return -1;
}
f = fdget(data->fd);
if (!f.file)
goto Ebadf;
inode = file_inode(f.file);
if (!S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || imajor(inode) != CODA_PSDEV_MAJOR) {
fdput(f);
goto Ebadf;
}
idx = iminor(inode);
fdput(f);
if (idx < 0 || idx >= MAX_CODADEVS) {
pr_warn("%s: Bad minor number\n", __func__);
return -1;
}
return idx;
Ebadf:
pr_warn("%s: Bad file\n", __func__);
return -1;
}
static int coda_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
struct inode *root = NULL;
struct venus_comm *vc;
struct CodaFid fid;
int error;
int idx;
if (task_active_pid_ns(current) != &init_pid_ns)
return -EINVAL;
idx = get_device_index((struct coda_mount_data *) data);
/* Ignore errors in data, for backward compatibility */
if(idx == -1)
idx = 0;
pr_info("%s: device index: %i\n", __func__, idx);
vc = &coda_comms[idx];
mutex_lock(&vc->vc_mutex);
if (!vc->vc_inuse) {
pr_warn("%s: No pseudo device\n", __func__);
error = -EINVAL;
goto unlock_out;
}
if (vc->vc_sb) {
pr_warn("%s: Device already mounted\n", __func__);
error = -EBUSY;
goto unlock_out;
}
error = bdi_setup_and_register(&vc->bdi, "coda", BDI_CAP_MAP_COPY);
if (error)
goto unlock_out;
vc->vc_sb = sb;
mutex_unlock(&vc->vc_mutex);
sb->s_fs_info = vc;
sb->s_flags |= MS_NOATIME;
sb->s_blocksize = 4096; /* XXXXX what do we put here?? */
sb->s_blocksize_bits = 12;
sb->s_magic = CODA_SUPER_MAGIC;
sb->s_op = &coda_super_operations;
sb->s_d_op = &coda_dentry_operations;
sb->s_bdi = &vc->bdi;
/* get root fid from Venus: this needs the root inode */
error = venus_rootfid(sb, &fid);
if ( error ) {
pr_warn("%s: coda_get_rootfid failed with %d\n",
__func__, error);
goto error;
}
pr_info("%s: rootfid is %s\n", __func__, coda_f2s(&fid));
/* make root inode */
root = coda_cnode_make(&fid, sb);
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
error = PTR_ERR(root);
pr_warn("Failure of coda_cnode_make for root: error %d\n",
error);
goto error;
}
pr_info("%s: rootinode is %ld dev %s\n",
__func__, root->i_ino, root->i_sb->s_id);
sb->s_root = d_make_root(root);
if (!sb->s_root) {
error = -EINVAL;
goto error;
}
return 0;
error:
mutex_lock(&vc->vc_mutex);
bdi_destroy(&vc->bdi);
vc->vc_sb = NULL;
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
unlock_out:
mutex_unlock(&vc->vc_mutex);
return error;
}
static void coda_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct venus_comm *vcp = coda_vcp(sb);
mutex_lock(&vcp->vc_mutex);
bdi_destroy(&vcp->bdi);
vcp->vc_sb = NULL;
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&vcp->vc_mutex);
pr_info("Bye bye.\n");
}
static void coda_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
mm + fs: store shadow entries in page cache Reclaim will be leaving shadow entries in the page cache radix tree upon evicting the real page. As those pages are found from the LRU, an iput() can lead to the inode being freed concurrently. At this point, reclaim must no longer install shadow pages because the inode freeing code needs to ensure the page tree is really empty. Add an address_space flag, AS_EXITING, that the inode freeing code sets under the tree lock before doing the final truncate. Reclaim will check for this flag before installing shadow pages. Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Luigi Semenzato <semenzato@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Metin Doslu <metin@citusdata.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Ozgun Erdogan <ozgun@citusdata.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Ryan Mallon <rmallon@gmail.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
clear_inode(inode);
coda_cache_clear_inode(inode);
}
int coda_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
{
int err = coda_revalidate_inode(dentry->d_inode);
if (!err)
generic_fillattr(dentry->d_inode, stat);
return err;
}
int coda_setattr(struct dentry *de, struct iattr *iattr)
{
struct inode *inode = de->d_inode;
struct coda_vattr vattr;
int error;
memset(&vattr, 0, sizeof(vattr));
inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
coda_iattr_to_vattr(iattr, &vattr);
vattr.va_type = C_VNON; /* cannot set type */
/* Venus is responsible for truncating the container-file!!! */
error = venus_setattr(inode->i_sb, coda_i2f(inode), &vattr);
if (!error) {
coda_vattr_to_iattr(inode, &vattr);
coda_cache_clear_inode(inode);
}
return error;
}
const struct inode_operations coda_file_inode_operations = {
.permission = coda_permission,
.getattr = coda_getattr,
.setattr = coda_setattr,
};
static int coda_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf)
{
int error;
error = venus_statfs(dentry, buf);
if (error) {
/* fake something like AFS does */
buf->f_blocks = 9000000;
buf->f_bfree = 9000000;
buf->f_bavail = 9000000;
buf->f_files = 9000000;
buf->f_ffree = 9000000;
}
/* and fill in the rest */
buf->f_type = CODA_SUPER_MAGIC;
buf->f_bsize = 4096;
buf->f_namelen = CODA_MAXNAMLEN;
return 0;
}
/* init_coda: used by filesystems.c to register coda */
static struct dentry *coda_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
{
return mount_nodev(fs_type, flags, data, coda_fill_super);
}
struct file_system_type coda_fs_type = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.name = "coda",
.mount = coda_mount,
.kill_sb = kill_anon_super,
.fs_flags = FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA,
};
fs: Limit sys_mount to only request filesystem modules. Modify the request_module to prefix the file system type with "fs-" and add aliases to all of the filesystems that can be built as modules to match. A common practice is to build all of the kernel code and leave code that is not commonly needed as modules, with the result that many users are exposed to any bug anywhere in the kernel. Looking for filesystems with a fs- prefix limits the pool of possible modules that can be loaded by mount to just filesystems trivially making things safer with no real cost. Using aliases means user space can control the policy of which filesystem modules are auto-loaded by editing /etc/modprobe.d/*.conf with blacklist and alias directives. Allowing simple, safe, well understood work-arounds to known problematic software. This also addresses a rare but unfortunate problem where the filesystem name is not the same as it's module name and module auto-loading would not work. While writing this patch I saw a handful of such cases. The most significant being autofs that lives in the module autofs4. This is relevant to user namespaces because we can reach the request module in get_fs_type() without having any special permissions, and people get uncomfortable when a user specified string (in this case the filesystem type) goes all of the way to request_module. After having looked at this issue I don't think there is any particular reason to perform any filtering or permission checks beyond making it clear in the module request that we want a filesystem module. The common pattern in the kernel is to call request_module() without regards to the users permissions. In general all a filesystem module does once loaded is call register_filesystem() and go to sleep. Which means there is not much attack surface exposed by loading a filesytem module unless the filesystem is mounted. In a user namespace filesystems are not mounted unless .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT, which most filesystems do not set today. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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MODULE_ALIAS_FS("coda");